Dibiasi v. Joe Wheeler Elec. Membership
Decision Date | 11 January 2008 |
Docket Number | 1060848. |
Citation | 988 So.2d 454 |
Parties | Narriman DIBIASI and Julia Brewer, as co-administratrixes of the estate of Dominic DiBiasi v. JOE WHEELER ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORP. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
M. Clay Martin and Tara L. Helms of Watson, Jimmerson, Martin, McKinney, Graffeo & Helms, P.C., Huntsville, for appellants.
John W. Dodson and Patrick G. Montgomery of Ferguson, Frost, & Dodson, L.L.P., Birmingham, for appellee.
This wrongful-death action was brought on behalf of Dominic DiBiasi ("Dominic"), who was electrocuted when he grabbed an uninsulated high-voltage transmission line hanging over the roof of the house on which he was standing. The transmission line, owned by Hartselle Utilities ("Hartselle"), was attached to a utility pole owned by Joe Wheeler Electric Membership Corp. ("Joe Wheeler"). Narriman DiBiasi, Dominic's mother, and Julia Brewer, Dominic's common-law wife, as co-administratrixes of Dominic's estate (hereinafter referred to collectively as "DiBiasi"), filed a wrongful-death action against both Hartselle and Joe Wheeler, alleging negligence and wantonness on the part of both parties. Joe Wheeler moved for a summary judgment, arguing that its pole was not defective and that Joe Wheeler owed no duty to Dominic. The trial court granted Joe Wheeler's motion and entered a judgment in its favor, stating that "the plaintiffs' claims set forth against [Joe Wheeler] in their original Complaint and all amendments thereto are dismissed with prejudice." The summary judgment was made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.
DiBiasi now appeals, arguing that there is substantial evidence indicating that Joe Wheeler owed a duty to Dominic. However, because DiBiasi makes no apparent argument in support of her wantonness claim, it is waived, and, therefore, we do not address it. See Pardue v. Potter 632 So.2d 470, 473 (Ala.1994) . We affirm the trial court's judgment.
On October 11, 2004, Dominic was residing with Alan and Sherry Holt at 1607 Main Street West, Hartselle, Alabama, to which Hartselle supplies the power. On the morning of the accident, he was working around the house when he and Alan decided to climb onto the roof to inspect the gutters. While they were on the roof, the men saw two lines above the roof of the Holts' house—one line was 2 to 2.5 feet above the peak of the roof, while the other was approximately 5 feet above the peak of the roof. The two men discussed attaching a pulley to the lines and sliding down, in the belief that the lines were support cables for the nearby utility poles. It appears that both men grabbed the lower of the two lines, a neutral line, and determined that "it would probably hold [them]." Dominic was curious about the higher of the two lines, and he grabbed it to determine whether it would hold them; that line, however, was an uninsulated 7,200-volt transmission line, and Dominic was killed when he grabbed it.
The line that electrocuted Dominic was an electric transmission line owned by Hartselle that crossed the Holts' house as it ran between two poles—one owned by Hartselle and the other owned by Joe Wheeler. Hartselle attached its line to Joe Wheeler's pole as part of a "joint-use" or "pole-sharing" agreement. The agreement allows the sharing of poles for the transmission of power to the companies' respective customers without the need to duplicate infrastructure.
DiBiasi sued both Hartselle and Joe Wheeler, alleging both negligence and wantonness. The negligence and wantonness claim against Joe Wheeler alleges as follows:
The trial court granted Joe Wheeler's summary-judgment motion, finding as follows:
2
DiBiasi now appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly granted Joe Wheeler's summary-judgment motion because, DiBiasi says, she produced substantial evidence showing that Joe Wheeler owed a duty to Dominic that it breached, resulting in his death.
DiBiasi argues that the trial court improperly entered a summary judgment for Joe Wheeler because, she says, (1) DiBiasi presented evidence indicating that Joe Wheeler knew or should have known that its pole was being used to create an unreasonably dangerous condition and, therefore, it owed a duty to Dominic to require the removal of the dangerous condition, and (2) DiBiasi presented substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Joe Wheeler knew or should have known that its utility pole was being used to run an uninsulated transmission line over the Holt residence in a manner that created an unreasonably dangerous hazard.
A summary judgment is appropriate only if the trial court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. Once a movant makes a prima facie showing that those two conditions are satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce "substantial evidence" that creates a genuine issue of material fact. Ex parte CSX Transp., Inc., 938 So.2d 959, 961 (Ala.2006). "Evidence is `substantial' if it is of `such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.'" Ex parte CSX Transp., 938 So.2d at 961 (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989)); § 12-21-12(d), Ala.Code 1975. "`"If the nonmovant [assuming the nonmovant has the burden of proof at trial] cannot produce sufficient evidence to prove each element of its claim, the movant is entitled to a summary judgment, for a trial would be useless."'" Prowell v. Children's Hosp. of Alabama, 949 So.2d 117, 128 (Ala.2006) ( ).
On appeal, this Court reviews a summary judgment de novo. Ex parte Essary, [Ms. 1060458, Nov. 2, 2007] ___ So.2d ___, ___ (Ala.2007). In doing so, we apply the same standard of review as did the trial court. Ex parte Lumpkin, 702 So.2d 462, 465 (Ala.1997). "`"Our review is subject to the caveat that we must review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant."'" Ex parte CSX Transp., 938 So.2d at 962 (quoting Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So.2d 829, 833 (Ala.2001), quoting in turn Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 742 So.2d 182, 184 (Ala.1999)); Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990)....
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