SPAULDING
Judge:
Appellees
brought this suit in trespass for damages sustained in an
automobile accident which occurred on July 6, 1970.
Appellant, who was the driver of one of the vehicles, was
substituted as defendant. He subsequently died, but, pursuant
to an appropriate stipulation, the case proceeded without the
appointment of a personal representative. In accordance with
the Act providing for compulsory
arbitration [1] as implemented by the Philadelphia
County Arbitration Rules, hearing was held before a panel of
three arbitrators on April 10, 1972, resulting in the
following award by the panel:
'Judgment in favor of the plaintiff Carolyn Dickerson and
against the defendant Cohen Hudson in the amount of Twenty
Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00)
Judgment in favor of the plaintiff Raymond Dickerson and
against the defendant Cohen Hudson in the amount of Five
hundred dollars ($500.00).
Judgment in favor of the plaintiff Donald Dickerson and
against the defendant Cohen Hudson in the amount of One
hundred twenty dollars and seventy-nine cents ($120.79).'
(Report and Award of Arbitrators).
Appellant's
counsel filed and perfected an appeal from the award
pursuant to the applicable local rules. Appellees then moved
to quash the appeal from arbitration. They alleged that
appellant offered no evidence as to liability, proferring
evidence solely on the issue of damages, and that the appeal
was in violation of the spirit of the arbitration rules in
that it was taken capriciously and for delay. Appellant filed
an answer to the petition to quash
contending that extensive cross-examination had tested the
evidence as to liability, that appellant regarded the award
as excessive, and that the appeal was taken in good faith
within the spirit of the rules of arbitration. The court
below granted appellee's petition, ordered the appeal
quashed and judgment entered on the award of the arbitrators.
Appellant now appeals from that order.
The court
below held that: 'We are of the opinion that this Appeal
should be quashed because it was not taken in good faith.
This Court has a right and indeed a duty to review Appeals
from arbitration where the issue is raised whether the
affidavit of 'no delay' is taken in good faith.'
The question on appeal is whether this holding was proper or
whether, under the facts in the instant case, it improperly
violated appellant's constitutional right to trial by
jury.
Our
consideration of the instant question necessarily begins with
the Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955), a leading
decision of our Supreme Court, which upheld the
constitutionality of the Act providing for compulsory
arbitration. The Court there, in approving the Act,
specifically noted its provision relating to the right to
appeal: 'Each of the parties was given the right to
appeal from the award to the court in which the cause was
pending at the time the rule of reference was entered, but
such appeal was subject to certain restrictions, . . ..'
381 Pa. at 226, 112 A.2d at 627. Although the precise holding
in Smith Case concerned the requirement that costs be paid as
a prerequisite to appealing from compulsory arbitration, its
reasoning is equally applicable to the other preconditions to
appeal enumerated by the Act, [2] E.g., to the requirements
that the appeal be taken in good faith and
not for the purpose of delay, which we are concerned with
here.
The Court in
Smith initially reviewed the benefits derived from the
extension of compulsory arbitration to an enlarged number of
cases: 'The Act of 1952, greatly enlarging, as it does,
the scope of the Act of 1836, is of extreme importance in
that it effects a decided innovation in procedure for the
adjudication of the class of minor claims to which it
relates. It has many obvious advantages. It is clearly
designed to meet the situation which prevails in some
communities of jury lists being clogged to a point where
trials can be had only after long periods of delay,--a
condition resulting largely from the modern influx of
negligence cases arising from automobile accidents in a great
number of which no serious personal injuries are involved.
Removing the smaller claims from the lists not only paves the
way for the speedier trial of actions involving larger
amounts, but, what is of equal or perhaps even greater
importance, makes it possible from the immediate disposition
of the smaller claims themselves, thus satisfying the need
for prompt relief in such cases. By the same token, and
working to the same end, the use of the Act will free courts
for the speedier performance of other judicial functions.
Moreover, there will be a saving to claimants of both time
and expense by reason of greater flexibility in fixing the
exact day and hour for hearings before the arbitrators as
compared with the more cumbersome and
less adaptable arrangements of court calendars. The operation
of the Act has proved eminently successful in all respects,
it appearing from statistics gathered . . . that there were
585 cases tried by arbitrators (in a 6 month period) . . .,
in only 30 or 5% Of which appeals were taken to the courts of
common pleas. It would seem clear, therefore, that the system
of arbitration set up by this statute offers encouraging
prospects for the speedier administration of justice in the
Commonwealth.' 381 Pa. at 229--230, 112 A.2d at 628--629.
Having thus
approved of the policy behind compulsory arbitration, the
Court went on to consider the appellant's contention that
the Act's prerequisites for appeal, specifically the
payment of costs, deprived him of his right to a jury trial.
They rejected this argument, their reasoning being set out in
the following lengthy paragraph: 'The main charge is that
the Act violates Article I, section 6, of the Constitution
P.S. that 'Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the
right thereof remain inviolate.' It is true, of course,
that this provision of the Constitution would be violated
by a statute the effect of which was to compel parties to
submit to arbitration against their will or without their
assent. Cutler & Hinds v. Richley, 151 Pa. 195, 25
A. 96. Indeed compulsory arbitration conflicts also with the
14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution in that it works a
deprivation of property and liberty of contract without due
process of law. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of
Industrial Relations of State of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522,
43 S.Ct. 630, 67 L.Ed. 1103; Dorchy v. State of
Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 44 S.Ct. 323, 68 L.Ed. 686. But
this is so only where the statute closes the courts to
litigants and makes the decision of the arbitrators the final
determination of the rights of the parties; therefore there
is no denial of the right of trial by jury if the statute
preserves that right to each of the parties by the allowance
of an appeal from the decision of the
arbitrators or other tribunal. Emerick v. Harris, 1 Bin. 416;
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 19 S.Ct.
580, 43 L.Ed. 873; 50 C.J.S. Juries § 118 pp. 832, 833.
In the Capital Traction Co. case it was said 174 U.S. at page
23, 19 S.Ct. at page 589: 'It (the Constitution) does not
prescribe at what stage of an action a trial by jury must, if
demanded, be had, or what conditions may be imposed upon the
demand of such a trial, consistently with preserving the
right to it.' The only purpose of the constitutional
provision is to secure the right of trial by jury before
rights of person or property are Finally determined. All that
is required is that the right of appeal for the purpose of
presenting the issue to a jury must not be burdened by the
imposition of onerous conditions, restrictions or regulations
which would make the right practically unavailable. As to
what amounts to such a forbidden restriction it has been held
that the constitutional provision is not violated by a
requirement of the payment of costs before the entry of an
appeal in order to obtain a jury trial, McDonald v. Schell, 6
Serg. & R. 239; nor by a requirement of giving bail for the
payment of costs accrued and to accrue or for the performance
of some other duty, Haines v. Levin, 51 Pa. 412;
Commonwealth, to Use of Allegheny County v. McCann &
Co., 174 Pa. 19, 34 A. 299; nor by a requirement of
furnishing security for the prosecution of the appeal and
satisfaction of the final judgment, Capital Traction Co.
v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 23, 43--45, 19 S.Ct. 580, 43 L.Ed.
873; nor by a requirement of the payment of a jury fee in
advance of trial. Gottschall v. Campbell, 234 Pa.
347, 361, 83 A. 286, 291. There can be no valid objection,
therefore, to the provisions of the Act of 1836, unchanged by
the Act of 1952, regarding the payment of the accrued costs
and the giving of a recognizance for the payment of the costs
to accrue in the appellate proceedings as the condition for
the allowance of an appeal from the award
of the arbitrators.' 381 Pa. at 230--231, 112 A.2d at
630--631.
The court
below approached the question here by a route similar to that
taken in Smith, beginning with a review of compulsory
arbitration in its jurisdiction: 'It is pertinent to
review the status of arbitration in the Common Pleas Court of
Philadelphia County. This method of disposing of cases was
introduced over the objections of many experienced trial
lawyers, because they feard (sic) that arbitration would be
used as a means of discovery so long as Appeals could be
taken...
