Dickinson v. Dickinson
| Decision Date | 05 February 1897 |
| Citation | 167 Mass. 474,45 N.E. 1091 |
| Parties | DICKINSON v. DICKINSON. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Henry
C. Nash, Jr., and Stephen S. Taft, for libelant.
Wm. G Bassett and T.G. Spaulding, for libelee.
The only question which is raised by the report in this case is whether the judge who presided in the court below was justified by the evidence in entering a decree for the libelant. This raises a question of law, for in divorce cases we have no authority to revise the findings of the judge who heard the case on matters of fact, if the evidence is sufficient to warrant the findings. Smith v. Smith, 167 Mass. 87, 45 N.E. 52. The libelee set up in his answer a divorce obtained by him, in the state of Indiana, from the libelant in the present case, in January, 1873, on proceedings begun by him in February, 1871. The judge found that this divorce was obtained by due and regular proceedings in the proper court in Indiana, and in accordance with the laws of that state; but that he went to Indiana for the purpose of obtaining it, for a cause which occurred here while the parties resided here, intending to return to this commonwealth to live, after it was obtained, and that he did so return, and has lived here ever since.
It is provided by Pub.St. c. 146, § 41, as follows: "A divorce decreed in another state or country according to the laws thereof, and by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of both the parties, shall be valid and effectual in this commonwealth; but when an inhabitant of this commonwealth goes into another state or country to obtain a divorce for a cause which occurred here, while the parties resided here, or for a cause which would not authorize a divorce by the laws of this commonwealth, a divorce so obtained shall be of no force or effect in this commonwealth." Whether, if the libelee had acquired a domicile in Indiana at the time he filed his application for a divorce there, we should recognize his divorce as valid, under article 4, § 1, of the constitution of the United States, providing that "full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state," we find it unnecessary to decide. By the laws of Indiana, a divorce may be decreed, for certain causes stated "on petition filed by any person who, at the time of the filing of such petition, shall have been a bona fide resident of the state one year previous to the filing of the same." The only ground upon which the courts of Indiana put their jurisdiction to decree a divorce, where the marriage has taken place and the cause for divorce has occurred in another state, is that the party applying for a divorce in Indiana had obtained, in good faith, a domicile there. Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407. See, also Wilcox v. Wilcox, 10 Ind. 436; Prettyman v Prettyman, 125 Ind. 149, 25 N.E. 179. So, too, in Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 123, where a divorce obtained in Indiana by a woman against her husband was held to be valid, it was put upon the ground that the decree in Indiana was at least prima facie evidence, and that, giving the fullest effect to the adverse testimony as it appeared in the record, it only raised a suspicion that the animus manendi may have been wanting. In delivering the opinion of the court, it was said by Mr. Justice Swayne: "The only question is as to the reality of her new residence and of the change of domicile." While the judge, in terms, has not said that the libelee did not acquire a domicile in Indiana, we are of opinion that this is fairly to be implied from the language used, taken in connection with the evidence. If the libelee did not acquire a domicile in Indiana, the court there had no jurisdiction, under the decisions last cited, to dissolve the marriage with the libelant, for a cause occurring here. See, also, Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass. 156; Ross v. Ross, 129...
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