Dewick v. Maytag Corp.
| Decision Date | 16 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 03 C 1548.,03 C 1548. |
| Citation | 296 F.Supp.2d 905 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | Michael A. DEWICK, Sr., et al., etc., Plaintiffs, v. MAYTAG CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
Donald J. Morrison, Joseph Thomas Morrison, Morrison & Morrison, Waukegan, IL, for Plaintiff.
David M. Holmes, Elisha S. Rosenblum, James Richard Dougherty, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Michael and Holly Dewick (collectively "Dewicks") have brought suit against Maytag Corporation ("Maytag") on behalf of their son Michael Dewick, Jr. ("Michael Jr."), who was seriously injured when—at the age of ten months—he crawled inside the broiler section of a kitchen range manufactured by Maytag.1 Dewicks have now filed a motion to amend their Complaint's prayer for relief by adding the possibility of imposing punitive damages based on Maytag's conduct, and the parties have completed the briefing on that motion.2 For the reasons explained here, their motion is granted under the standards established by Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rule") 15(a).3
Dewicks allege that their Maytag range was "defective, unreasonably dangerous, and not reasonably safe for its intended and forseeable uses" (Compl.¶ 10). Essentially Dewicks assert that there were inadequate warnings alerting consumers, or other safety devices protecting children against the situation, that (1) the broiler door on the range could be opened with a minimal amount of force and (2) because one burner unit heats both the broiler and the oven, the broiler portion of the range becomes hot (sometimes even hotter than the oven) even when only the oven is in use—the situation when Michael Jr. sustained his injuries (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 13; D. Motion, Background ¶¶ 4,7,8).4 Furthermore, Dewicks contend that Maytag was aware of the problems with the broiler well before Michael Jr.'s injury because of earlier and substantially similar incidents involving the same range model, but that Maytag did not properly investigate those incidents (D. Motion, Background ¶¶ 10-13 19, 21, 27-29). Finally, Dewicks assert that Maytag decided to redesign the range so that more force would be required to open the broiler door, but it did not implement that change until after the range that injured Michael Jr. had been manufactured and sold to Dewicks (D. Motion, Background ¶¶ 23-26, 30).
Rule 15(a) specifies that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." That rule of lenity has been read as giving district courts discretion to deny such leave for a limited variety of reasons, including a recognition that allowing an amendment would be futile (Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)). In making the latter determination courts consider whether the complaint as amended would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted according to the generous test established by Rule 12(b)(6) (Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1085 (7th Cir.1997)), under which denial of the amendment is called for "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations" (Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)). And for that purpose the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in Dewicks' favor (Sherwin Manor Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McAuliffe, 37 F.3d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Under long established Illinois law, which the parties and this Court all agree controls under Erie v. Tompkins principles, punitive damages may be awarded where a defendant has committed a tort under circumstances showing "fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or when the defendant acts willfully, or with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others" (Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 186, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1978)). To that end a plaintiff must show that defendant has exhibited willful and wanton conduct indicating a high degree of moral blame, such as that akin to an intentional tort or crime (Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 138 Ill.2d 404, 415-16, 150 Ill.Dec. 510, 563 N.E.2d 397, 402 (1990); Manuel v. Red Hill Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 10 Bd. of Educ., 324 Ill.App.3d 279, 288, 257 Ill.Dec. 790, 754 N.E.2d 448, 457 (5th Dist.2001)).
Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App.2d 109, 135-37, 253 N.E.2d 636, 648-49 (1st Dist.1969), aff'd, 46 Ill.2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970) speaks of factors relevant in determining whether the conduct of a products liability defendant is willful and wanton. Those factors boil down to (1) defendant's knowledge of a defect in its product and its corresponding knowledge that the defect is likely to cause injury and (2) its failure to take affirmative action to avoid the potential for injury arising from the defect—for example, including a warning with the product or remedying the defect (Moore, 116 Ill.App.2d at 136-37, 253 N.E.2d at 649; Kopczick v. Hobart Corp., 308 Ill.App.3d 967, 974, 242 Ill.Dec. 490, 721 N.E.2d 769, 776 (3d Dist.1999); Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 Ill. App.3d 1102, 1112-13, 56 Ill.Dec. 413, 427 N.E.2d 608, 616 (4th Dist.1981)).
As for the first of those considerations, Illinois courts recognize the existence of prior substantially similar occurrences as substantively relevant to show that a defendant had knowledge of an alleged defect and of the likelihood of injury from that defect (Moore v. Remington Arms, 100 Ill.App.3d at 1110-11, 56 Ill.Dec. 413, 427 N.E.2d at 614-15; Barton v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 325 Ill.App.3d 1005, 1031, 258 Ill.Dec. 844, 757 N.E.2d 533, 555 (1st Dist.2001)). Here Maytag had been alerted in March 2000 that one-year-old Damon Drozd was severely burned when he opened the broiler door on his family's Maytag range while his mother was using the oven portion of the range (D. Motion, Background ¶¶ 10-13). Then Maytag became aware of another incident in May 2001 in which one-year-old Christian Garland was also severely burned when he opened the broiler door on the Maytag range in his home while his foster mother was using the oven portion of the range (D. Motion, Background ¶¶ 27-28).5
Maytag asserts that even if it had knowledge of the characteristics of its range from prior substantially similar occurrences, that does not equate to its knowledge of a defect or likelihood of injury from the defect (M.Mem.9, 14). But because what Maytag terms as "characteristics" played a vital role in causing the Drozd and Garland injuries, that is really a distinction without a difference in the futility analysis (again this Court neither makes nor implies a decision either way as to whether Maytag's range was defective or likely to cause injury—once more those are matters for future determination, not for resolution at the pleading stage).
Maytag's stronger argument is that the Drozd and Garland claims did not put it on sufficient notice to establish willful and wanton conduct. Maytag leans heavily on the Loitz teaching that the mere existence of prior substantially similar occurrences does not mandate a finding of willful and wanton conduct without an examination of such factors as the total number of products sold, the total amount of usage and the product's inherent dangerousness (Loitz, 138 Ill.2d at 419-20, 150 Ill.Dec. 510, 563 N.E.2d at 404). Those factors bear on whether a manufacturer's failure to take some affirmative action to abate the problem amounts to willful and wanton conduct.
But on that score it is clear that such an analysis is primarily a fact-based inquiry that does not easily lend itself to resolution at the pleading stage. Thus Maytag's rattling off of cases where greater numbers of prior substantially similar occurrences did not trigger the imposition of punitive damages completely ignores a central principle of Loitz: that the decision to allow (or disallow) punitive damages is a more nuanced process than merely engaging in a rote comparison of numbers.6
Moreover, the underpinning of the Loitz factors itself negates any notion of threshold futility. As Barton, 325 Ill.App.3d at 1032, 258 Ill.Dec. 844, 757 N.E.2d at 555 points out:
Loitz and its progeny involve inherently dangerous products or situations. As the supreme court noted, "guns are inherently dangerous instrumentalities, and the mere occurrence of other explosions does not, without more, establish outrageous misconduct or some other basis sufficient to warrant the imposition of punitive damages."
In contrast, the bulk of courts (but not all) that have considered the issue have determined that stoves and ovens are not inherently dangerous (see, e.g., Walker v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc., 241 Ark. 525, 242 Ark. 97, 412 S.W.2d 621, 625 (1967) and cases cited there; cf. Enis v. Ba-Call Bldg. Corp., 639 F.2d 359, 364 (7th Cir.1980) ()).7 Illinois courts that have applied Loitz have found the distinction between inherently dangerous and non-inherently dangerous products to be critical for an obvious reason: Because the use of that first category of products can by definition be expected to lead to accidents even if the products themselves are not defective, it takes a good many more adverse occurrences before the manufacturer is considered to be on notice of a problem with the product itself, such that the manufacturer's failure to take affirmative steps to cure the problem may be viewed as willful and wanton conduct (see Barton, 325 Ill.App.3d at 1032, 258 Ill.Dec. 844, 757 N.E.2d at 555; Kopczick, 308 Ill.App.3d at 975, 242 Ill. Dec. 490, 721 N.E.2d at 776).8
Ultimately, at the very least Dewicks have a colorable...
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