Dewalt v. Hooks

Decision Date04 November 2022
Docket Number165A21
PartiesROCKY DEWALT, ROBERT PARHAM, ANTHONY MCGEE, and SHAWN BONNETT, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons v. ERIK A. HOOKS, in his official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety, and the NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Heard in the Supreme Court on 30 August 2022.

Appeal pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 7A-27(a)(4) from an order denying plaintiffs' motion for class certification entered on 22 February 2021 by Judge James E. Hardin Jr. in Superior Court, Wake County.

ACLU of North Carolina Legal Foundation by Daniel K. Siegel and Kristi Graunke, for plaintiff-appellants.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Orlando L. Rodriguez, Special Deputy Attorney General, Mary Carla Babb, Special Deputy Attorney General, and James B. Trachtman, Special Deputy Attorney General, for defendant-appellees.

Aviance Brown, Irving Joyner, Daryl Atkinson, Whitley Carpenter, and Ashley Mitchell, for North Carolina Conference of the NAACP, amicus curiae.

Lockamy Law Firm, by Scott Holmes; and Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, by Daniel Greenfield, Bradford Zukerman, and Kathrina Szymborski, for Professors Sharon Dolovich, Alexander A Reinert, Margo Schlanger, and John F. Stinneford, amici curiae.

Nichad Davis and Benjamin I. Friedman, Professors and Practitioners of Psychiatry, Psychology, and Medicine, for amici curiae.

NEWBY CHIEF JUSTICE

¶ 1 In this case we consider whether the trial court erred by denying plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Plaintiffs are inmates in North Carolina Department of Public Safety (DPS) custody. Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against defendants seeking to represent certain individuals in DPS custody who are being or will be subjected to solitary confinement. Plaintiffs do not challenge the use of solitary confinement in every housing setting or allege that solitary confinement is per se unconstitutional. Rather plaintiffs allege that defendants' policies and practices concerning specific restrictive housing assignments violate the state constitution. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The trial court concluded plaintiffs failed to establish a common predominating issue, plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the named representatives would fairly and adequately represent the class, and that litigating as a class was not the superior method of adjudication. Plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's order.

¶ 2 On 16 October 2019, plaintiffs[1] filed a class action lawsuit seeking to certify a class of current and future inmates assigned to one of five restrictive housing classifications. Plaintiffs alleged the conditions of confinement across the five restrictive housing assignments presented the same substantial risk of harm to all individuals and constituted cruel or unusual punishment.

¶ 3 The five challenged restrictive housing settings are: Restrictive Housing for Disciplinary Purposes (RHDP), Restrictive Housing for Control Purposes (RHCP), High Security Maximum Control (HCON), Restrictive Housing for Administrative Purposes (RHAP), and the first two phases of the Rehabilitative Diversion Unit (RDU).

¶ 4 RHDP is a short-term placement and "presumptive sanction" for disciplinary infractions, such as disobeying an order, possessing a cell phone, refusing a drug test, or using disrespectful or defamatory language. Individuals assigned to RHDP may have personal property in their cells, are allowed limited telephone privileges, receive visitation rights, and have access to cell study materials, such as educational programs and college coursework. Prison staff may impose up to twenty or thirty days of confinement in RHDP. Between October 2018 and October 2019, the average length of a placement in RHDP was eleven days.

¶ 5 RHCP "is a long-term restrictive housing assignment for the removal of [an incarcerated person] from the general offender population to confinement in a secure area." RHCP is reserved for offenders who have displayed "disruptive behavior, assaultive actions, threats to the safety of staff or other offenders, or threats to the security and operational integrity of the facility." People in RHCP receive one hour of recreation time five days a week and have access to a shower three times a week. They eat all meals in their cell, may not attend religious, educational, or vocational programs outside of their cell, and have no guaranteed telephone or canteen access. People in RHCP are entitled to two noncontact visits every thirty days, but visitation privileges are suspended for at least twelve months if an individual is found guilty of assault on a staff member resulting in physical injury. RHCP classifications are reviewed every six months. If placement in RHCP is due to assault on a staff member resulting in physical injury, however, assignments are reviewed at twelve months. Between October 2018 and October 2019, the average length of stay in RHCP was 131 days.

¶ 6 HCON is the most restrictive housing assignment and is for "offenders who pose the most serious threat to the safety of staff and other offenders or who . . . require more security than can be afforded in [other housing settings]." Review of an HCON classification occurs every six months, or it occurs every twelve months if placement is due to assault on a staff member resulting in physical injury. People who are removed from HCON are automatically placed in RHCP, RDU, or the Therapeutic Diversion Unit. Between October 2018 and October 2019, the average length of stay in HCON was 154 days.

¶ 7 RHAP is a temporary placement for administrative, rather than disciplinary, purposes. Individuals may be placed in RHAP to protect staff members and other offenders from threats of harm, to minimize the risk of escape, to preserve order, to provide control while completing an investigation, or to serve as a "cooling off measure[,]" as referred to in the policy. While assigned to RHAP, individuals have access to medical and mental health services, receive daily visits from a health care staff member, may have personal property in their cells, and are allowed telephone privileges. In addition, individuals in RHAP may receive an unlimited number of one-hour, noncontact visits. Between October 2018 and October 2019, the average length of stay in RHAP was eight days.

¶ 8 RDU is a placement program "designed as a safe alternative to segregation, providing positive reinforcements to increase desired behaviors, and decrease unwanted behaviors through . . . appropriate consequences . . . [and] positive reinforcement." Individuals in RDU housing are allowed certain authorized personal property in their units, such as pencils, pens, books, a radio, a deck of cards, and hygiene items. From October 2018 to October 2019, the average length of stay in RDU was between twelve and fourteen months.

¶ 9 Defendants filed their answer on 21 January 2020. On 4 February 2020, the matter was designated as exceptional pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts and assigned to Judge James E. Hardin Jr. Plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification on 24 April 2020 pursuant to Rule 23(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See N.C. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 23(a) (2021). Plaintiffs thereafter took discovery and submitted evidence in support of their motion. Defendants filed their response in opposition with supporting evidence on 12 August 2020. The trial court held a Webex hearing on 1 December 2020 and heard oral argument from both parties.

¶ 10 On 22 February 2021, the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification and found that a certifiable class did not exist for three independent reasons: (1) plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a common predominating issue among the group of potential class members, (2) plaintiffs did not establish that the named representatives would fairly and adequately represent the interests of all class members, and (3) litigating this case as a class action was not the superior method of adjudication. Plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court under N.C. G.S. § 7A-27(a)(4).

¶ 11 This Court reviews a trial court's class certification order for abuse of discretion. Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 369 N.C. 202, 209, 794 S.E.2d 699, 706 (2016). "[T]he test for abuse of discretion is whether a decision 'is manifestly unsupported by reason[ ]' or 'so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision ....'" Frost v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 353 N.C. 188, 199, 540 S.E.2d 324, 331 (2000) (quoting Little v. Penn Ventilator Co., 317 N.C. 206, 218, 345 S.E.2d 204, 212 (1986)). "Within this general standard, when addressing a class certification order, this Court has recognized that conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and findings of fact are considered binding if supported by competent evidence." McMillan v. Blue Ridge Cos., 379 N.C. 488, 2021-NCSC-160, ¶ 7 (citing Fisher, 369 N.C. at 209, 794 S.E.2d at 706).

¶ 12 Rule 23 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes class action lawsuits. Rule 23 provides that "[i]f persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued." N.C. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 23(a).[2] "The party seeking to bring a class action under Rule 23(a) has the burden of showing that the...

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