DeYoung v. State

• Decision Date: 24 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. S97P0875,S97P0875
• Citation: 493 S.E.2d 157,268 Ga. 780
• Parties: , 97 FCDR 4248 DeYOUNG v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 157

493 S.E.2d 157

268 Ga. 780, 97 FCDR 4248

DeYOUNG v. The STATE.

No. S97P0875.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 24, 1997.

Reconsideration Denied Dec. 19, 1997.

[268 Ga. 792] Edwin J. Wilson, Sharon Lee Hopkins, Lawrenceville, for Andrew Grant DeYoung.

Thomas James Charron, Dist. Atty., Debra Halpern Bernes, Asst. Dist. Atty., Nancy I. Jordan, Jack E. Mallard, Asst. Dist. Attys., Cobb County District Attorney's Office, Marietta, Wesley Scott Horney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for State.

Joseph L. Chambers, Sr., Prosecuting Attys. Counsel, Smyrna, Michael Mears, MultiCounty Public Defender, Atlanta, Stephen C. Bayliss, Atlanta, for other interested parties.

THOMPSON, Justice.

Andrew Grant DeYoung was convicted of the malice murders of his parents, Kathryn and Gary DeYoung, and his 14-year-old sister Sarah. ¹ The jury recommended the death penalty, finding that as to each of the three counts of the indictment, the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, to wit: murder; the offender committed the offense of murder for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value; the offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved depravity of mind of the defendant and aggravated battery of the victims prior to their deaths. OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2), (4), (7). The trial court sentenced DeYoung to death. Finding no error, we affirm.

During the months preceding the crime, DeYoung told his accomplice David Michael Hagerty ² that he wanted to start a business and hoped to find investors to finance the project. He later confided in Hagerty that he had been unsuccessful in finding financial backing, but that he had another solution. He estimated his parents' estate to be worth $480,000, and, as Hagerty testified, "he felt that the only means to acquire the money was take his family's life." Subsequently, DeYoung told Hagerty that "the murders were going to have to take place," and the two met to discuss preparations.

DeYoung formulated the plan to murder his parents and two siblings by slashing their throats, and then setting fire to the house. Several days before the planned event, DeYoung drove Hagerty to the DeYoung family's church in Dunwoody. There they buried two containers--a footlocker and another box--which contained what DeYoung described to Hagerty as evidence which would incriminate him. In preparation for the murders, DeYoung and Hagerty purchased clothing and supplies, including an 11-inch filet knife and two gasoline containers.

According to the plan, DeYoung and Hagerty traveled on foot to the DeYoung home at 2:00 a.m. on the designated day. On the way, they retrieved boots, gloves and knives from a duffle bag which DeYoung had left in the woods earlier that evening. Both men were armed with knives. They approached the DeYoung home from the rear of the property where they retrieved two containers of gasoline they had left there earlier. When they reached the house, DeYoung took a handgun from his duffle bag and tucked it into his waistband. After he cut the telephone wires, he and Hagerty entered the house. DeYoung went upstairs where his parents and sister were asleep. He instructed Hagerty to go to a downstairs bedroom where his 16-year-old brother Nathan was asleep, and to cut his throat with the filet knife.

DeYoung stabbed his mother repeatedly while she was sleeping in her bedroom upstairs; her screams awakened his father. As he struggled with his father, DeYoung's sister Sarah came to the doorway of their parents' bedroom. DeYoung slashed his father to death, and then stabbed and killed Sarah in the hallway. Hagerty heard a commotion upstairs, and changed his mind about killing Nathan.

Nathan testified that he heard stomping and banging noises coming from upstairs, and he heard his sister cry out and call his name. Upon finding that the phone was dead, Nathan escaped through his bedroom window and ran to a neighbor's house for assistance. Instead of setting fire to the house as they had planned, DeYoung and Hagerty searched the area for Nathan. Nathan returned with a neighbor who was armed with a gun. The neighbor noticed movement in the driveway, and observed a figure clad in black. As the neighbor was about to shoot at the man, he observed that it was Andrew DeYoung, and he called out, "Andy, what did you do?" The neighbor testified that he had no doubt the man he saw was the defendant. Nathan did not see the suspect's face, but he testified that his "movements and his body size resembled Andy, my brother."

DeYoung and Hagerty fled from the house in separate directions. Both had discarded their clothing, boots, and weapons along the way. They eventually met up later that morning at Hagerty's home, where they concocted an alibi. Hagerty observed that DeYoung had injuries to his neck and forehead.

DeYoung drove back to his home at 10:30 a.m., seven hours after the murders. He told police that he had spent most of the night at Hagerty's home, and he denied any involvement in the crimes. Authorities noted that he was calm and showed no grief over the deaths of his family members. There were scratches and abrasions present on his face, neck, hands and right arm.

Hagerty was interviewed by police and gave several statements in which he admitted his participation in the crimes. He also led authorities to the clothing worn by him during the killings, and to the footlocker and box which had been concealed on the church property. These contained DeYoung's shoulder holster and ammunition pouch and a hand-drawn map depicting the route to the DeYoung home. An arrow on the map pointed to a cul-de-sac where the house was located and was accompanied by the words "Just Do It." Hagerty also led police to a gun that fit the holster recovered in the footlocker, and a Glock Model 81 military survival knife, which he identified as similar to the knife DeYoung used on the night of the crime. The victims' wounds were consistent with that knife. DeYoung and Hagerty were arrested on the same day, and charged with the three murders.

1. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murders of his parents and sister. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. DeYoung contends that the trial court erred in excusing prospective jurors Standifer and Huff for bias against the death penalty. In order to justify disqualification under Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852-854, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), it must be shown that the venireperson's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror. A juror who merely expresses "qualms" about capital punishment is not subject to being struck for cause. Jarrell v. State, 261 Ga. 880(1), 413 S.E.2d 710 (1992); Alderman v. State, 254 Ga. 206(4), 327 S.E.2d 168 (1985). In determining whether the Witt standard has been met, a prospective juror's voir dire must be considered in its entirety. Crowe v. State, 265 Ga. 582(10), 458 S.E.2d 799 (1995). And a trial court's determination that a juror should be disqualified is entitled to deference. Diaz v. State, 262 Ga. 750(2)(b), 425 S.E.2d 869 (1993).

a. Venireperson Standifer's voir dire responses as to whether he could vote for the death penalty were often equivocal and he initially appeared to be uncertain of his position on this issue. However, after extensive questioning by the trial court, Standifer's unwillingness to impose the death penalty became more clear. Although Standifer stated he would vote for a life sentence nine times out of ten, indicating the death penalty might be a viable option, he later explained that he would vote for death only if the crime were committed against his family or himself. Standifer concluded by stating that he had always believed he could not vote to impose the death penalty and still held that view, but noted that he had never been questioned on this subject before.

This Court has recognized that many venirepersons " 'simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made "unmistakably clear." ' [Cit.]" Ledford v. State, 264 Ga. 60, 64(6), 439 S.E.2d 917 (1994). It was, therefore, for the trial court to resolve the equivocations and conflicts in Standifer's responses. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that this venireperson should be disqualified. Id.; Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777(9), 450 S.E.2d 680 (1994); Foster v. State, 258 Ga. 736(1), 374 S.E.2d 188 (1988).

b. Venireperson Huff stated that she had always been opposed to the death penalty and although she thought there might be a place for it in society today, she could not vote to impose it. Huff particularly expressed her aversion to death by electrocution. Huff stated that she had given the issue of punishment a great deal of thought but her opposition to the death penalty had not changed over time. Although she would try to lay these views aside and consider death as a viable punishment option, she clearly expressed her lack of confidence that she could do so. The trial court did not err in excusing Huff on the basis of her inability to vote for death. Ledford, supra at (6)(b), 439 S.E.2d 917.

3. DeYoung next asserts that the trial court erred by failing to excuse venirepersons Horner, Cannon, and Brown on reverse Witherspoon ³ grounds. While these jurors indicated a preference for a death sentence under certain circumstances, the record supports the trial court's finding that they were capable of serving as impartial jurors and would consider both evidence in mitigation and the option of a life sentence. See Carr, supra at (6), 480 S.E.2d 583; Hittson v. State, 264 Ga. 682(6), 449 S.E.2d 586 (1994). We find...