Dials v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 07 October 1921
• Citation: 233 S.W. 888,192 Ky. 440
• Parties: DIALS v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

233 S.W. 888

192 Ky. 440

DIALS v. COMMONWEALTH.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

October 7, 1921

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lawrence County.

A. R Dials was convicted of unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquors, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Clyde L. Miller and Fred M. Vinson, both of Louisa, for appellant.

Chas I. Dawson, Atty. Gen., and John M. Waugh, of Ashland, for the Commonwealth.

CLARKE J.

Appellant was tried and convicted under indictment, charging him with unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquors in Lawrence county, Ky. which is in violation of the first section of chapter 81 of the Acts of the 1920 Session of the Kentucky Legislature. For reversal he insists: (1) That the law under which he was convicted, in so far as it attempts to prohibit the transportation of intoxicating liquor, for which only he was tried, is so indefinite as to contravene the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States (2) that the court erred in overruling his demurrer to the indictment; and (3) that the evidence upon which he was convicted was a confession obtained from him in violation of section 1649b, Ky. Statutes, known as the "Anti-Sweating Act," and therefore incompetent.

1. Section 1 of chapter 81 of the 1920 Acts provides:

"That it shall be unlawful to manufacture, sell, barter, give away, or keep for sale, or transport, spirituous, vinous, malt or intoxicating liquors except for sacramental, medicinal, scientific or mechanical purposes in the commonwealth of Kentucky."

None of the several acts made unlawful by this section was a crime at common law, and, under such circumstances, a statute making them so must be sufficiently certain to show what the Legislature intended to prohibit and punish, otherwise it will be void for uncertainty, "but reasonable certainty in view of the conditions is all that is required and liberal effect is always to be given to the legislative intent when possible," and it is only where "the Legislature declares an offense in words of no determinate signification, or its language is so general and indefinite that it may embrace not only acts commonly recognized as reprehensible, but also others which it is unreasonable to presume were intended to be made criminal," that the statute will be declared void for uncertainty. 16 C.J. 67. The purpose of the Legislature in the enactment of this chapter, as indicated by its title and terms, and in view of the fact that it was enacted immediately after the adoption of an amendment to the state Constitution, now section 226a thereof, prohibiting the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors in the commonwealth, except for certain named purposes, was to provide penalties for violations of the constitutional amendment; and to regulate the manufacture, sale, and transportation of same for such excepted purposes. That this act was not hastily enacted, but is rather the culmination of the most intense and widespread public agitation, is a matter of common knowledge.

Except, therefore, as permitted by the terms of the constitutional amendment and this act, it seems to us that we must assume the Legislature meant, as it has stated clearly, that all other transportations of intoxicating liquors should be unlawful and any presumption to the contrary would be wholly unwarranted. The word "transport," while general, is not indefinite, but, on the contrary, has a commonly understood "determinate signification." That the Legislature fully realized the general character and wide scope of the words "manufacture, sale and transport" is attested by the fact such limitations were placed thereon as the Legislature intended they should have by specifying the desired exemptions therefrom. Are we not therefore under such circumstances bound to assume that the Legislature meant to include every possible application of the general terms used except as clearly stated or necessarily implied from what is stated? We think so.

It is argued that it cannot be presumed that Legislature by section 1 of the act meant to prohibit the transportation of liquors for personal use even though the language of this section is broad enough for that purpose, since by a later section of the act...