Dickinson v. Perry
| Decision Date | 27 May 1919 |
| Docket Number | 9118. |
| Parties | DICKINSON v. PERRY. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where a railway company dismissed from its service an employé who had served the company for nine years in the capacity of switchman in its yards, and, while in the discharge of his duties, was thrown from a box car by reason of a defective brake, and received injuries for which the company voluntarily compensated him, and on being discharged from the hospital where he had been sent for treatment by the agents of the company, the physician in charge gave him a letter addressed to the yardmaster of the company where the employé had formerly worked for the company, which letter stated -and in a few days after his return he presented himself to such yardmaster and offered to resume his former duties and exhibited to him such letter, at the time the yardmaster saying, "Dan, you are out of service, you are ineligible, and you will have to see the superintendent," and that he thereafter saw the superintendent and asked for re-employment, and was by said superintendent informed that, according to the doctor's report, he could not do anything for him, and that thereafter he asked the superintendent for a service letter, who, in a few days thereafter, sent him a letter as follows: -and thereafter he again applied to the superintendent of said company for re-employment, and was again informed by the said superintendent that he was incapacitated according to the doctor's report; that he thereafter applied for work as switchman to the officers who were empowered to hire switchmen of four other railway companies, each time exhibiting his service letter, and each time failing to receive employment; and he thereafter filed suit against the receiver of such company so issuing said service letter for damages, making the same a part of his petition, and by proper averments charged that the language used in the said service letter stating why he was dismissed from the service of the railway company was untrue, and that, as a result of the untruthfulness thereof, he had been blacklisted, and on account thereof refused employment by other railway companies, and that he could never secure employment from any railway company on account thereof, and as a direct and proximate result of said blacklisting he had been damaged in the sum of $20,000- held:
(a) That the truthfulness or untruthfulness of the statement contained in such service letter was an issue properly joined by the pleadings, and was a proper question for decision by the jury; and
(b) That, where special damages were alleged by the plaintiff and competent testimony offered in support thereof, the questions of the truthfulness or untruthfulness of the statement contained in the service letter as to why the plaintiff was dismissed from the service of the railway company and the measure of his damages were correctly submitted to the jury by the court, and the jury thereafter returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and assessed his damage in the sum of $3,000, and the trial court approved the same, the judgment should be affirmed.
Section 3769, Rev. Laws Okl. 1910, requiring that public service corporations given to employés discharged or leaving the service, a letter stating the nature of the service rendered and the cause for which the employé was discharged or quit the service does not deny to such public service corporations due process of law, and is not violative of section 7, art 2, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, nor of the Constitution of the United States, or the Fourteenth Amendment.
Requiring public service corporations to give a letter as designated in the foregoing paragraph of the syllabus, commonly known as a "service letter," is a requirement which affects the public welfare, and is a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
The requirement that a public service corporation shall give a service letter as described in the second paragraph of the syllabus herein is not a violation of section 22, art. 2, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, guaranteeing the right of free speech.
Where there is competent evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict of the jury and the instructions of the court to the jury fairly state the law arising upon the issue raised by the pleadings and the evidence, the judgment rendered upon the verdict will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
The presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of statutes, and the Supreme Court, whenever possible to do so, will uphold the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.
The Legislature is itself the judge of the conditions which warrant legislative enactments, and they are only to be set aside when they involve such palpable abuse of power and lack of reasonableness to accomplish a lawful end that they may be said to be merely arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and hence irreconcilable with the conception of due process of law.
A "certificate" is the usual and customary method to indicate that which has or has not been done.
[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Certificate.]
Error from District Court, Oklahoma County; Edward Dewes Oldfield, Judge.
Action by Daniel J. Perry against J. M. Dickinson, receiver for the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. Demurrer to plaintiff's evidence overruled, judgment for plaintiff, motion for new trial denied, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
C. O. Blake, of El Reno, K. W. Shartel, of Oklahoma City, R. J. Roberts, of El Reno, and W. H. Moore, of McAlester, for plaintiff in error.
Vaught & Brewer, of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.
This is an appeal from the district court of Oklahoma county. Daniel J. Perry, defendant in error, plaintiff below, on the 11th day of March, 1916, commenced this action against J. M. Dickinson, receiver for the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, a corporation, plaintiff in error, defendant below, by filing his petition, which was afterwards amended, to recover the sum of $20,000 damages. For convenience the parties will hereinafter be referred to as plaintiff and defendant, as they respectively appear in the court below.
The amended petition of the plaintiff is quite lengthy; therefore only the substance of the same will be stated.
He alleged that the defendant was receiver of the railway company named; that on the 30th day of June, 1913, the plaintiff was in the employ of said railway company in the city of Shawnee, Okl., as switchman; that on said date he was in discharge of his regular duties, and in setting the brake on a box car received injuries on account of a defect in the brake and its appliances, which defect was known to the agents and employés of the railway company, or could have been known with the exercise of proper diligence; that he was severely injured, describing his injuries, and that on account of same he was taken to the railway company's hospital in the city of Shawnee, where he was kept for two months, and for another month he spent his time at the hospital and at his home, going back and forth, and that thereafter he was advised by the physicians and representatives of the railway company that he would be ready for work within a very short time; that he entered into a settlement with the railway company for the damages he had sustained because of said injuries, and executed a release to the company for the same; that, after he had done so, he was taken worse, and said railway company, at its own expense, carried him to the hospital of said company, in the city of Chicago, where he was treated for approximately one month by a physician of said company; that thereafter he returned to Shawnee on or about the 17th day of December, 1913; that he was weak and run down, and remained at his home for approximately 60 days; that when he left the hospital in Chicago he was given a certificate directed to the general yardmaster of said railway company at Shawnee, Okl., advising said yardmaster that he was able to resume his work on his return to Shawnee, which certificate he attached to his amended petition, causing the same to be marked Exhibit A; that on his return to Shawnee he reported to the yardmaster of the company and was advised that he was out of service because he was ineligible for duty; that the report of the doctor showed he was incapacitated, and to see the superintendent; that he saw the superintendent, who informed him he was incapacitated according to the doctor's report, whereupon he exhibited the certificate marked Exhibit A, the superintendent remarking, "I have got nothing like that in my office."
Following this the plaintiff makes specific allegations in his amended petition which are as follows:
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