Dial v. Crosby County

• Decision Date: 03 July 1936
• Docket Number: No. 4511.,4511.
• Parties: DIAL v. CROSBY COUNTY et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 534

96 S.W.2d 534

DIAL v. CROSBY COUNTY et al.

No. 4511.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Amarillo.

July 3, 1936.

Rehearing Denied September 7, 1936.

Appeal from District Court, Roberts County; W. R. Ewing, Judge.

Suit by Gertrude A. Dial against Crosby County and others. From a judgment changing the venue, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Kinney & Ritchey, of Miami, for appellant.

Robert M. McKee and W. P. Walker, both of Crosbyton, L. A. Wicks, of Ralls, and S. D. Stennis, of Pampa, for appellees.

HALL, Chief Justice.

Mrs. Gertrude A. Dial, claiming to be the owner of twelve Crosby County Jail Bonds in the sum of $1,000 each, filed this suit in the district court of Roberts county against Crosby county, road district No. 2 of Crosby county, J. W. Holibaugh, whom she alleged stole the bonds from her, Robert S. Harkins, individually and as county treasurer of Crosby county, and also joined the county judge and the commissioners of the four commissioners' precincts of said county, seeking to recover against them individually and as commissioners. She alleged that she bought the bonds in the open market in 1926; that Crosby county had paid to her all interest which had matured upon said bonds to March, 1932, and therefore had notice that appellant was the owner of said bonds; that on or about February 19, 1932, in Roberts county where this suit was instituted, the defendant, Holibaugh, stole said twelve bonds from appellant; that in January, 1933, the appellant filed this suit in the district court of Roberts county against the county and its treasurer, Harkins, alleging the fact that the bonds had been stolen, and prayed for an injunction against the county and Harkins, its treasurer, enjoining them from paying said bonds, or any interest thereon; that citation was served on both the county and its treasurer, Harkins.

She further alleged that immediately after the theft of the bonds, she notified Crosby county, its county judge and members of its commissioners' court, and the county treasurer, of the theft, and that she was the owner of said bonds and demanded that no payment be made to any one other than the plaintiff. She further alleged that the criminal acts of Holibaugh were committed in Roberts county; that they constituted a crime, trespass, or tort committed in said county; that the appellees, after the notice of said theft, and with the intent of acquiring said bonds and depriving this appellant of the value thereof, on or about the 25th day of May, 1933, and after said suit had been filed in Roberts county, bought or attempted to buy said bonds as an investment for said road district No. 2 of Crosby county at 80 cents on the dollar, which was far below the market value of said bonds; that the entire transaction was perpetrated by appellees, who were officers of Crosby county and of road district No. 2, for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff of her property; that all the appellees, at the time of the purported purchase of said bonds, had notice of the theft, and in attempting to buy the same and taking possession thereof they were guilty of receiving and concealing stolen property; that the acts ratified and adopted the original theft of said bonds, and made them parties thereto; that while the appellees purported to act for Crosby county and road district No. 2 in the purchase of said bonds, the same was beyond the scope of their authority and not in the discharge of any duties as officers of Crosby county or road district No. 2, and since said acts exceeded their duties and authority, such officers were individually liable to appellant for damages.

She prayed for return of the bonds, or for damages against the county, the road district, and the officers of the county, both personally and in their respective capacities, and that she have a joint and several judgment against them, as well as against J. W. Holibaugh.

She further alleged that after the acquisition of the bonds by appellees, all of said appellees, except Holibaugh, had paid to Crosby county and said district No. 2 interest due on said bonds, the amount of which appellant could not state, but that said payments, whatever they might be, constituted a conversion of funds belonging to appellant, and that said conversion was in furtherance of the original plan to defraud this appellant, and made said appellees liable, jointly and severally, to this appellant.

All of the defendants were cited, and answered, except Holibaugh, who could not be located.

Said defendants filed a joint plea of privilege, asking that the cause be transferred to the district court of Crosby county.

Appellant filed her controverting affidavit, in which she incorporated her amended petition in full. Appellant alleged that this suit is based upon a crime, trespass, or tort committed in Roberts county, where the suit is pending, and that the appellees herein all had notice of said crime, trespass, or tort at and before they adopted the original theft of said bonds, and thereby became a party to said theft, and that the district court of Roberts county thereby had venue of this cause, and appellees, and that said cause came under the jurisdiction of subdivision 9, article 1995 of the Revised Statutes 1925. She further alleged in her controverting affidavit that the appellees had knowingly received and concealed stolen property, to wit, the twelve bonds, which constituted a crime, trespass, or tort, and since the bonds had been stolen in Roberts county, the venue for the prosecution of said crime was in said county, and thereby the cause of action for the recovery of said bonds or damages came under subdivision 9 of article 1995, R.S.1925, and the court had venue to try this cause.

She further alleged that the court had jurisdiction of Holibaugh because he committed the offense in Roberts county, and since the suit was for the possession of said bonds, the appellees were necessary party defendants, and came within the provisions of subdivision 29a of said article 1995 (as added by Acts 1927, 1st Called Sess., c. 72, § 2 [Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 1995, subd. 29a]).

The appellees filed what is termed an amended and supplemental plea of privilege, in substance the same as their original plea. Thereafter appellant filed her amended and supplemental controverting affidavit.

Upon a...