Diaz v. Phoenix Lubrication Serv. Inc. Dba Jiffy Lube

Decision Date04 May 2010
Docket NumberNo. 1 CA-CV 09-0034.,1 CA-CV 09-0034.
Citation224 Ariz. 335,230 P.3d 718
PartiesJoseph Bryant DIAZ; Joseph Diaz, Jr., Patricia Diaz, Plaintiffs/Appellants,v.PHOENIX LUBRICATION SERVICE, INC. dba Jiffy Lube, Defendant/Appellee.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals

Coben & Associates By Larry E. Coben, Scottsdale, Attorney for Appellants.

Carnahan Perry Hanlon & Hudson PLC By Christopher M. Hanlon, Michael R. Perry, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

GEMMILL, Judge.

¶ 1 During a routine oil change and service job, did Phoenix Lubrication Service, Inc., dba Jiffy Lube (Jiffy Lube) owe Plaintiffs a duty to perform a safety inspection of the tires of Plaintiffs' vehicle and to warn of any dangerous tread wear? We answer this question in the negative, and we therefore affirm summary judgment in favor of Jiffy Lube.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On October 30, 2004, Plaintiff Joseph Bryant Diaz (Bryant) took the Volvo owned by his parents, Plaintiffs Joseph Diaz, Jr. and Patricia Diaz, to a Jiffy Lube for an oil change. The oil change service purchased by Bryant included, among other things, a check of the Volvo's tire pressure. Jiffy Lube does not sell or replace tires, but does offer a separate tire rotation service and inspection for an additional fee. Bryant, however, purchased only the oil change service and does not recall asking Jiffy Lube to perform any work on the Volvo's tires or to inspect the condition of the tires.

¶ 3 A few weeks later, on November 21, 2004, Bryant was driving the Volvo on East Mayo Boulevard near the 56th Street intersection. It had been raining and Bryant lost control of the Volvo as it traveled over a wet portion of the road. The car traveled off the road and rolled over. As a result, Bryant suffered serious injuries, including paralysis. Plaintiffs assert that the worn condition of the tread on the inside portion of the Volvo's rear tires “caused or contributed to the underlying accident.”

¶ 4 On June 29, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants Ford Motor Company, Volvo Car Corporation, Volvo Cars of North America, LLC., Volvo Cars of North America, Inc., and Discount Tire Company. The complaint contained, among other allegations, a strict products liability claim against Ford and Volvo for defective design “regarding [the Volvo's] handling characteristics, roof structure, and seatbelt restraint system.”

¶ 5 Plaintiffs also alleged a negligence claim against Discount Tire. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that the Volvo had been taken to Discount Tire in July 2004 to have its rear tires replaced. According to Plaintiffs, Discount Tire did not properly inspect the rear tires to determine the existence of wear patterns that are symptomatic of suspension and alignment problems. This omission allowed “the [Volvo] to be released for use with a known handling problem that caused significant and dangerous wear patterns on the rear tires.” The wear pattern allegedly caused the tires to achieve less traction, making the Volvo dangerous for use on wet roads.

¶ 6 In March 2006, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include UAG Phoenix, LLC, dba Volvo North Scottsdale (“UAG”). Based upon allegations set forth in Discount Tire's notice of non-party at fault, Plaintiffs alleged UAG serviced their Volvo on September 29, 2004 and November 5, 2004 and negligently failed to inspect the Volvo's tires. UAG named Jiffy Lube as a non-party at fault, alleging that Jiffy Lube “breached its duty to examine the [Volvo's] tires in an appropriate manner” during the October 2004 oil change. Plaintiffs initially opposed UAG's notice of non-party of fault and moved to strike UAG's notice. In their motion, Plaintiffs stated that UAG “has no evidence that Jiffy Lube had a duty to inspect in the inside surface of the tires on the [Volvo].”

¶ 7 After the denial of their motion to strike UAG's listing of Jiffy Lube as a non-party at fault, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add Jiffy Lube as a defendant. Plaintiffs claim Jiffy Lube was negligent because the service Jiffy Lube performed on Plaintiffs' Volvo “included or should have included a check of the [Volvo]'s tire pressure, an examination of the tires on the [Volvo] and notification of the tire wear.” According to Plaintiffs, when the Volvo was parked over the service bay, the Jiffy Lube technician underneath the Volvo who was changing the oil should have observed portions of the Volvo's rear tire treads.

¶ 8 All of the Defendants except Jiffy Lube were eventually dismissed from the action. In July 2008, Jiffy Lube filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it did not owe Plaintiffs a duty to inspect the inside tread of the Volvo's tires. The court denied Jiffy Lube's motion on the basis that it was not timely filed. The court stated, however, that at trial it would likely “adopt Jiffy Lube's position that it did not owe a legal duty to [Plaintiffs].” Consequently, both parties agreed that the motion for summary judgment should be submitted to the court for reconsideration. The court agreed to reconsider the motion and then granted it. Final judgment was entered in January 2009 in favor of Jiffy Lube.

¶ 9 Plaintiffs timely appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003) and 12-2101(B) (2003).

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Plaintiffs contend the court erred in granting Jiffy Lube's motion for summary judgment. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Maycock v. Asilomar Dev., Inc., 207 Ariz. 495, 496, ¶ 2, 88 P.3d 565, 566 (App.2004). We determine de novo whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court correctly applied the law. Green v. Garriott, 221 Ariz. 404, 417, ¶ 51, 212 P.3d 96, 109 (App.2009); Mein v. Cook, 219 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 9, 193 P.3d 790, 792 (App.2008).

¶ 11 The primary issue on appeal is whether Jiffy Lube owed a legal duty to Plaintiffs in regard to the allegedly worn tires.1 We conclude, with guidance from the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 150 P.3d 228 (2007), that Jiffy Lube did not owe Plaintiffs a legal duty that would permit a recovery in this case.

¶ 12 “To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d at 230. Duty is an “obligation, recognized by law, requiring the [defendant] to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.” Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 504, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (1983) (quoting W. Proffer Handbook on the Law of Torts § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971)). The existence of a duty is a question of law that we review de novo. Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 295, ¶ 11, 211 P.3d 1272, 1279 (App.2009). The other elements of negligence are usually factual issues to be decided by a jury. Id. Whether a defendant owes the plaintiff a duty is a threshold issue. Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143, ¶ 11, 150 P.3d at 230. Absent a duty, a negligence action cannot be maintained. Id.

¶ 13 Plaintiffs contend that Jiffy Lube owed Plaintiffs a duty to inspect the Volvo's tires because the oil change contract required Jiffy Lube to check each tire's air pressure. Plaintiffs also contend that, aside from the contract, a duty arose because the standard in the industry called for vehicle maintenance businesses like Jiffy Lube “to inspect all visible vehicle components for hazards during the performance of their service work.” Finally, Plaintiffs argue public policy is better served by imposing such a legal duty on Jiffy Lube. We analyze Plaintiffs' arguments using the principles provided by our supreme court in Gipson regarding the determination of duty.

¶ 14 The issue presented in Gipson was whether persons who are prescribed drugs owe a duty of care when they improperly give their drugs to others. 214 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 1, 150 P.3d at 229. In analyzing this issue, the Arizona Supreme Court considered two factors in evaluating the existence of a duty: (1) the relationship between the parties and (2) public policy considerations. Id. at 144-146, ¶¶ 18-26, 150 P.3d at 231-233. The court explained that [d]uties of care may arise from special relationships based on contract family relations, or conduct undertaken by the defendant.” Id. at 145, ¶ 18, 150 P.3d at 232. In addition, the common law provides various categorical relationships that can give rise to a duty, such as the landowner-invitee relationship, the tavern owner-patron relationship, and relationships that create a duty to control the actions of another. Id. at¶ 19. The court cautioned, however, against determinations of duty based on a “fact-specific analysis” of the relationship between the parties, emphasizing that the issue of duty is a legal matter rather than a factual matter. Id. at ¶ 21. Public policy, the other factor used to determine the existence of a duty, may be found in state statutory laws and the common law. See id. at 146 n. 4, ¶ 24, 150 P.3d at 233 n. 4. With these precepts in view, we examine the relationship between the parties and any applicable public policy.

The Relationship Between The Parties

¶ 15 In this case, the relationship between the parties did not create a duty on the part of Jiffy Lube to inspect the tires. First, the categories of relationships discussed in Gipson do not encompass the relationship Jiffy Lube had with Plaintiffs. In addition, we disagree with Plaintiffs that their contractual relationship with Jiffy Lube extended to a safety inspection of the Volvo's tires such that Jiffy Lube owed a duty of reasonable care to inspect...

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