Dickinson v. Suggs

• Decision Date: 27 March 2015
• Docket Number: 2130899.
• Citation: 196 So.3d 1183
• Parties: Douglas S. DICKINSON and Barbara Dickinson v. James H. SUGGS et al.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

196 So.3d 1183

Douglas S. DICKINSON and Barbara Dickinson

v.James H. SUGGS et al.

2130899.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

March 27, 2015.

Opinion Overruling Application for Rehearing May 29, 2015.

Andrew P. Campbell and Yawanna N. McDonald of Campbell, Guin, Williams, Guy & Gidiere, LLC, Birmingham, of appellants.

J. Frank Head of Ellis, Head, Owens & Justice, Columbiana, for appellees.

MOORE, Judge.

Douglas S. Dickinson and Barbara Dickinson (“the Dickinsons”) appeal from a judgment of the Shelby Circuit Court (“the trial court”) entered on April 10, 2014, determining that James H. Suggs, Ruth E. Suggs, and the James H. & Ruth E. Suggs Revocable Trust (“the Suggses”) had acquired certain property located in Shelby County from the Dickinsons by adverse possession. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Procedural History

On June 5, 2008, the Suggses filed a complaint against the Dickinsons requesting that the trial court determine the boundary lines between their properties and that it declare that James and Ruth had adversely possessed a portion of property to which the Dickinsons had title. On September 19, 2008, the Dickinsons filed an answer and a counterclaim seeking to quiet title to the disputed property and asserting claims of slander of title and conversion.¹ After a trial and the trial court's viewing of the property on several different occasions, the trial court entered a judgment on April 10, 2014, determining that the Suggses had adversely possessed a portion of the property to which the Dickinsons had title. On May 9, 2014, the Dickinsons filed a postjudgment motion; that motion was denied on June 24, 2014. On July 21, 2014, the Dickinsons filed their notice of appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court; that court subsequently transferred the appeal to this court, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 12–2–7.

Standard of Review

“Where a trial court hears ore tenus testimony, as in this case, its findings based upon that testimony are presumed correct, and its judgment based on those findings will be reversed only if, after a consideration of all the evidence and after making all inferences that can logically be drawn from the evidence, the judgment is found to be plainly and palpably erroneous. See City of Birmingham v. Sansing Sales of Birmingham, Inc., 547 So.2d 464 (Ala.1989) ; King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 513 So.2d 1023 (Ala.198[7] ) ; Robinson v. Hamilton, 496 So.2d 8 (Ala.1986) ; see, also, Meeks v. Hill, 557 So.2d 1238 (Ala.1990). The trial court's judgment will be affirmed if there is credible evidence to support the judgment. City of Birmingham v. Sansing Sales of Birmingham, Inc., supra; see, also, American Casualty Co. v. Wright, 554 So.2d 1015 (Ala.1989).... The presumption of correctness is particularly strong in boundary line disputes and adverse possession cases, because the evidence in such cases is difficult for an appellate court to review. Seidler v. Phillips, 496 So.2d 714 (Ala.1986) ; Wallace v. [Putman ], 495 So.2d 1072 (Ala.1986) ; Drennen Land & Timber Co. v. Angell, 475 So.2d 1166 (Ala.1985) ; May v. Campbell, 470 So.2d 1188 (Ala.1985).”

Bearden v. Ellison, 560 So.2d 1042, 1043–44 (Ala.1990). The presumption of correctness afforded a trial court's judgment regarding a property dispute is “further enhanced if the trial court personally views the property in dispute.” Wallace v. Putman, 495 So.2d 1072, 1075 (Ala.1986). “ ‘Questions of law are reviewed de novo.’ ” Butterworth v. Morgan, 22 So.3d 473, 474–75 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (quoting Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So.2d 337, 342 (Ala.2004) ).

Discussion

The parties in this case are coterminous landowners. The property that the Suggses claimed by adverse possession is two separate and distinct parcels of land described as “parcel 4” and “parcel 5.” Parcel 4 consists of approximately .4 acres, and parcel 5 consists of approximately .8 acres. On appeal, the Dickinsons argue that the Suggses failed to prove the elements of adverse possession as to both parcels.

We initially note that the trial court did not specifically determine which type of adverse possession applied in this case, and the parties are in dispute on this issue.

“ ‘In Alabama there are basically two types of adverse possession, these two types being statutory adverse possession and adverse possession by prescription. Adverse possession by prescription requires actual, exclusive, open, notorious and hostile possession under a claim of right for a period of twenty years. See, Fitts v. Alexander, 277 Ala. 372, 170 So.2d 808 (1965). Statutory adverse possession requires the same elements, but the statute provides further that if the adverse possessor holds under color of title, has paid taxes for ten years, or derives his title by descent cast or devise from a possessor, he may acquire title in ten years, as opposed to the twenty years required for adverse possession by prescription. [Ala.] Code 1975, § 6–5–200. See, Long v. Ladd, 273 Ala. 410, 142 So.2d 660 (1962).

“ ‘Boundary disputes are subject to a unique set of requirements that is a hybrid of the elements of adverse possession by prescription and statutory adverse possession. In the past there has been some confusion in this area, but the basic requirements are ascertainable from the applicable case law. In a boundary dispute, the coterminous landowners may alter the boundary line between their tracts of land by agreement plus possession for ten years, or by adverse possession for ten years. See, Reynolds v. Rutland, 365 So.2d 656 (Ala.1978) ; Carpenter v. Huffman, 294 Ala. 189, 314 So.2d 65 (1975) ; Smith v. Brown, 282 Ala. 528, 213 So.2d 374 (1968) ; Lay v. Phillips, 276 Ala. 273, 161 So.2d 477 (1964) ; Duke v. Wimberly, 245 Ala. 639, 18 So.2d 554 (1944) ; Smith v. Bachus, 201 Ala. 534, 78 So. 888 (1918). But see, Davis v. Grant, 173 Ala. 4, 55 So. 210 (1911). See also [Ala.] Code 1975, § 6–5–200(c). The rules governing this type of dispute are, in actuality, a form of statutory adverse possession. See [Ala.] Code 1975, § 6–5–200(c) ; Berry v. Guyton, 288 Ala. 475, 262 So.2d 593 (1972).’

“[Kerlin v. Tensaw Land & Timber Co., ] 390 So.2d [616] at 618–19 [ (Ala.1980) ].

“Although the Alabama Supreme Court has applied the hybrid form of adverse possession described above in true boundary-line disputes, see, e.g., Johnson v. Brewington, 435 So.2d 64, 65 (Ala.1983), it has held that, when a coterminous landowner is claiming to have acquired all or a significant portion of another coterminous landowner's land by virtue of adverse possession, (1) the case is an adverse-possession case rather than a boundary-line dispute, (2) the hybrid form of adverse possession does not apply, and (3), therefore, the party claiming adverse possession must prove the elements of either statutory adverse possession or prescriptive adverse possession. See McCallister v. Jones, 432 So.2d 489, 492 (Ala.1983) (holding that, when one coterminous landowner claimed to have acquired ownership of a three- to five-acre portion of the other coterminous landowner's land, the case was an adverse-possession case to which the hybrid form of adverse possession applicable in boundary-line disputes did not apply); and Kerlin, 390 So.2d at 619 (holding that, when one conterminous landowner claimed to have acquired ownership of the entire lot of the other coterminous landowner, the case was an adverse-possession case to which the hybrid form of adverse possession applicable in boundary-line disputes did not apply).”

Buckner v. Hosch, 987 So.2d 1149, 1152 (Ala.Civ.App.2007).

In the present case, the Suggses claimed to have adversely possessed a total of 1.2 acres of the Dickinsons' total 8.6 acres, including 175 feet of highway frontage. We conclude that parcels 4 and 5 were a “significant portion” of the Dickinsons' property and, thus, that the hybrid form of adverse possession did not apply. But see Holifield v. Smith, 17 So.3d 1173, 1178 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (holding that an “approximately 1/2–acre gore does not constitute all or a significant portion of the 20–acre west half [and, therefore,] the case ... is a true boundary-line dispute”). Because it is undisputed that the Suggses did not pay taxes on parcels 4 and 5, we conclude that the 20–year period for adverse possession by prescription applies.

Parcel 4

Parcel 4 is adjacent to a parcel of land known as “parcel 2” on which the Suggses and some of James and Ruth's family members had placed various homes and mobile homes. Ruth testified that her husband's parents, who were the Suggses' predecessors in title, had placed a large barn and a tractor shed on parcel 4 as early as 1946. James and Ruth's daughter, Vivian Glenn, testified that James's father had kept his cows corralled in the barn during the 1950s and that he had also stored corn in the barn. Various Suggs family members testified that they had stored various items in the barn through the years and even up until the time of the trial and that electricity lines have been run to the barn. It was undisputed that the barn and the tractor shed still existed on parcel 4 at the time of the trial.

Ruth also testified that her husband's father had farmed a large garden adjacent to the barn for years. She also testified that he had subsequently used that area as a pasture for his horses and that he had erected a fence for that purpose. There was testimony indicating that there had been fencing on both sides of the barn.

With regard to the element of actual possession, the Dickinsons argue that the fencing was insufficient to show actual possession. Although the Dickinsons cite several cases in which this court has affirmed a trial court's determination that no adverse possession had been proven although there was evidence that a fence had been erected by the claimed possessors, there are also cases affirming judgments determining that adverse possession had been proven relying, at least in part, on the erection of a fence on the disputed property. See, e.g.,...