Devlin v. WSi Corp.
| Decision Date | 28 September 1993 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 91-13011-Y. |
| Citation | 833 F. Supp. 69 |
| Parties | David L. DEVLIN, Plaintiff, v. WSI CORPORATION, The Analytic Science Corporation, Janis Farnham, Barry Tudor and James Bardis, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
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James E. Grumbach, Serino, Vernaglia, Ley & Young, Boston, MA, for plaintiff.
Kenneth M. Bello, Karen K. Burns, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., Boston, MA, for defendants.
Discrimination based on age burdens commerce, and arbitrary age limits on employment, regardless of ability to perform work, unjustly hinder older individuals who desire to work. "In the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers often find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs."1 Consequently, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) — codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 — to protect workers between the ages of forty and seventy from losing their jobs due to the intolerable practices and misconceptions of some employers.
When David Devlin ("Devlin"), age 50, was terminated from his job, he found himself in a situation that he believes the ADEA explicitly prohibits. Specifically, Devlin alleges that his termination by WSI Corporation ("WSI"), coming just months after the installment of new managers, was based on his age. Devlin further contends that his termination, if not due solely to his age, was made in bad faith to prevent Devlin from receiving already earned benefits or in retaliation for his filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Devlin also claims that The Analytic Science Corporation ("Analytic") and the individual defendants intentionally interfered with his employment contract with WSI. Accordingly, Devlin's three count Complaint alleges violation of the ADEA (Count I), wrongful discharge (Count II), and intentional interference with advantageous contractual relations (Count III).2
Convinced that age was the primary motivator in WSI's decision to terminate him, Devlin filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in May 1991. On November 20, 1991, Devlin, a resident of Georgia, filed the instant action. In response to the Complaint, the Corporate defendants and the individual defendants Barry Tudor ("Tudor"), James Bardis ("Bardis"), and Janis Farnham ("Farnham") moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On April 21, 1992, after oral argument, this Court dismissed the ADEA claims (Count I) against Tudor, Bardis, and Farnham and deferred ruling on Devlin's allegations of age discrimination against WSI and Analytic. The parties agreed to convert the motion to dismiss Count One to a motion for summary judgment. Further briefing was ordered on the issue of whether Ron Irving ("Irving"), Devlin's immediate successor, was Devlin's permanent replacement. Since there is complete diversity between the parties, the Court also ordered further briefing on the motion to dismiss the state law claims. The matter was then taken under advisement.3
Analytic, a corporation with its principal place of business in Reading, Massachusetts, is the parent corporation of WSI. In 1982, at the age 43, Devlin commenced work for WSI as a salesperson. By 1988, Devlin's sales territory covered what was known within WSI as the Southeast Region. It included eleven states and Puerto Rico. In December 1988, Farnham became Devlin's sales manager. At that time Bardis, the Director of Commercial Systems Groups at Analytic, was responsible for overseeing the sales division of WSI. Farnham reported directly to Bardis, who in turn reported to Tudor, the president of Analytic. Farnham, Bardis, and Tudor were all employees of Analytic.
During a sales convention in September 1989, Farnham referred to Devlin and another employee who was also over forty as the "old men's club." Also in the fall of 1989, WSI implemented a retroactive sales policy that pre-empted some already earned sales commissions. Devlin opposed the new plan and voiced his concerns to Farnham. Under an alleged threat of termination, Devlin reluctantly accepted the new policy.
In October 1989, Devlin's doctor, believing Devlin to be suffering from high blood pressure and work-related stress, advised him to take two weeks off from work. Devlin returned to work on November 13, 1989 and filed a claim for workers' compensation on November 17, 1989. WSI contested the workers' compensation claim and on November 21, 1989, WSI terminated Devlin's employment. Devlin was 50 years old.
Late in 1989, Analytic purchased Electronic Satellite Data Systems ("Electronic"), a company which produced, marketed and sold satellite imagery and weather display and processing equipment. Analytic eventually closed Electronic and transferred some of its employees to WSI. Bardis, responsible for filling the vacancy created by Devlin's termination, looked to Electronic for a transfer employee. Irving, the Electronic sales representative for all of the United States and Canada, expressed an interest in the WSI southeast sales position. Bardis was familiar with Irving. The two had met at trade shows and Irving had previously interviewed with Bardis for Farnham's job.
In January 1990, Irving discussed the sales position with Farnham and began shouldering some of the job's responsibilities. Irving was never formally interviewed or offered the position. Nevertheless, by March 1990, Irving, Farnham, and Bardis had "come to an understanding" that Irving would be WSI's new southeast sales representative. The parties executed a sales compensation agreement and, with Tudor's approval, Irving officially became WSI's southeast sales agent. At that time, Irving was 42 years old.
After Devlin left, but before Irving assumed the sales post, WSI reorganized its sales territories and created a new territory which incorporated some of Devlin's former sales areas. The remaining states stayed within the southeast territory. Although under the impression that WSI policy required sales agents to live in the territory they serviced, Irving worked out of his home in Maryland, a state not within his territory. Disturbed that his home was not suitable to accommodate both his work and his young family and troubled by his perception that WSI policy mandated that he live in his sales territory, Irving requested WSI to move him to Georgia. Tudor adamantly refused this request.
In August 1990, during a lengthy discussion with Tudor, Irving aired his dissatisfaction with his living and working arrangements. To alleviate the problem, Irving requested WSI to move him to Georgia. Irving thought this a reasonable request, in view of the fact that WSI and Analytic had recently moved their other employees to Massachusetts, WSI's new headquarters. Tudor, however, was unyielding and suggested that if Irving was unhappy at WSI then he should resign. On that same day, prompted by Tudor's suggestion, Irving resigned. At the time of his resignation, Irving had been the southeast sales representative for only six months. Irving's successor at WSI was in his mid-twenties and lived in Georgia.
Summary judgment shall be granted only when the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating its legal entitlement to summary judgment. Lopez v. Corporacion Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1516 (1st Cir.1991). This Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992); Continental Grain Co. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, 972 F.2d 426 (1st Cir.1992). Nonetheless, the non-movant cannot rest content with unsupported allegations; rather, it must set forth specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, in order to establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). It is against this backdrop that the Court examines the motion for summary judgment.
Title 29, U.S.C section 623 states in part:
A suit brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.5 This requirement is true for all ADEA plaintiffs unless there is direct evidence of age discrimination. The elements of a prima face case arise from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), in which the Supreme Court enunciated a standard test for all discrimination cases. The McDonnell Douglas test has a shifting burden and, as adapted to an age discrimination case, requires:
(1) that the plaintiff be over 40 years of age;
(2) that the plaintiff be demoted or discharged;
(3) that a younger person or person under 40 years of age replace the plaintiff;
(4) that the plaintiff be qualified to do the job.
Menard v. First Sec. Services Corp., 848 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.1988); Dea v. Look, 810 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.1987) citing Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.1979); Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1172 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___...
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