Dewitt v. Lechuga

• Decision Date: 26 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. WD 75266.,WD 75266.
• Citation: 393 S.W.3d 113
• Parties: Joshua DeWITT, Appellant, v. Esmeralda LECHUGA, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

393 S.W.3d 113

Joshua DeWITT, Appellant,

v.Esmeralda LECHUGA, Respondent.

No. WD 75266.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Western District.

Feb. 26, 2013.

Lauri J. Laughland, Grandview, MO, for Appellant.

Esmeralda Lechuga, Costa Mesa, CA, Respondent, pro se.

Before Division I: MARK D. PFEIFFER, Presiding Judge, and VICTOR C. HOWARD and ALOK AHUJA, Judges.

MARK D. PFEIFFER, Presiding Judge.

Joshua DeWitt (“Father”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri (“trial court”), which dismissed without prejudice ¹ Father's Petitionfor Declaration of Paternity, Order of Custody, Visitation, and Support (“Petition”) for lack of personal jurisdiction over the minor child (“Child”). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with our ruling today.

Factual and Procedural History

Father filed his Petition ² on June 28, 2011. Father alleged in his Petition that he and Child's mother, Esmeralda Lechuga (“Mother”), resided in Jackson County, Missouri, at the time Father filed his Petition. Father also alleged that he and Mother had engaged in sexual intercourse in Jackson County, Missouri, and as a result of such sexual intercourse, Mother gave birth to Child on September 30, 2010, in the State of California. At the time the Petition was filed, Father did not know the address of Child, but did not dispute that Child was born in California and has resided in California since birth. Pursuant to DNA testing sought and obtained by the California Department of Child Support Services, it was determined that Father is the biological father of Child. Father requested in his Petition, among other things, that the trial court: declare the paternity of Child; grant Father legal and physical custody of Child, with reasonable supervised visitation to Mother; and award child support.

Mother answered, in pertinent part, that Child was born in and had always resided in California and had never resided in Missouri. To her responsive pleading, Mother attached documents dated November 5, 2010, from the California Department of Child Support Services reflecting Mother's efforts in the State of California to establish Father's paternity of Child and Father's corresponding child support obligations, which led to Mother's administrative enforcement proceedings in Missouri.³

On October 11, 2011, the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem and next friend to represent the interests of Child.

The trial court scheduled multiple hearings for the parties to present briefing and argument regarding jurisdictional issues.

Thereafter, on March 2, 2012, the trial court entered its judgment, finding that it did not have jurisdiction over Child and dismissing the matter without prejudice. Father filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court.

Father appeals.

Standard of Review

Matters of jurisdiction are reviewed de novo. K.M.J. ex rel. I.G.M. v. M.A.J., 363 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Mo.App. E.D.2012).

Analysis

In his sole point, Father asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for lack of jurisdiction because under Missouri's Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), §§ 210.817 to 210.852,⁴ and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”), §§ 454.1500 to 454.1728, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the parties. In its judgment, the trial court stated that it did “not have jurisdiction over the minor child in this matter” and, therefore, dismissed Father's action without prejudice. Mother contends that the trial court did not err in dismissing Father's petition for lack of jurisdiction because under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), §§ 452.700 to 452.930,⁵ California is Child's home state and has jurisdiction over Child, and Missouri courts do not have subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the parties.

Missouri courts recognize two types of jurisdiction—personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction—and both are based on constitutional provisions. [Webb] ex rel. [J.C.W.] v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Mo. banc 2009). Article V of the Missouri Constitution governs subject matter jurisdiction, and grants circuit courts “original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and criminal.” Mo. Const. art. V, § 14. This is a civil case; therefore, the trial court had constitutionally vested subject matter jurisdiction over the matters of paternity, child support, and child custody. Hightower v. Myers, 304 S.W.3d 727, 733 (Mo. banc 2010). However, the circuit court's constitutionally granted subject matter jurisdictiondiffers from the circuit court's statutory authority to grant relief in a particular case. Ketteman v. Ketteman, 347 S.W.3d 647, 654 (Mo.App. W.D.2011). The jurisdictional provisions of the UPA, the UIFSA, and the UCCJEA do not remove subject matter jurisdiction from the circuit court over the matters of paternity, child support, and child custody; instead, those provisions “provide guidance to a trial court regarding the exercise of its authority to assert its jurisdiction over a [matter] because of the statutory limitations.” Al–Hawarey v. Al–Hawarey, 388 S.W.3d 237, 243 (Mo.App. E.D.2012).

Multiple uniform laws with different jurisdictional predicates address paternity and interstate issues of child support and custody. The UPA addresses parentage; the UIFSA addresses parentage and child support; the UCCJEA addresses custody and visitation. Therefore, we must examine the interplay among the UPA, the UIFSA, and the UCCJEA.

The fundamental goal of the UPA is to establish “ ‘uniformity among paternity determinations across the state,’ ” Fry v. Fry (In re Marriage of Fry), 108 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo.App. S.D.2003) (quoting Piel v. Piel, 918 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Mo.App. E.D.1996)), though it is not the exclusive method for determining parentage in Missouri. White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo.App. W.D.2009). Section 210.829.1 states that an action brought under the UPA “may be joined” with an action for “dissolution of marriage, annulment, separate maintenance, support, custody or visitation.” Section 210.841.3 provides that a judgment in a UPA proceeding “may contain any other provision directed against the appropriate party to the proceeding” concerning support, custody, visitation, the furnishing of a bond, or “[a]ny matter in the best interest of the child.” However, this provision does not independently authorize the grant of relief beyond a determination of paternity; it simply specifies what may be included in a judgment when the UPA action is joined with other actions. State ex rel. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Hudson, 158 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Mo.App. W.D.2005).

Father argues that Mother is subject to personal jurisdiction under section 210.829.2 of the UPA by engaging in sexual intercourse in Missouri. Section 210.829.2 of the UPA provides that: “A person who has sexual intercourse in this state thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state to an action brought under sections 210.817 to 210.852 with respect to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse.” This subsection “provides a novel ... extension of the ‘long arm’ concept.” Unif. Parentage Act (1973) § 8, 9B U.L.A. cmt. at 429 (2001).

Father also argues that Mother is subject to personal jurisdiction under section 454.1515 of the UIFSA by engaging in sexual intercourse in Missouri. The UIFSA is an alternative statutory method outside of the UPA for determining paternity and support issues, such that section 210.844 of the UPA provides that specified provisions of the UPA ⁶ are applicable to UIFSA determinations of paternity and that “no other provisions of [the UPA] shall apply” in such actions. The UIFSA only addresses child support and paternity issues. Lunceford v. Lunceford, 204 S.W.3d 699, 702 (Mo.App. W.D.2006); Straight v. Straight, 195 S.W.3d 461, 464 (Mo.App. W.D.2006). Under the UIFSA:

[i]n a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or to determine parentage of a child, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual or the individual's guardian or conservator if:

....

(6) the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse[.]

§ 454.1515(a)(6). This subsection (6), which is derived from the UPA (1973) Section 8, provides a factual “affiliating nexus” for the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident individual for purposes of determining parentage or establishing a support order. Interstate Family Support Act (2001) § 201, 9 Part IB U.L.A. cmt. at 185–86 (2005).

Father has alleged, and Mother has not denied, that they engaged in sexual intercourse in Missouri and that Child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse. Thus, the trial court had the statutory authority to make a paternity determination.

Because the UIFSA deals strictly with paternity and child support issues, we must look to the UCCJEA to determine whether the trial court has statutory authority to make an initial custody determination regarding Child. Al–Hawarey, 388 S.W.3d 237, 243. This analysis may well result in bifurcated adjudications, where one state adjudicates paternity and child support and another state adjudicates custody and parenting time.

Section 452.740.1 of Missouri's version of the UCCJEA is the exclusive basis for determining whether the trial court is authorized to make a child custody determination. § 452.740.2. Section 452.740.1 provides that:

Except as otherwise provided in section 452.755 [temporary emergency jurisdiction if child has been abandoned or is threatened with or subjected to mistreatment or abuse], a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:

(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of...