Dickinson v. Lane

• Decision Date: 06 October 1908
• Citation: 85 N.E. 818,193 N.Y. 18
• Parties: DICKINSON v. LANE et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

193 N.Y. 18

85 N.E. 818

DICKINSON

v.LANE et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 6, 1908.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Action by Grace Georgette Dickinson against Lillie Lane and others. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (117 App. Div. 908,102 N. Y. Supp. 1134), unanimously affirming a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The facts alleged by the plaintiff in her complaint are in substance as follows: In 1875 George W. Kidd entered into an antenuptial agreement with Anna Estelle Slocum, whereby, in consideration of the sum of $40,000 advanced to him by her, to be used in the business he was then carrying on, he agreed to marry her, and to adopt her daughter, the plaintiff in this action. As the complaint continues, he also agreed to make said daughter ‘his heir and that in case there should be issue of said marriage, he would by will bequeath and devise all his property equally to and among the said child and his other children, and in case there should be no issue of said marriage, then in that case, he would bequeath and devise all his property’ to the plaintiff herein. This contract was followed by the marriage of Mr. Kidd and Mrs. Slocum, the surrender by the latter to the former of the possession of the plaintiff, her daughter, and the payment of said sum of $40,000 to him, by the use of which in his business he ‘accumulated a large fortune, consisting of real and personal property, which he had at the time of and left at his death.’‘Among such property was a policy of life insurance’ for $10,000 on his life, dated December 22, 1873, the premiums on which had all been paid by him. On the 22d of November, 1897, while said contract was in full force, and in due course of performance by his wife, he ‘attempted by an instrument purporting to be an assignment to transfer’ said policy of insurance to ‘his brothers and sisters and a niece,’ who are defendants in this action, purely as a gift, and without other consideration than mutual love and affection. Said instrument contained a guaranty as to ‘the validity and sufficiency’ thereof, and a covenant to warrant and defend the title of the assignees to said policy. The amount of the policy has been paid into court, and is now in the hands of the chamberlain of the city of New York, one of the defendants. After the death of Mr. Kidd, and on May 11, 1905, the plaintiff recovered judgment in the Supreme Court against his executors, the other defendants herein being also parties defendant to that action, requiring them to specifically perform said contract, and adjudging that the plaintiff was entitled to all his property and estate, subject only to the right of his wife to dower, and under the statute of distributions. The complaint herein contains no allegation that said assignment was made from evil motives, or with intent to defraud the plaintiff, and fraud is not alleged as a fact in connection therewith, although it is alleged, as a conclusion of law, that the assignment ‘was executed in derogation, in violation, and fraudulently as to the contract.’ The relief demanded was a judgment that the assignment is a violation of the antenuptial contract, and void as to the plaintiff, that she recover from the chamberlain the entire proceeds of the policy, and that he be enjoined from making payment thereof to any one else. The defendant William I. Seaman demurred to the complaint upon the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained by the Supreme Court at Special Term, and final judgment was rendered against the plaintiff accordingly, which on appeal to the Appellate Division was unanimously affirmed. A further appeal was then taken by her to this court.Henry D. Luce and Charles C. Dickinson, for appellant.

Frederick E. Fisher and William H. Wadhams, for respondents.

VANN, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The complaint does not rest upon actual fraud alleged as matter of fact, but on constructive fraud alleged as a conclusion of law. The theory of the pleader was that the plaintiff, by means of the antenuptial contract made between her mother and the decedent, became entitled to all the property of the latter at his death, without any reduction through gifts made in his lifetime; that, in the words of her counsel, ‘there was no option given to the decedent as to the sum or sums which he might give away,’ either in his lifetime or by last will and testament, and that he held his property as a quasi trustee, with power to use for the support of himself and family, but with no power to make a donation of any substantial amount to any person, or for any purpose. This construction of the contract is not required by the words used, and it would lead to such absured results as to show that it was not within the intention...