Diaz v. Florida

• Decision Date: 03 November 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 15–cv–62670–BLOOM/Valle
• Citation: 219 F.Supp.3d 1207
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
• Parties: Marissa DIAZ, Plaintiff, v. State of FLORIDA, 17th Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida, Defendant.

219 F.Supp.3d 1207

Marissa DIAZ, Plaintiff,

v.State of FLORIDA, 17th Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida, Defendant.

Case No. 15–cv–62670–BLOOM/Valle

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed November 3, 2016

Entered November 4, 2016

Peter J. Solnick, Peter J. Solnick PA, Aventura, FL, for Plaintiff.

Jamie Marie Ito, Florida Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

BETH BLOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This cause is before the Court upon Defendant State of Florida, 17th Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [29] ("Motion"). The Court has reviewed the Motion, all supporting and opposing filings, and the record in this case. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.

I. Relevant Facts

In September of 2012, Plaintiff Marissa Diaz ("Diaz"), began working as an administrative assistant in the probate unit of the 17th Judicial Circuit. See Defendant's Statement of Material Facts, ECF No. [28] ("Def. SOF"), ¶ 1.¹ After interviewing with Linda Brooks ("Brooks"), a supervisor in the mental health unit, and Diana Sobel ("Sobel"), the Chief of Personnel for the 17th Circuit, Diaz was promoted to a case manager position in the mental health unit in March, 2013. Id. ¶¶ 3–5. Diaz's job duties in the mental health unit included responding to "beeps" from courtrooms, also known as "running," writing up competency orders, processing reports, making copies, and delivering reports to courtrooms. Id. ¶ 7. Diaz covered twenty-two (22) courtrooms, and processed evaluations from judges by entering pertinent information into a database. See Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Facts ("Pl. SOF"), ECF No. [35], ¶ 7. After making copies, Diaz delivered any evaluations or reports needed to the courtrooms. Id. Diaz responded immediately if beeped by a courtroom, and her duties required that she travel up and down between courtrooms and her office. Id. Diaz was aware of the position's requirements when she applied for the job. Def. SOF ¶ 9.

Diaz testified that she had a heavier workload than some of her co-workers from the beginning of her employment in the mental health unit. Id. ¶ 12. The intensity of her job was a concern for Diaz, as she told her supervisors that her co-workers who worked at their desks could "step up" and work more efficiently for the judges and the court. Id. ¶ 10. Diaz emailed Sobel in May, 2014 to complain that her duties were "quite grueling" and "quite overwhelming," and noted that she was "confused as to why it has been this way only for the runner case manager position." Id.

On August 13, 2014, Diaz informed Brooks that she was pregnant, and shortly thereafter, told Brooks that she wanted to "slow down." Id. ¶¶ 13–14. Brooks informed Diaz that she would need to obtain a doctor's note in order to adjust her duties. Id. ¶ 14. Thereafter, when Diaz spoke to Sobel about the request, Sobel told Diaz to slow down, and emailed Diaz a medical certification form to complete. Id. ¶ 15. Brooks later became aware that Diaz had spoken to Sobel about her pregnancy and request to "slow down," but the parties dispute whether Brooks was aware that Diaz complained to Sobel about the manner in which Brooks treated her after announcing her pregnancy. See Def. SOF ¶ 16; Pl. SOF ¶ 16. When Sobel subsequently spoke to Brooks about the meeting with Diaz, Sobel told Brooks that Diaz did not think that she could perform the functions of her job the way she was. Def. SOF ¶ 17; see also Deposition of Linda Brooks, ECF No. [27–3] ("Brooks Dep."), at 48. The medical certification that Diaz returned to Sobel on October 10, 2014 stated, "patient is unable to move as fast as before," but aside from "walking at a fast pace," the certification did not list any specific job duties affected by Diaz's pregnancy, and the only accommodation requested was that Diaz be allowed "to perform [her] job slower." Id. ¶ 18. As a result of the medical certification form, Sobel told Diaz to "slow down and take breaks if she need[ed] to"; Diaz could, and did on occasion, use the benches in the courthouse to rest; Diaz would remain near the courtrooms between pages instead of rushing back and forth from her office to the courtrooms; and Brooks sometimes helped Diaz conduct her runs. Id. ¶ 19.

According to Diaz, despite having made past complaints of unfair treatment prior to her pregnancy, Brooks treated her differently and worse after she notified Brooks of her pregnancy. Id. ¶¶ 44–45 Pl. SOF ¶¶ 44–45. Even though Diaz complained about being asked about her "personal business," she has no recollection of reporting pregnancy discrimination, even though she believes she implied to Sobel that she was "very uncomfortable" with Brooks. Def. SOF ¶ 46; Pl. SOF ¶ 46.

Events leading to Diaz's termination

The mental health unit has its own two-drawer cabinet located outside of Diaz's cubicle, containing office supplies for the use of mental health unit employees. Id. ¶ 21. In addition, the 17th Circuit Court Administration, of which the mental health unit is a part, has a supply room located down the hall from Diaz's cubicle. Id. ¶¶ 6, 20. Despite an office policy requiring employees to submit office supply requests in writing to a supervisor, employees obtained supplies without strict adherence to office policy. Id. ¶ 23–24; Pl. SOF ¶ 24. Bert Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") is a purchasing technician, whose job duties included assisting employees to obtain office supplies. Def. SOF ¶ 24. According to Rodriguez, he frequently provided "odds and ends" to employees in the mental health unit but did not provide items in bulk to individual employees. See Deposition of Alberto Rodriguez, ECF No. [27–4] ("Rod. Dep."), at 14–15.

On October 21, 2014, Diaz went to the supply room and asked Rodriguez for supplies. Def. SOF ¶ 25. Diaz took the following items from the supply room: 24 mechanical pencils, 2 refill packs for mechanical pencils, 72 pencils, 144 eraser caps, 36 Post–It note pads, 12 highlighters, 4 dry erase markers, 24 Sharpies, 10 rolls of tape, and 12 glue sticks. Id. ¶ 26. Rodriguez offered to take the box containing the supplies to Diaz's cubicle for her. However, Diaz declined and instead put them in an empty cubicle. Id. ¶ 27. The parties disagree on the proper characterization of the location in which Diaz left the box and specifically whether it could be considered a secluded area. See Def. SOF ¶ 27; Pl. SOF ¶ 27. Nevertheless, Rodriguez later took the box of supplies to Diaz's cubicle because she was pregnant and he did not want her to carry it. Def. SOF ¶ 27; see also Rod. Dep. at 29.

Brooks observed Rodriguez deliver the box of supplies to Diaz's cubicle, and that most of the supplies in the box were available in the mental health unit's supply cabinet. Def. SOF ¶¶ 28, 30. When Brooks asked him what the box was, Rodriguez responded that Diaz had requested it and that he was leaving it there. Rod. Dep., at 30. Based upon the quantities of supplies contained in the box, Brooks believed that there could be an issue. Brooks Dep. at 62–63. Brooks told Sobel about her observations and Rodriguez's statement. Def. SOF ¶ 31. Later that day, Sobel and Brooks met with Diaz and asked her about the supplies and why she needed them. Def. SOF ¶ 32. Diaz responded that she needed the box of supplies "to use." Deposition of Marissa Diaz, ECF No. [27–1] ("Diaz Dep."), at 136. Brooks and Sobel were not satisfied with Diaz's response, which Sobel thought to be evasive. Def. SOF ¶ 33; see Sobel Dep. at 19. Even though Diaz believed that Brooks and Sobel thought she was trying to steal the supplies, she did not offer an explanation because she was concerned about being overheard by her co-workers. Def. SOF ¶ 35.

After speaking to Diaz, Sobel recommended termination based on her belief that Diaz was attempting to steal state property. Id. ¶ 38. According to Sobel, the supplies Diaz took were "more supplies than any one individual would need ... boxes of items, some of which had no bearing on her job." Id. ; see also Sobel Dep., at 18. Though Sobel made the recommendation, the ultimate decision to terminate Diaz was made by Kathy Pugh, the Trial Court Administrator, who did not know that Diaz was pregnant until after she made the decision to terminate. Def. SOF ¶ 39–40. Diaz was informed on October 28, 2014 that her employment was terminated, three months after informing Brooks of her pregnancy. Def. SOF ¶ 43.

II. Legal Standard

A party may obtain summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The parties may support their positions by citation to the record, including inter alia, depositions, documents, affidavits, or declarations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is genuine if "a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party." Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States , 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. See Davis v. Williams , 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Further, the Court does not weigh conflicting evidence. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga. , 485 F.3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Carlin Comm'n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. , 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 198...