Dickerman v. Reeder
| Citation | 109 P. 1060,59 Wash. 405 |
| Parties | DICKERMAN v. REEDER et al. (CRAB CREEK LUMBER CO., Intervener. |
| Decision Date | 23 July 1910 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Adams County; O. R. Holcomb Judge.
Action by H. R. Dickerman against W. C. Reeder and another, wherein the Crab Creek Lumber Company intervened. From the judgment plaintiff appeals, and defendants cross-appeal. Affirmed on plaintiff's appeal, and defendants' appeal sustained and cause remanded, with directions.
W. W. Zent and John M. Cannon, for plaintiff.
Lovell & Davis, for defendants.
Plaintiff brought this action to foreclose a mechanic's line, for the amount due him as contractor for the construction of a building at Ralston in Adams county. The Crab Creek Lumber Company intervened in the action, and sought to foreclose a lien for material furnished to the contractor. The defendants Reeder and Lucy, owners of the building defended by making certain denials and alleging counterclaims for damages. The lower court found upon the trial that there was due the plaintiff upon the contract $987.30, but deducted therefrom $550 as liquidated damages, and entered a decree of foreclosure for the balance, with interest, costs and attorney's fees, and also entered a decree in favor of the Crab Creek Lumber Company for the amount of its claim. The plaintiff has appealed, claiming that the court erred in overruling the demurrers to defendants' conterclaim for damages; also, in admitting in evidence a copy of the plans and specifications, and also in allowing damages in the sum of $5 per day for delay beyond the specified time for completing the building. The defendants Lucy and Reeder have filed a cross-appeal, claiming that the court erred in receiving in evidence the architect's final certificate. Neither appeal affects the decree in favor of the intervener. The appellant and respondents will be designated in this opinion as plaintiff and defendants respectively.
The plaintiff first argues that the court erred in overruling the demurrers to the affirmative defenses which set up counterclaims. The answer of the defendants, after admitting the contract alleged in the complaint and making certain general denials, alleged as an affirmative defense by way of counterclaim, as follows: 'That in the contract entered into between plaintiff and defendants it was agreed that he would complete the building and deliver the same to the defendants on or before December 1, 1908, and in case of failure to deliver the said building the said plaintiff agreed to pay stipulated damages in the sum of $5 per day and on the 15th day of April, 1909, the date of bringing this action the said building had not been finished or delivered as per the contract, and by reason thereof the plaintiff is indebted to these defendants in the sum of $600.' If we understand the plaintiff's argument, it is to the effect that, because the words 'the contract' and 'the building' are used without setting out the contract or more specifically stating what building is referred to, the separate answer is in itself incomplete and therefore insufficient. We think the separate answer is sufficiently complete within itself, for it states the substance of the contract. But if it is indefinite or uncertain, the overruling of a demurrer would not necessarily be reversible error.
It is next argued that the court erred in receiving in evidence a copy of the plans and specifications. There is no merit in this contention, for the copy offered in evidence was identified as the specifications referred to in the contract. None were attached to the contract set up in the complaint, although the plans and specifications were made a part thereof by express reference thereto, and it is not claimed that the copy offered was not correct. The evidence is sufficient to show that the copy offered is one of the originals.
It is next argued that the court erred in deducting $550 as stipulated damages, for delay in completing the building after the period provided for in the contract, being 110 days at $5 per day. Such contracts have...
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Bavaria Inv. Co. v. Washington Brick, Lime & Sewer Pipe Co.
...by the terms of the contract, their decision should be final and conclusive on the parties. In fact, our decision in Dickerman v. Reeder, 59 Wash. 405, 109 P. 1060, even further, holding that, when the contract provides for an appeal to arbitration, it is incumbent upon the party, not satis......
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Lindblom v. Mayar
...4 Wash. 390, 30 P. 396; Schmidt v. North Yakima, 12 Wash. 121, 40 P. 790; Wiley v. Hart, 74 Wash. 142, 132 P. 1015; Dickerman v. Reeder, 59 Wash. 405, 109 P. 1060; 6 Cyc. 88. In harmony with this view of the law, it is held that a complaint seeking recovery upon such a contract, the terms o......
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Grand Union Laundry Co. v. Carney
...upon delay involved the calculations of expected business profits. Williams v. Resenbaum, 57 Wash. 94, 106 P. 493; Dickerman v. Reeder, 59 Wash. 405, 109 P. 1060; Erickson v. Green, 47 Wash. 613, 92 P. As we have already stated, we regard the damages here as difficult of ascertainment, so i......
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