Dickerson v. State Farm Lloyd's Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-11-00071-CV,10-11-00071-CV |
| Parties | DORIS DICKERSON INDIVIDUALLY & AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JERRY DICKERSON & LONGHORN PEST CONTROL, Appellants v. STATE FARM LLOYD'S INC. D/B/A STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY AND/OR D/B/A STATE FARM AND LAURA CAMPOS, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
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From the 220th District Court
Hamilton County, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINIONAppellants, Doris Dickerson, individually and as representative of the estate of Jerry Dickerson, and Longhorn Pest Control, challenge the trial court's granting ofsummary judgment and several other orders in favor of appellee, Laura Campos.1 By four issues, appellants argue that the trial court erred in: (1) granting Laura's no-evidence motion for summary judgment; (2) sustaining Laura's objections to appellants' summary judgment evidence of proximate cause; (3) granting Laura's motion to sever; and (4) denying appellants' motions to limit the testimony of Laura and her husband, Miguel Campos. We affirm.
This lawsuit arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred near Hico, Texas, on February 19, 2006. The accident involved a Toyota Tacoma pickup truck driven by the decedent, Jerry Dickerson, and two other vehicles, a Kia Sorrento driven by Jennifer Green and a Lexus ES300 sedan driven by Laura.2 The facts regarding how the accident took place are disputed.
It is undisputed that, on February 19, 2006, Jerry, a sixty-nine year old, was traveling southbound on Highway 281 and lost control of his pickup truck on an icy surface on the Bosque River bridge.3 Based on his investigation, Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Erich Neumann concluded that Jerry lost control of his pickup truck because he was driving at an unsafe speed with regard to the road conditions, a fact that even appellants' accident reconstructionist Cam Cope admitted. After losingcontrol of his pickup truck, it was alleged that Jerry struck the high curb of the bridge and then Green's Kia that was traveling in the oncoming lane. Laura asserts on appeal that although "no passenger in the Kia needed medical attention" and the "damage rating to the Kia was lower than the other vehicles," the record contains evidence that the Kia sustained major damage, a claim that appellants dispute. Nevertheless, after striking the Kia, Jerry's pickup truck began to spin. The pickup truck allegedly collided with the high curb of the bridge at least one more time, possibly several times, and the rear axle of the pickup truck became dislodged. After striking the high curb of the bridge once more, the pickup truck began sliding sideways southbound down the bridge "with considerable force."
Laura was driving her Lexus sedan northbound on Highway 281 at the time this incident transpired.4 Laura alleges on appeal that she was driving right behind Green's Kia when the incident began. Upon seeing the collision between Jerry's pickup truck and the Kia, Laura states that she slowed down and moved toward the center of thebridge in an attempt to avoid colliding with either of the vehicles. However, Laura was unable to avoid colliding with Jerry's pickup truck, which was now careening down the bridge sideways. The side of Jerry's pickup truck collided with the front of Laura's sedan. Neither Laura nor her husband, a front-seat passenger at the time, sustained serious injuries.
Jerry, however, died at the scene of the accident. The actual cause of Jerry's death was hotly contested in the trial court. On February 14, 2008, appellants filed their original petition asserting wrongful death and survival claims against Laura and seeking monetary compensation for the death of Jerry. Appellants alleged that Laura was negligent in failing to: (1) "yield right of way to [Jerry]"; (2) "come to a stop before impacting the decedent's vehicle"; (3) "keep in a single northbound lane"; and (4) "take proper advance evasive action prior to impact." Subsequently, appellants amended their original petition to assert claims against Jerry's uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier, State Farm Lloyd's, Inc. d/b/a State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm").5
In support of their allegations against Laura and State Farm, appellants proffered three expert witnesses—Cope, Al Davies, M.D., and Emergency Medical Technician ("EMT") Steven Edgar. Cope testified via deposition that Laura failed to stop or reduce her speed upon seeing Jerry collide with the Kia. He also opined that, based on his calculations, Laura was speeding given the road conditions and that she failed to take evasive action to reduce or eliminate the risk of colliding with Jerry's pickup truck.Cope estimated that, at the point of impact, Jerry's pickup truck was "at rest or nearly at rest" and that Laura was traveling between forty-five and fifty-five miles per hour.
Dr. Davies recounted that Jerry's death certificate indicated that he died as a result of blunt-force trauma sustained during the accident. Dr. Davies opined that Jerry's collision with Laura was far more injurious than the collision between Jerry's pickup truck and the Kia. Dr. Davies also testified that Jerry likely had a skull fracture, a neck or spinal injury, and lung, esophageal, or aortic injuries as a result of the accident. Dr. Davies admitted that any one of these injuries could have caused Jerry's death; however, it was Dr. Davies's opinion that Jerry died of exsanguinations or "bleeding out" from one of his thoracic injuries. Dr. Davies was unable to rule out the possibility that Jerry's internal bleeding could have been caused by the initial collision with the Kia.
Edgar, the EMT that treated Jerry at the scene of the accident, stated that it was his belief, within a reasonable medical probability, that Jerry's collision with Laura's sedan was more severe than any other impact involved in the accident and that Jerry's collision with Laura's sedan was the impact that caused his death.
Subsequently, Laura filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, contending that there was no evidence that her alleged acts proximately caused Jerry's death or any of the damages associated with the accident. Without a hearing, Judge James Morgan, granted Laura's no-evidence motion for summary judgment. In his letter ruling, Judge Morgan stated that the deposition testimony of appellants' expertwitnesses failed to establish causation and, thus, prevented appellants' expert witnesses from testifying as to causation.
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, which Judge Morgan eventually granted. Thereafter, several motions were filed by both parties. Laura filed a motion to strike the testimony of Cope. State Farm moved to strike the testimony of Dr. Davies and Edgar, arguing that their causation testimony did not meet the standards set forth in Daubert and its progeny, see generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993); Laura adopted this motion. Laura filed a motion to sever appellants' claims against her from those against State Farm, and she filed another no-evidence motion for summary judgment. And finally, appellants moved to limit the trial testimony of Laura and her husband for "belatedly turning in their deposition errata sheets." All of these motions were presented to Judge Morgan's successor, Judge Phil Robertson.
After reviewing the documents contained in the file, Judge Robertson: (1) granted the motions to strike the opinions of Edgar, Dr. Davies, and Cope; (2) granted Laura's motion to sever; (3) denied appellants' motion to limit the testimony of Laura and her husband; and (4) granted Laura's re-urged no-evidence motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
By their second issue, appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in striking the testimony of their experts, Dr. Davies, Edgar, and Cope. We disagree.
The trial court serves as an evidentiary gatekeeper by screening out irrelevant and unreliable expert evidence, and it has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of such evidence. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 590 (Tex. 1999); Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 718-19 (Tex. 1998); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles such that the ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). A reviewing court cannot conclude that a trial court abused its discretion simply because the reviewing court would have ruled differently. See Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1989).
The Texas Rules of Evidence provide that: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of opinion or otherwise." TEX. R. EVID. 702. To establish a witness's expert qualifications, the party calling the witness must show "that the expert has 'knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education' regarding the specific issue before the court which would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that particular subject." Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 121 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1996)); see Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 718. Whether a witness is qualified to offer expert testimony is amatter committed to the trial court's discretion. Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 151; see also Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 718-19.
Essentially, a two-part test governs whether expert testimony is admissible: (1) the expert must be...
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