Di Lustro v. Penton
Decision Date | 14 July 1932 |
Citation | 106 Fla. 198,142 So. 898 |
Parties | DL LUSTRO v. PENTON, Sheriff. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
En Banc.
Original proceeding by John Di Lustro for writ of habeas corpus directed to Moses H. Penton, as sheriff of Escambia County.
Petitioner remanded to sheriff's custody.
Philip D. Beall and Wm. McChesney, both of Pensacola, for petitioner.
Jennings & Watts and Olin E. Watts, all of Jacksonville, for respondent.
The petitioner is held by the respondent upon an information charging him as follows:
'First Count: * * * Did then and there unlawfully engage in the practice of barbering without first having obtained a certificate of registration as a registered barber issued pursuant to the provisions of chapter 14650 of the Laws of Florida of 1931 by the Board of Barber Examiners said board established by said act.
'Second Count: * * * Did then and there unlawfully hire and employ a certain person, to-wit: to engage in the practice of barbering, the said not then and there having and holding a valid unexpired and unrevoked certificate of registration to practice barbering and the said ----- not then and there having and holding a valid unexpired and unrevoked certificate of registration as a registered apprentice nor a permit to practice as a journeyman nor a permit to work as an apprentice under the provisions of Chapter 14650 of the Laws of Florida of 1931.
'Third Count: * * * Did then and there use on a patron certain barber tools, to-wit: razors, scissors, tweezers, combs rubber discs and parts of vibrators, which said barber tools had been used on another patron, which said tools were not then and there kept in a closed compartment and were not then and there immersed in boiling water nor in a solution of two per cent carbolic acid nor its equivalent before each such use.'
The petitioner is charged with the violation of chapter 14650 of the Acts of 1931, the pertinent portions of which are as follows:
Section 2 of the act defines barbering as those who shall engage in certain practice directly or indirectly or without payment for the public generally as follows:
'Barbering Defined
'Shaving, or trimming the beard or cutting or bobbing the hair.
'Facial and scalp massages or treatments with oils, creams, lotions or other preparation.
'Singeing, shampooing or dyeing the hair or applying hair tonics.
'Applying cosmetic preparations, antiseptics, powders, oil, clay or lotions to scalp, face or neck; and
'For the purpose of this Act and as used herein the term 'barber shop' is hereby defined to embrace and include any establishment or place or business wherein the practice of barbering as hereinabove defined is engaged in or carried on.'
--and then proceeds to specifically exempt from the statute certain persons:
'Exemptions
'(a) Persons authorized by the law of this State to practice medicine and surgery or osteopathy or chiropractic or persons holding a drugless practitioner certificate under the law of this State;
'(b) Commissioned medical or surgical officers of the United States Army or Navy or Marine hospital service;
'(c) Registered nurses under the laws of this State;
'(d) Persons practicing beauty culture;
'(e) Persons employed in state or local institutions, or hospitals as barbers.'
The act further provides:
'Constitutionality
The petition specifically attacks this Law because it is unconstitutional in that it contains:
(a) An unreasonable and arbitrary distinction and discrimination between persons engaged in the same class and kind of business or occupation, or exercising the same privileges, and makes an arbitrary distinction between persons similarly situated.
(b) That it does not bear equally and uniformly on all person engaged in the same class of business or occupation, and does not fall alike on all persons engaged in the same particular class of business or avocation.
(c) That it unreasonably and arbitrarily exempts part of the class or business or occupation of barbers, included in the definition of barbering.
(d) That it arbitrarily and unreasonably imposes a license tax and fee upon a portion of a certain class of business or occupation, and exempts certain other persons in said business or occupation similarly situated, without any valid reason therefor.
The constitutional provision for the 'Equal protection of the laws' seeks ...
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State Ex Rel. Fulton v. Ives
... ... Section 4151(24) to section ... 4151(48) Cum.Supp.1934 C.G.L. 1927 ... The law ... was considered by this court in Di Lustre v. Penton, ... 106 Fla. 198, 142 So. 898, 901. In that case the act was ... sustained against an attack that it contained provisions ... unlawfully ... and those who do not. Cooley's Constitutional Limitation, ... pp. 824, 825; Di Lustro v. Penton, 106 Fla. 198, 142 ... While ... freely admitting that it is difficult to construe or apply to ... new circumstances as they ... ...
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State v. Inland Empire Refineries, Inc.
... ... Huss, 199 Cal. 21, 248 ... P. 235; In re [3 Wn.2d 670] Schmolke, 199 Cal. 42, ... 248 P. 244; Di Lustro v. Penton, 106 Fla. 198, 142 ... So. 898; Gulfport Building & Loan Association v. City of ... Gulfport, 155 Miss. 498, 124 So. 658; ... ...
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State Ex Rel. Lane Drug Stores, Inc. v. Simpson
... ... 595] ... canon of statutory interpretation, full effect should be ... given thereto ... In the ... case of Di Lustro v. Penton, Sheriff, 106 Fla. 198, ... 142 So. 898, 901, the court expressed serious doubt as to the ... validity of certain exemptions contained ... ...
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Corn v. State, 46922
...1967); Finlayson v. Conner, 167 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1964); Insurance Co. of Texas v. Rainey, 86 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1956); and DiLustro v. Penton, 106 Fla. 198, 142 So. 898 (1932). He contends that the questioned statute appropriately applies to family residences and other buildings where the publi......