Holifield v. Smith

Decision Date11 July 2008
Docket Number2061204.
Citation17 So.3d 1173
PartiesJackie HOLIFIELD and Rita Holifield v. Debra O. SMITH, Frank M. Overstreet, and Alberta Overstreet.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Gregory C. Buffalow of Miller Hamilton Snider & Odom, LLC, Mobile, for appellants.

Walter H. Honeycutt, Mobile, for appellees.

BRYAN, Judge.

The defendants, Jackie Holifield and Rita Holifield, appeal a judgment establishing a fence line as the boundary line between their land and the land of the plaintiffs, Debra O. Smith ("Debra"), Frank M. Overstreet ("Frank"), and Alberta Overstreet ("Alberta"). We reverse the trial court's judgment insofar as it erred in describing the location of the fence line, and we remand the case for the trial court to correct that error. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Alberta, the mother of Debra and Frank, owns record title to a life estate in the east half of the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of Section 23 in Mobile County ("the east half"). Debra and Frank own record title to the remainder interest in the east half. The Holifields own record title to the west half of the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of Section 23 in Mobile County ("the west half").

In August 2004, Joe Williams, who owned the west half at that time, had the west half surveyed by a licensed land surveyor to determine the location of the boundary line between the west half and the east half. The resulting survey drawing depicted the location of that boundary line as indicated by the description of the west half in the deeds in Williams's chain of title ("the deed line"). The survey drawing also depicted a fence line located a short distance west of the deed line. Williams, who knew that fences had been located in the vicinity of the fence line depicted on the survey drawing since the 1940s, offered to pay Alberta money if she would convey to him her interest in the gore of land located west of the deed line and east of the fence line depicted on the survey drawing. However, Alberta, indicating that she considered the fence line depicted on Williams's survey to be the boundary line between the west half and the east half, declined to convey her interest in that gore.

In February 2006, the Holifields, with knowledge that the owners of the east half contended that the fence line depicted on Williams's survey drawing was the boundary line between the west half and the east half, acquired title to the west half from Williams.

In May 2006, Alberta, Debra, and Frank sued the Holifields, alleging that the Holifields claimed record title to certain land located east of a fence that had stood for more than 20 years; that Alberta, Debra, and Frank or their predecessors in title had possessed that land and farmed it for more than 20 years; and, therefore, that, by virtue of adverse possession, they owned that land. They sought (1) a determination that, by virtue of adverse possession, they owned that land and (2) the establishment of the location of the true boundary line between the west half and the east half. Their complaint purported to give the legal description of the land they claimed to own by virtue of adverse possession; however, that legal description, which described land located west of the west half, was erroneous.

Answering the complaint, the Holifields denied that Alberta, Debra, and Frank owned any of the land located west of the deed line. The Holifields also asserted a counterclaim seeking the establishment of the location of the true boundary line between the west half and the east half.

Thereafter, the trial court held a bench trial at which it received evidence ore tenus. At the close of all the evidence, the Holifields moved the trial court to dismiss the action on the ground that the failure of the complaint filed by Alberta, Debra, and Frank to describe accurately the land they were claiming they owned by virtue of adverse possession deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court denied the Holifields' motion to dismiss.

In a posttrial brief they submitted before the trial court entered its judgment, the Holifields again asserted that the failure of the complaint to describe accurately the land Alberta, Debra, and Frank were claiming to own by virtue of adverse possession deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Thereafter, the trial court entered a judgment finding that the line of a fence erected in 1940 ("the 1940 fence line") by Bluett Tanner, who owned the west half at that time, was the boundary line between the west half and the east half. In so holding, the trial court implicitly found that Alberta, Debra, and Frank or their predecessors in title had acquired, by adverse possession, the portion of the west half bounded on the west by the 1940 fence line and bounded on the east by the deed line. The legal description of the 1940 fence line contained in the judgment, however, erroneously located it to the west of the west half.

Following entry of the judgment, the Holifields timely appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

We must first determine whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. The Holifields argue that the failure of the complaint to describe accurately the land that Alberta, Debra, and Frank claimed to own by virtue of adverse possession deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. If the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction, its judgment is void, and a void judgment will not support an appeal. Thus, if the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we would not have jurisdiction over an appeal from the trial court's judgment.

The Holifields ground their argument that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction on § 6-6-541, Ala.Code 1975, which provides that a complaint in a quiet-title action "must describe the lands [at issue] with certainty." However, § 6-6-541 itself does not state that compliance with that requirement is a prerequisite to the trial court's exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over the quiet-title action. Moreover, the Holifields have not cited to us any caselaw standing for the proposition that compliance with that requirement is a jurisdictional requirement. In the absence of any law so holding, we conclude that, although compliance with that requirement is a condition of obtaining relief in a quiet-title action, it is not a condition of the trial court's exercising subject-matter jurisdiction.

In this particular case, by the time the Holifields challenged the failure of the complaint to describe accurately the land that Alberta, Debra, and Frank were claiming to own by virtue of adverse possession, Alberta, Debra, and Frank had introduced, without objection by the Holifields, evidence at trial indicating that the land they claimed to own by virtue of adverse possession was bounded on the east by the deed line and bounded on the west by the 1940 fence line, which was a straight line running parallel to, and approximately 17 feet west of, the deed line. The introduction of that evidence without objection by the Holifields cured the erroneous description of the land contained in the complaint. See Rule 15(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. ("When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues."). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the action the Holifields made at the close of all the evidence.

With regard to the merits of the trial court's judgment, the Holifields first argue that the trial court erred in implicitly finding that Alberta, Debra, and Frank were the owners of the land bounded on the east by the deed line and bounded on the west by the 1940 fence line because, they say, there was insufficient evidence that the use of that land by the owners of the east half was hostile.

"In Lockhart v. Corcoran, 494 So.2d 93 (Ala.Civ.App.1986), this court outlined the standard of review applicable in adverse-possession cases:

"`"Whether the evidence establishes adverse possession is a question of fact, the determination of which, when made upon evidence presented ore tenus, is favored with a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or manifestly unjust." Tidwell v. Strickler, 457 So.2d 365, 368 (Ala. 1984). The trial court's judgment in such a case need only be supported by credible evidence. Jemison v. Belcher, 368 So.2d 849 (Ala.1979).'

"494 So.2d at 93."

Bohanon v. Edwards, 970 So.2d 777, 781 (Ala.Civ.App.2007). Moreover,

"[i]n ore tenus proceedings, the trial court is the sole judge of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses, and the trial court should accept only that testimony it considers to be worthy of belief. Ostrander v. Ostrander, 517 So.2d 3 (Ala. Civ.App.1987). Further, in determining the weight to be accorded to the testimony of any witness, the trial court may consider the demeanor of the witness and the witness's apparent candor or evasiveness. Ostrander, supra. ... It is not the province of this court to override the trial court's observations. Brown [v. Brown, 586 So.2d 919 (Ala.Civ.App. 1991) ]."

Woods v. Woods, 653 So.2d 312, 314 (Ala. Civ.App.1994).

"In Kerlin v. Tensaw Land & Timber Co., 390 So.2d 616 (Ala.1980), the supreme court recited Alabama law regarding adverse possession:

"`In Alabama there are basically two types of adverse possession, these two types being statutory adverse possession and adverse possession by...

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    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
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    ...the case, the decree is supported by credible evidence." Graham v. McKinney, 445 So.2d 892, 894 (Ala. 1984).’)." Holifield v. Smith, 17 So.3d 1173, 1179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).With regard to its conclusion that James is entitled to an easement in a portion of the roadway by adverse possessio......
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