DGHI, Enterprises v. Pacific Cities, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 May 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 67041-2,67041-2 |
| Citation | 137 Wn.2d 933,977 P.2d 1231 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | DGHI, ENTERPRISES, A Washington General Partnership, Petitioner, v. PACIFIC CITIES, INC., A Washington Corporation; Richard F. Evans, Jr. and Jane Doe Evans, Husband and Wife; and John A. Taylor and Jane Doe Taylor, Respondents, Michael R. Ukena and Ponce Pierson Ukena, Husband and Wife; James Contini and Jane Doe Contini, Husband and Wife; Border 2 Border Screenprinting, Inc., a Washington Corporation; Sea To Sea Sportswear, Inc., a Washington Corporation; and George C. Brain and Jane Doe Brain, Husband and Wife, Defendants. |
Edwards, Sieh, Smith & Goodfriend, P.S., by Catherine Wright Smith and Brendan P. Finucane, Seattle; and Sonkin & Klein, by Robert S. Klein, Seattle, for petitioner.
Reed McClure, by William R. Hickman and John P. Erlick, Seattle; and Lee, Smart, Cook, Martin & Patterson, P.S., Inc., by Joel E. Wright and Kelly M. Willig, Seattle, for respondents.
general partnership, seeks discretionary review of a decision by the Court of Appeals, Division I, upholding denial of a motion for new trial by the King County Superior Court, holding that a successor superior court judge could sign and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in a civil nonjury case in which the trial judge, immediately prior to his death, had delivered an oral decision discussing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law but did not sign either findings of fact and conclusions of law or a judgment. This Court granted review. We reverse.
The question presented in this case is whether, under Civil Rules (CR) 52(a) and 63(b), a successor superior court judge may sign and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law where the predecessor judge, immediately prior to his death, delivered only an oral decision in which he discussed findings of fact and conclusions of law but neither signed nor filed findings of fact and conclusions of law or a judgment.
Petitioner DGHI Enterprises, a general Washington partnership, sued Respondents PCI Cities, Inc., a Washington corporation, Richard F. Evans, Jr. and John A. Taylor for breach of a commercial lease. 1 After 12 days of trial in the King County Superior Court before a judge without a jury, when Petitioner rested its case, the trial judge, the Honorable James D. McCutcheon, Jr., rendered an oral decision on May 2, 1995 granting Respondents' motion to dismiss under CR 41(b)(3). 2 In that oral decision the court discussed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 3 The court asked the prevailing parties to prepare final The presentation proceeding was held on July 31, 1995. 5 Petitioner submitted seven pages of objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 6 The court rejected most of them, but agreed with two minor changes. 7 The court then asked Respondents to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law reflecting the changes 8 and requested additional briefing on the question whether "a party seeking to establish individual liability and a removal of the corporate veil may do so with impunity." 9
documents and discussed a date for presentation of the findings of fact and conclusions of law for signature. 4
A hearing on award of attorney's fees was held before Judge McCutcheon on August 23, 1995. 10 At the end of the hearing he stated he would review Petitioner's objections to the award of attorney's fees, but did not at that time sign the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 11 Another hearing was scheduled for September 28, 1995, but Judge McCutcheon died two days before that date. 12
Following Judge McCutcheon's death, Petitioner filed a motion for new trial under RCW 2.28.030 and CR 63. 13 On December 13, 1995, the Honorable Peter Jarvis, King County Superior Court, denied the motion, 14 and on February 14, 1996 signed the findings of fact and conclusions of Petitioner appealed the order denying its motion for new trial to the Court of Appeals, Division I. The Court of Appeals, the Honorable Anne L. Ellington writing, affirmed denial of the motion for new trial, holding that the successor judge could properly sign and enter formal findings of fact and conclusions of law because the record demonstrated the predecessor judge prior to his death had adopted those same findings and conclusions, 17 concluding the successor judge had "made no findings based on evidence that he did not hear." 18
law considered by Judge McCutcheon prior to his death, entered judgment for the Respondents, and awarded attorney's fees. 15 In a judgment of dismissal, Judge Jarvis stated the findings of fact and conclusions of law he signed had been "expressly adopted on the record by Judge McCutcheon pursuant to CR 52(a)...." 16
Petitioner DGHI Enterprises sought discretionary review by this Court which was granted December 1, 1998.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case was based on an interpretation of CR 52 and 63. Interpretation of a court rule is a matter of law requiring de novo review. 19
The principal issue in this appeal involves interpretation of Civil Rules (CR) 52 and 63. At the close of Petitioner's case in this non-jury trial, the trial court granted Respondents' Under RCW 2.28.030(2) a judge "shall not act" as a judge "when [the judge] was not present and sitting as a member of the court at the hearing of a matter submitted for its decision." 23 A limited exception to this prohibition is contained in CR 63(b) which states:
motion for dismissal under CR 41(b)(3). 20 CR 41(b)(3) states in part: "Defendant's Motion After Plaintiff Rests.... If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in rule 52(a).... " A hearing was scheduled for September 28, 1995 for final presentation of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Before he could sign and file the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial judge died unexpectedly on September 26, 1995. 21 Following the death of the original trial judge, the successor judge, Judge Peter D. Jarvis, signed and entered proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the prevailing parties. 22 The document was identical to the one which would have been considered for signing by Judge McCutcheon on September 28, 1995 if he had not died two days before
(b) Disability of a Judge. If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge before whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be performed by the court under these rules after a verdict is returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may (Emphasis added.)
in his discretion grant a new trial.
CR 52(a)(1) states:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law. Judgment shall be entered pursuant to rule 58 and may be entered at the same time as the entry of the findings of fact and the conclusions of law.
Respondents contend the requirements of CR 52(a) were met, first, by the detailed oral decision delivered by Judge McCutcheon in which he stated he "intended to adopt" the prevailing party's proposed findings and conclusions; 24 and, second, by the presentation hearing at which Judge McCutcheon answered objections to the proposed findings and conclusions, made a few minor changes and then "adopted on the record" the proposed findings and conclusions. 25 Respondents note that on September 12, 1995 Petitioner's attorney advised counsel for Respondents that, with two exceptions, the proposed findings were acceptable. 26 Respondents argue that, for this reason, entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the successor judge was merely a ministerial act requiring no exercise of discretion, and hence denial of the motion for a new trial was proper. 27
In its decision, the Court of Appeals stated 28 The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Judge McCutcheon had not signed CR 63(b) is unambiguous in its requirement that findings of fact and conclusions of law must be filed before a successor judge may perform the duties of a predecessor judge who cannot perform those duties because of death, sickness or other disability. "If the statute is unambiguous, its meaning is to be derived from the language of the statute alone." 30 In this case, the predecessor trial court judge, Judge McCutcheon, did not sign and file findings of fact and conclusions of law before his death. 31 This Court has stated:
the proposed findings and conclusions, but nevertheless concluded he had adopted them. 29
The purpose of filing is to deposit the document in a public place so that it may be seen and examined by any person interested [in it] ..., and "A document may be said to be filed with an officer when it is placed in his official custody, and deposited in the place where his official records and papers are usually kept." [ 32
Respondents' theory is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. "A statute should be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant." 33
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