DeWitt v. London Rd. Rental Ctr., Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | A16-1794 |
| Citation | 899 N.W.2d 883 (Mem) |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Craig DEWITT, Cross-Appellant, v. LONDON ROAD RENTAL CENTER, INC., Respondent, Jach's, Inc., d/b/a The Tower Tap & Restaurant, et al., Appellants, Marlee Enterprise, Inc., Defendant. |
Scott Wilson, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Robert Edwards, Robert N. Edwards, Chtd., Anoka, Minnesota (for cross-appellant).
Jacob M. Tomczik, Cheryl Hood Langel, McCollum, Crowley, Moschet, Miller & Laak, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent).
Timothy P. Tobin, Abigail A. Pettit, Gislason & Hunter LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants).
Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Smith, John, Judge.*
This appeal is taken from a judgment in an action arising out of personal injuries suffered by cross-appellant Craig DeWitt1 while seated at a picnic table that appellants Jach's, Inc., d/b/a The Tower Tap & Restaurant, and Chester Morgan (collectively, Tower Tap) rented from respondent London Road Rental Center, Inc. DeWitt argues that the district court erred by dismissing his res ipsa loquitur claim against Tower Tap and imposing discovery sanctions for his failure to produce unlimited medical authorizations. Tower Tap argues that the district court erred by enforcing exculpatory and indemnity clauses in the rental contract to require them to pay London Road's attorney fees and costs. Because we conclude that the district court erred by dismissing DeWitt's res ipsa loquitur claim but otherwise reject the arguments on appeal, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Tower Tap rented folding picnic tables from respondent London Road for use on Tower Tap's premises during Ma and Pa Kettle Days in August 2012. Upon delivery of the tables, Tower Tap signed a contract that contains both exculpatory and indemnification clauses.
DeWitt visited Tower Tap on the evening of August 11, 2012, and sat at one of the picnic tables. Around 11:00 p.m., the picnic table collapsed, pinning DeWitt's hips between the tabletop and the bench seat. DeWitt suffered serious injuries that required surgery to his left hip and aggravated preexisting low back pain and a previous shoulder injury. Following the incident, both Tower Tap and London Road examined the picnic table without determining what caused it to collapse.
DeWitt commenced this action against Tower Tap and London Road, seeking to hold both liable for negligence and relying in part on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Tower Tap asserted a cross-claim against London Road for common-law indemnity, and London Road asserted cross-claims for contractual indemnity and contribution.
Under the requirements of Minn. R. Civ. P. 35.04, DeWitt executed authorizations for the release of his medical records. DeWitt gave an unlimited release for providers who had treated him only for injuries suffered at Tower Tap, but limited his authorization for release of records from other providers to left hip, low back, and right shoulder pain and injuries. After unsuccessfully conferring on the issue, Tower Tap moved to compel DeWitt to provide unlimited authorizations and sought attorney fees and costs in connection with its motion. The district court granted Tower Tap's motion and fee request, ordering DeWitt's counsel, Robert Edwards, to pay $2,284 in attorney fees and $246.62 in costs.
Both Tower Tap and London Road moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Tower Tap on DeWitt's claim of res ipsa loquitur and granted summary judgment against Tower Tap on its claim for common-law indemnity and liability and to London Road on its claim for contractual indemnity.2 The court subsequently entered a $19,809.20 costs-and-disbursements judgment against DeWitt and in favor of Tower Tap and a stipulated $47,000 judgment against Tower Tap and in favor of London Road on its contractual indemnity claim.
This appeal by DeWitt and Tower Tap follows.
I. Did the district court err by granting summary judgment to Tower Tap on DeWitt's res ipsa loquitur claim?
II. Did the district court err by awarding attorney fees and costs as a discovery sanction for DeWitt's failure to provide unlimited medical releases?
III. Did the district court err by granting summary judgment to London Road on Tower Tap's common-law indemnity claim and London Road's contractual indemnity claim?
DeWitt asserts that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Tower Tap on his negligence claim that is based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This court reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment. STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P. , 644 N.W.2d 72, 76–77 (Minn. 2002). "In general the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence from the circumstances of an accident." Johnson v. W. Fargo Mfg. Co. , 255 Minn. 19, 25, 95 N.W.2d 497, 502 (1959). For the doctrine to apply:
(1) The event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; [2] it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and [3] it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.
Warrick v. Giron , 290 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn. 1980) (citing Spannaus v. Otolaryngology Clinic , 308 Minn. 334, 337, 242 N.W.2d 594, 596 (1976) ). At the summary-judgment stage of proceedings, a plaintiff need not definitively establish each element but must point to "enough evidence that the three conditions exist so as to make it a jury question as to whether they exist or not." Stearns v. Plucinski , 482 N.W.2d 496, 498 n.2 (Minn. App. 1992) ; see also Stelter v. Chiquita Processed Foods, L.L.C. , 658 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Minn. App. 2003) ().
The district court determined that DeWitt cannot meet the second, exclusive-control element required under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not expressly defined the "exclusive control" element but has cautioned that "control [must be] seen as a flexible term." Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co. , 344 N.W.2d 856, 863 (Minn. 1984) (citing W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 39, at 218–21 (4th ed. 1971)). The requisite control may be exercised at the time of the negligence or at the time of the resulting injury. Peterson v. Minn. Power & Light Co. , 207 Minn. 387, 391, 291 N.W. 705, 707 (1940). Although the doctrine cannot apply in cases of "divided control," it can apply when the jury can conclude "that the instrumentality was never improperly used, touched or interfered with in any way" after the defendant relinquished control, such that "[t]he control that defendant exercised carried over to the time of the occurrence of the injury." Peterson , 207 Minn. at 391, 291 N.W. at 707.
Applying these principles, we conclude that DeWitt presented sufficient evidence to proceed with his negligence claim under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Importantly, DeWitt's claim is grounded in premises liability, under which Tower Tap had a duty to inspect and maintain the safety of its premises for invitees like DeWitt. See Olmanson v. LeSueur County , 693 N.W.2d 876, 881 (Minn. 2005). The corporate representative for London Road testified that the tables had been rented previously without incident, and that the tables were cleaned and inspected after each rental. And DeWitt testified that the table was empty when his group arrived at Tower Tap and that he did not tamper with the picnic table. Under the foregoing caselaw, this evidence is sufficient to support an inference of negligence by Tower Tap in inspecting and maintaining the safety of its premises.
Tower Tap argues that DeWitt is precluded from proceeding with his negligence claim under a res ipsa loquitur theory because the picnic table might have collapsed due to a latent defect or third-party tampering, which were undiscovered by Tower Tap even in the absence of negligence. This argument misapprehends the purpose and operation of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Although "the doctrine has no application where all of the facts and circumstances appear in evidence" or "where the cause of the accident is known and is not in question," Johnson , 255 Minn. at 25–26, 95 N.W.2d at 502, "the mere presence or possibility of other causes is not sufficient to preclude the inference of negligence on the part of defendant where the evidence reasonably excuses those causes." Rinkel v. Lee's Plumbing & Heating Co. , 257 Minn. 14, 19, 99 N.W.2d 779, 783 (1959). Indeed, to require a plaintiff to disprove any other possible causes of his or her injury would effectively require the plaintiff to prove his or her claim without the benefit of the inference that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine allows, thereby depriving the doctrine of any effective use. See, e.g. , Curtis v. Lein , 169 Wash.2d 884, 239 P.3d 1078, 1083 (2010) (); Cunningham v. Hayes , 463 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) ().
" ‘When the injury might, with equal probability , have resulted from the acts of others as well as from the acts of defendant, proof of facts, other than of injury, from which defendant's negligence can be inferred must be made before the question can be submitted to the jury.’ " Olson v. St. Joseph's Hosp. , 281 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Minn. 1979) (quoting Collings v. Nw. Hosp. , 202 Minn. 139, 144, 277 N.W. 910, 912 (1938) (emphasis added)).3 Once other possible causes have been sufficiently eliminated, the plaintiff is entitled to argue the res ipsa inference, the defendant is entitled to argue other causes, and the jury must...
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Dewitt v. London Rd. Rental Ctr., Inc.
...fees that it had expended in this matter.Tower Tap appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.4 Dewitt v. London Rd. Rental Ctr., Inc. , 899 N.W.2d 883, 885, 892 (Minn. App. 2017). The court of appeals substantially followed the district court’s reasoning, relying on the indemnity clause’s......