Elizabeth K. By Patricia K. v. WARRICK CTY. SCHOOL, EV 91-99-C.

• Citation: 795 F. Supp. 881
• Decision Date: 02 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. EV 91-99-C.,EV 91-99-C.
• Parties: ELIZABETH K., by her parents and next friends, PATRICIA K. and Steven K., Plaintiffs, v. WARRICK COUNTY SCHOOL CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

795 F. Supp. 881

ELIZABETH K., by her parents and next friends, PATRICIA K. and Steven K., Plaintiffs, v. WARRICK COUNTY SCHOOL CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. EV 91-99-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Evansville Division.

January 2, 1992.

Katherine M. Black, Carbondale, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Mark E. Neff, Boonville, Ind., Donald L. Dawson, Troy A. Reynolds, Thomas E. Wheeler, II, Kightlinger & Gray, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

BROOKS, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT which were filed on October 21, 1991. The REPLY BRIEF TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was filed by the plaintiff on November 5, 1991. The DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was filed on November 18, 1991.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. Elizabeth K. hereinafter Elizabeth was a seven year old child residing with her parents hereinafter parents on the day the complaint was filed.

2. On or about August 29, 1991, Elizabeth's primary disability was diagnosed as "communication disorder."

3. The Warrick County School Corporation hereinafter defendant proposed that Elizabeth be placed in a classroom which was labeled "Developmental Kindergarten." The parents objected to the placement, complaining that the Developmental Kindergarten did not address Elizabeth's communication disorder, and was not staffed by persons qualified in communication disorders.

4. As a result of this objection, the parents requested an S-1 hearing regarding the appropriateness of the placement decision. This hearing was held on October 31, 1990. At the hearing, the parents were represented by their present counsel.

5. On December 7, 1991 the hearing officer's decision was issued. The order contained the following language, found at Page 6:

The classroom (DK) is not to contain "mixed categories" unless the primary focus is on speech and language. If the focus changes, then this Order is modified to mandate the development of a Communication Handicapped classroom.

The parents were notified of their right to appeal the S-1 hearing officer's decision.

6. The parents perfected an appeal of the hearing officer's decision. This appeal was heard by the Board of Special Education Appeals on February 14, 1991. The parents were again represented by counsel.

7. The Board of Special Education ruled on March 6, 1991 that the hearing officer's placement decision was affirmed. The written ruling also advised the parents that an aggrieved party would have thirty days from receipt of the order in which to seek judicial review.

8. The Complaint Seeking Judicial Review of Administrative Order was filed on July 5, 1991.

DISCUSSION

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1991). Section 1415 provides that a civil action may be brought by the aggrieved party in a State Court of competent jurisdiction, or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy.

The defendant seeks summary judgment of this matter, alleging that the plaintiffs did not file the appeal until after the statute of limitations had expired. According to the defendant, the applicable statute of limitations is thirty days. Alternatively, the plaintiffs argue that a two or a five year statute of limitations should be applied by this Court, and that under a two year statute of limitations, the appeal is timely. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the record shows that the plaintiffs have failed to comply with the appropriate statute of limitations, summary judgment should be granted.

This case is governed by the Individual with Disabilities Education Act 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. hereinafter IDEA or the Act. The IDEA does not provide a statute of limitations applicable to the IDEA, therefore, the Court must determine the appropriate statute of limitations to be applied by the Court. "The settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1941-42, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Numerous courts have adopted this practice, and have applied an analogous state statute of limitations to the IDEA. See generally Schimmel by Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477 (4th Cir.1987); Janzen v. Knox County Board of Education, 790 F.2d 484 (6th Cir.1986); Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.1984). The Court notes that this is a case of first impression; no Indiana cases have interpreted this particular section of the IDEA to determine an applicable statute of limitations.

One concern noted by the Wilson Court is whether one state statute of limitations should be applied consistently, or whether the appropriate statute of limitations should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268, 105 S.Ct. at 1942. The Sixth Circuit has considered this issue, and ruled:

The nature of actions that can be brought under this Act as well as the Act's goal of proper education of the handicapped child make the selection of state limitations periods on a case-by-case basis an imperative. The individual case must be characterized by considering the facts, the circumstances, the posture of the case and the legal theories presented.

Janzen v. Knox County Board of Education, 790 F.2d 484, 487 (6th Cir.1986). See also Hall v. Knott County Board of Education, 941 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.1991); Lawson v. Edwardsburg Public School, 751 F.Supp. 1257 (W.D.Mich.1990).

The Court has three Indiana statute of limitations from which to choose. The defendant argues that the 30 day statute of limitations provided by Ind.Code § 4-21.5-5-5 (1990) for judicial review of administrative decisions is applicable. Alternatively, the plaintiffs assert that the two year statute of limitations applied to causes of action for injuries to person or character pursuant to Ind.Code § 34-1-2-2(1) (1991) should be applied; or that the five year statute of limitations pursuant to Ind.Code § 34-1-2-2(2) (1991) for actions against a public officer should be applied.

The defendant argues that the 30 day administrative review statute of limitations is the most analogous to the cause of action arising under IDEA. Thus, the defendant asserts that the thirty day statute of limitations should be applied. However, the plaintiffs contend that the application of a thirty day statute defeats the policies of the IDEA since such a short time period restrict the availability of judicial review. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that under the present set of circumstances, the thirty day statute of limitations should be applied, and the cause of action is untimely.

Purpose of IDEA

The IDEA was designed to provide an appropriate, free public education. The specific purpose of the act is set forth as follows:

It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all handicapped children have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected, ...

20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1991). The statute of limitations which the Court ultimately applies must not be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act.

Appropriate Statute of Limitations

The plaintiffs advocate the adoption of either a two year or a five year statute of limitations. The Court rejects the five year statute of limitations applicable to actions against public officials as too lengthy. The purpose of the IDEA is to insure handicapped children receive a proper education. In order to meet this goal, prompt resolution of disputes is necessary. Thus, a five year statute of limitations is inconsistent with the underlying policy and purpose of the IDEA.

There are two questions which the Court must answer when deciding which is the applicable statute of limitations. First, does Indiana have an analogous statute of limitations which may be applied? If so, would the utilization of the statute of limitations be consistent with the policies and goals of the IDEA. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985).

a. Sufficient Analogy

The plaintiffs assert that the review provided for administrative decisions is not sufficiently analogous to the review provisions of the IDEA to allow its application. The standard of review for administrative decisions is set forth in Ind.Code § 4-21.5-5-11, which provides:

Judicial review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for the agency action supplemented by additional evidence taken under section 12 of this chapter. The court may not try the cause de novo or substitute its judgment for that of the agency.

The plaintiffs contend that the IDEA requires judicial review which is close to a de novo standard. In support of this proposition, the plaintiffs cite the following cases: Janzen, 790 F.2d 484, 487 (Administrative agency statute provides too narrow of a review since additional evidence is allowed only if there was good reason not to present that evidence at the agency level); Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 436 (5th Cir.1984) (Administrative agency review is too limited); Tokarcik v. Forrest Hills, 665 F.2d 443, 451 (3rd Cir.1981) (Review should not be limited to examination of the record).

The IDEA mandates that when reviewing a case brought pursuant to the Act, the Court "shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). This language is relied upon by the plaintiffs in arguing that ...