DF v. Western School Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. IP 94-0853-C.,IP 94-0853-C.
• Citation: 921 F. Supp. 559
• Parties: D.F., M.F., and D.J.F., Plaintiffs, v. WESTERN SCHOOL CORPORATION and Kokomo Area Special Education Cooperative, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

921 F. Supp. 559

D.F., M.F., and D.J.F., Plaintiffs, v. WESTERN SCHOOL CORPORATION and Kokomo Area Special Education Cooperative, Defendants.

No. IP 94-0853-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

March 29, 1996.

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Milo G. Gray, Jr., Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services, Indianapolis, Indiana, for plaintiffs.

Thomas D. Wheeler, Kightlinger & Gray, Indianapolis, Indiana, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HAMILTON, District Judge.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491, requires states, as a condition of receipt of certain federal funds, to ensure that all handicapped children have available to them a free appropriate public education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B). The IDEA and its implementing regulations establish a presumption in favor of what is often called "mainstreaming," that is, educating children with disabilities together with children who are not disabled. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.8, 300.550. This case explores the outer boundaries of this mainstreaming requirement.

Plaintiffs are D.F. and his parents. D.F. is now thirteen years old; he was born thirteen weeks premature on February 24, 1983. He has mental disabilities classified as moderate or severe, hydrocephalus, communication disorder, a seizure disorder, cerebral palsy, and visual problems. Defendants are the Western School Corporation and the Kokomo Area Special Education Cooperative, which is a cooperative program among several school districts for providing special education services to handicapped children. Defendants had placed D.F. for several years in special education classes for moderately mentally handicapped children at Pettit Park Elementary School ("Pettit Park"), which is located outside the boundaries of D.F.'s home school district. During the 1992-93 school year, D.F.'s parents began to question whether D.F.'s placement in the moderately mentally handicapped program ("MoMH") at Pettit Park was appropriate. Prior to the 1993-94 school year, they sought to have D.F. reassigned to a program that would put him in a regular classroom with more extensive contact with non-disabled peers in his neighborhood school, Western Elementary School ("Western").¹

After D.F.'s parents and the school officials disagreed about the proper placement for D.F. for the 1993-94 school year, his parents requested an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b). An independent hearing officer conducted an evidentiary hearing and ruled in favor of the school district. The state Board of Special Education Appeals upheld that decision. Plaintiffs now seek judicial review of that decision pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). In addition to their IDEA claim, plaintiffs also assert claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The court has subject matter jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1343.

In this court, the parties have submitted the administrative record, including transcripts of testimony and documentary exhibits, from the proceedings before the hearing officer and the Board of Special Education Appeals. The plaintiffs have also submitted supplemental affidavits and reports from two expert witnesses, Gwen Chesterfield and Bradley Passenger. Defendants have submitted a supplemental affidavit with exhibits from Phyllis Craig, director of special services for the Kokomo Area Special Education Cooperative. Both sides have filed motions for summary judgment. As explained below, after review of the administrative record and the additional evidence submitted by the parties, the court agrees with the hearing officer that the defendants gave sufficient consideration to "mainstreaming" D.F. and had sufficient reasons not to pursue such a program for D.F. The court therefore upholds the decision of the hearing officer and board of appeals, and grants summary judgment for the defendants.

Standard of Review and Summary Judgment

The standard for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 is familiar. Summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a finder of fact to find in favor of the non-moving party on the particular issue. E.g., Methodist Medical Ctr. v. American Medical Sec., Inc., 38 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir.1994). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Where the court's task is to review an administrative record and decision to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is otherwise according to law, summary judgment is ordinarily a useful vehicle. See, e.g., Hunger v. Leininger, 15 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.1994). In that type of judicial review, credibility decisions are for the administrative decisionmaker rather than the court. The court considers only the facts presented by the administrative record, and there is rarely a dispute as to the contents of that record. If the administrative record contains substantial evidence that might have supported the contrary result in the administrative process, that fact carries little if any weight on judicial review. On the other hand, where the court makes its decision de novo, the contents of the administrative record may not matter at all. If there is conflicting evidence, the court conducting a de novo review must weigh that evidence and make its own decision, so that where the evidence conflicts on material facts, summary judgment will not be appropriate.

The standard of review under the IDEA lies somewhere between de novo review and the substantial evidence/otherwise according to law standard frequently applied to administrative decisions. Elizabeth K. v. Warrick County Sch. Corp., 795 F.Supp. 881, 885 (S.D.Ind.1992). The IDEA provides that the reviewing court "shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decisions on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). Under this statute, the court's role is not merely to determine whether the administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3050, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). In cases challenging administrative decisions under the IDEA, a district court must independently determine whether the IDEA's requirements have been satisfied. Board of Educ. of Murphysboro v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1166 (7th Cir.1994). The statutory directives to consider additional evidence and to decide on the preponderance of the evidence take the court's role well beyond the more familiar standards for judicial review of administrative adjudications. At the same time, the court does not hear the case de novo, erasing the blackboard and hearing all evidence as if for the first time. Congress has directed the courts to consider the administrative record. Pointing out that courts have no special expertise in educational policy, the Supreme Court has instructed that the lower courts must give "due weight" to the results of the administrative process, and should not "substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. at 3051. Accord, Board of Educ. of Murphysboro, 41 F.3d at 1166. The Seventh Circuit has squarely held that the party challenging the administrative decision has the burden of proof. Id. at 1167; Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 21 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 938 F.2d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1991). Under this intermediate standard of judicial review, summary judgment can still be an appropriate vehicle for deciding IDEA claims. Nothing in the statute prohibits use of the summary judgment mechanism. See Murray v. Montrose County Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 921, 928 n. 12 (10th Cir.1995); Victoria L. v. District Sch. Bd., 741 F.2d 369, 372 (11th Cir.1984). In fact, "summary judgment is a common vehicle for addressing the merits of an IDEA case in the district court." Board of Educ. of Downers Grove v. Steven L., No. 93 C 7168, 1995 WL 513572, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 25, 1995); see also Hunger v. Leininger, 15 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.1994).

The hearing officer in this case heard substantial evidence that supported his decision in favor of the defendants. He also heard evidence that could have supported a contrary decision. Both sides have submitted additional evidence here, in the form of affidavits from special education experts. That evidence concerns more recent developments, coming after the due process hearing.² Given the conflicting evidence in the record, summary judgment would not be appropriate if this court's task were to make a decision de novo. But under the applicable standard of review, the issue here is whether plaintiffs have come forward with sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable trier of fact to find that the hearing officer's decision was wrong on the merits, while giving "due deference" to the hearing officer's expertise and findings.

After careful review of the administrative record and the administrative decision, as well as the supplemental evidence offered by the parties, the court concludes that summary judgment for defendants is warranted in this case. Plaintiffs have not come forward with evidence that would support...