DeZerega v. Meggs

• Decision Date: 16 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. A086725.,A086725.
• Citation: 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 366,83 Cal.App.4th 28
• Parties: David DeZEREGA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Jason MEGGS, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

99 Cal.Rptr.2d 366

83 Cal.App.4th 28

David DeZEREGA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Jason MEGGS, Defendant and Respondent.

No. A086725.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4.

August 16, 2000.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing September 14, 2000.

Malcolm A. Smith, Esq., San Francisco, for Appellants.

David J. Beauvais, Esq., Berkeley, for Respondent.

Marjorie Gelb, Esq., Brian Kelly, Esq., Donald A. Tine, Esq., Berkeley, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board.

SEPULVEDA, J.

We ordered transfer of this appeal from a judgment of the Alameda County Municipal Court after it was certified for such transfer by the Appellate Division of the Alameda County Superior Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 61-69.) It concerns the right of a "roommate," whose occupancy in a leased apartment was approved and expressly authorized by the owner, to the protections of the eviction-control provisions adopted by the City of Berkeley and in effect when the owners sought to evict the "roommate." We conclude that, contrary to the determination of the appellate division, the trial court correctly held the "roommate" entitled to those protections as a matter of law, such that the "roommate" was entitled to summary judgment in view of the landlords' failure to serve a notice stating good cause for termination of the roommate's occupancy. We further conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the landlords' appellate challenge to an award of attorneys' fees. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment from which the appeal is taken, and dismiss the appeal from the fee award.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs David and Sara DeZerega are owners of an apartment building on Piedmont Avenue in Berkeley, which includes the three-bedroom unit at issue in this lawsuit (hereafter, the premises). In late December of 1995, Sara DeZerega executed an agreement to lease the premises to Helen Yoon, who was identified in the lease as "Tenants" or "Tenant(s)." The lease, which was largely typewritten or computer-generated, provided that the premises were "to be used only as a private residence by, and occupancy is limited to, the following named persons: Helen Yoon and Two roommates." It went on to provide that "[a]ny unregistered occupant or occupancy by any person disallowed by Owner shall void this agreement and possession of the premises shall revert to Owner." It flatly prohibited any assignment or subletting.

In February 1997, defendant Jason Meggs¹ met with Helen Yoon and the two other then-occupants, Michael Nnadi-Nwazurumike and Aaron Forth, and arranged to move in, apparently in place of Forth. Defendant later declared that he and the other occupants agreed to "share the common areas including the living room, bathroom and kitchen" and to "share equally the household expenses including rent." Forth moved out, and on March 1, 1997, defendant moved in. He paid his share of the March rent to Yoon, and assumed a share of the security deposit by reimbursing Forth for the share he had previously paid.

Around this time, Helen Yoon delivered to defendant a blank "Application to Rent" form sent to her by plaintiff Sara DeZerega, "to have the new roommate fill out." The form bore a typewritten mailing address for "D. DeZerega" and the legend, "Individual applications required from each adult occupant." It also recited that "[t]he undersigned makes application to rent housing accommodations" at the address of the premises. It requested information about the applicant's present address, employment, reasons for moving, references, and emergency contacts. Sara DeZerega later declared, however, that she never ran a credit or reference check on defendant.

On March 3, defendant mailed the form, filled in with the requested information, to plaintiff Sara DeZerega.² He included a cover letter in which he wrote that he was "very happy to be living in one of your units," and "hope[d] to stay for some time."

Coincidentally, on March 3 Helen Yoon called Sara DeZerega to say that she wished to end her own occupancy of the premises and "wanted to know about the logistics in transferring the lease to Michael Nnadi-Nwazurumike." Ultimately Nnadi-Nwazurumike submitted an application to rent, including a credit application and processing fee. On or about March 18, 1997, he and Sara DeZerega executed a lease as "tenant(s)" and "owner," respectively. It was substantially similar, if not identical, to the lease executed by Helen Yoon. It recited that "tenant(s)" rented the described premises for residential purposes "on a month-to-month basis, terminable by Owner or Tenant(s) by the giving of 30 days written notice to the other (MONTH TO MONTH RENTAL)." Paragraph 9, entitled "Use and Occupancy," provided, "The premises are to be used only as a private residence by, and occupancy is limited to, the following named persons," followed by a blank space in which was written "Michael Nnadi-Nwazurumike and 2 (two) roommates." It went on to state, "The `base occupancy level' of the premises is 3 person(s). Tenants) agrees not to allow any other person to occupy said premises without written approval of Owner." Paragraph 12, entitled "ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETING," flatly prohibited (1) assignment or subletting of "Tenant(s)'" interest; (2) advertising the premises for renting; (3) placing "[a]ny name, other than those of the Tenant(s)" on the mailbox serving the premises; and (4) listing any telephone service for the premises in a name "other than those of Tenant(s)." Paragraph 20 provided that in the event of proceedings "to enforce any part of this agreement," the prevailing party would recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

On April 22, plaintiffs apparently issued a "Vacancy Registration" under the local rent ordinance stating that the tenancy of Helen Yoon ended, and that of Michael Nnadi-Nwazurumike began, on April 8, 1997. At some point Yoon was apparently replaced by a new "roommate," Karla Stine.

On September 30, 1997, Michael Nnadi-Nwazurumike served defendant with a handwritten 30-day notice to vacate. The notice stated, "This is your official 30 day notice of eviction. This means that by no later than October 31, 1997 you need to have all of your possessions removed from 2522 Piedmont Ave. # 7 in Berkeley. I also expect the return of all keys to the premises. You will receive your deposit of $705 back if you clean and repair any damage you may have inadvertently caused while in residence. As of the evening of 9/30/97, you have not paid your share of October 97 rent. I will assume you want the landlord, Sara DeZerega, to deduct your last month (October) rent of $353 from your $705 deposit. [¶] If you have any questions please feel free to ask me or you can contact Sara DeZerega. [¶] Sincerely, M.A. Nnadi-Nwazurumike [¶] the sole lessee of 2522 Piedmont # 7[¶] Berkeley, CA 94704."

In October 1997 defendant offered to pay his share of the rent directly to Sara DeZerega. She declined, writing on October 31 that she was returning his check, and recapitulating a previous conversation in which she told him that "our policy is not to accept checks directly from roommates of the person who has signed the rental agreement with us, in this case Michael Nadi-Nwazurumike [sic]. Michael is solely responsible for all the rent and we will accept a check only from him. [¶] Any arrangements, monetary or otherwise, that you have with Michael are strictly between the two of you."

On or around November 17, 1997, Michael Nnadi-Nwazurumike wrote to Sara DeZerega "to give my official 30 day notice to vacate your apartment ... by midnight of December 17, 1997." He went on to write, "I will notify Jason Meggs and Karla Stine that I am moving and that they should either be out by 12/17/97 or contact you about other arrangements. I know that Karla may be interested in continuing to stay on in the apartment, but I do not know how that will work out with the Jason Meggs situation, [¶] I had indicated that I would pursue eviction procedures against Jason Meggs, but the amount of energy and time required to do this is too great for me at this time. I appreciate your understanding over the last few months. I also hope that you have better luck dealing with Mr. Meggs."

On November 17, 1997, Nnadi-Nwazurumike wrote to defendant and Karla Stine, stating in part, "I am officially letting you know that I have already given the owner of the apartment, Sara DeZerega, 30 days notice that I am ending my lease and vacating the apartment. By 12 midnight, December 17, 1997, we will all need to have our things out of the apartment as well as clean the premises so that we can recover as much of our deposits as possible. Since the lease has always been in only my name it is required that we all move out by the above time unless the owner would like to make other arrangements with you both."

On December 4, 1997, David and Sara DeZerega wrote to defendant again declining to accept a check from him and adding, "As I explained in a previous letter, Michael A. Nnadi-Nwazurumike is the only person with whom we have a signed rental agreement and he is solely responsible for the rent until December 17, 1997. Likewise he will be the recipient of the deposit when the apartment is vacated. Any monies owed to you by him or vice versa is [sic] a matter between the two of you. As explained to us by our attorney and according to the rent board publication on sub-letting, Michael A. Nnadi-Nwazurumike is our tenant. You are Michael's roommate and as such are considered a `sub-tenant.' For legal purposes Michael is your landlord. When Michael gives us a 30 day notice of intent to vacate, (as he has done) the rental agreement ends. Michael and all of his roommates (sub-tenants) need to leave with him, by midnight December 17, 1997. Anyone occupying the premises after that time is trespassing and is subject to legal action. [¶] Once a written 30 day notice has been given...