Dickson v. Dickson
Decision Date | 13 August 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 960237,960237 |
Parties | Stephanie R. DICKSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Thomas A. DICKSON, Defendant and Appellee. Civil |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Carol K. Larson of Pringle & Herigstad, PC, Minot, for plaintiff and appellant.
Thomas M. Tuntland, Mandan, for defendant and appellee.
¶1 Stephanie Dickson appeals from an amended divorce judgment awarding "joint legal custody" to Stephanie and Thomas Dickson, requiring Stephanie Dickson to notify Thomas Dickson if the child were to be out of her care for more than 36 hours, and ordering Thomas Dickson to pay two-thirds of the child's noncovered medical expenses. She also appeals the trial court's denial of her attorney fees. We conclude "joint legal custody" has no legal meaning under North Dakota law. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.
¶2 Stephanie and Thomas Dickson divorced in 1993. The district court awarded custody of their minor child to Stephanie Dickson and reasonable visitation to Thomas Dickson. The court ordered Thomas Dickson to pay $1600-per-month child support and to pay all noncovered medical expenses. In 1994, the court entered the first amended judgment, specifically defining the conditions of visitation.
¶3 On August 28, 1995, the court issued a second amended judgment, allowing Stephanie to move to New York with the child and modifying child support and visitation accordingly. Stephanie Dickson and the child moved back to North Dakota on November 8, 1995. Stephanie Dickson moved the court to reinstate visitation as specified under the first amended judgment and to reinstate child support as ordered under the original divorce judgment.
¶4 The court entered a third amended judgment on June 28, 1996, in which it awarded "joint legal custody," with physical custody primarily to Stephanie Dickson. If the child were to be out of Stephanie Dickson's care for more than 36 hours, the court required her to contact Thomas Dickson to allow him to exercise visitation during that time. Thomas Dickson was to pay $1683-per-month child support.
¶5 Stephanie Dickson appeals from the June 28, 1996, third amended judgment in McHenry County District Court. The district court had jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. The appeal is timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. Art. VI, § 6, and N.D.C.C. § 28-27-01.
¶6 We are first asked to decide whether the trial court erred in modifying the custody order from "sole legal custody" to "joint legal custody" without finding a significant change in circumstances. Because North Dakota law does not provide for "joint legal custody," we conclude, absent a definition provided by the trial court, "joint legal custody" is a meaningless amorphism, and its award is without legal significance.
¶7 Under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.1:
¶8 Unlike some other states, North Dakota law does not separate "physical custody" from "legal custody." 1 The majority of states which recognize a distinct "legal custody" define the term by statute. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. Ann. § 518.003, subd. 3(a) ( ); Iowa Code Ann. § 598.41(5) (); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.001(2) and (2m) ( ); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-5-7.1 (); Cal. Fam.Code § 3003 ( ). A few states have crafted judicial definition of the term. See Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 508 A.2d 964, 967 (1986) (); Bird v. Starkey, 914 P.2d 1246, 1250 n. 6 (Alaska 1996) ( ); Matter of Alexandria H., 159 Misc.2d 345, 604 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (Fam.Ct.1993) (defining "joint legal custody").
¶9 In matters involving child custody, this Court will look to the intent of the legislature. See Boeddeker v. Reel, 517 N.W.2d 407, 410 (N.D.1994) ( ). We will not graft onto our law separate "legal custody," absent legislative approval. The North Dakota Legislature has not divided custody into "physical custody" and "legal custody," and we decline to do so.
¶10 Trial courts do, however, have the authority to allocate various reasonable rights to the noncustodial parent. See N.D.C.C. § 14-05-22 (); Reinecke v. Griffeth, 533 N.W.2d 695, 697 (N.D.1995) ( ); Perala v. Carlson, 520 N.W.2d 839, 841 (N.D.1994) ( ). If a trial court allocates such reasonable rights, even if it chooses to characterize the allocation as "joint legal custody," those allocations are effective. See, e.g., Olson v. Olson, 361 N.W.2d 249, 251 (N.D.1985) ( ). This Court cautioned, " '[s]pecific conditions imposed concerning custody arrangements and visitation rights can only be justified and made workable through the combined efforts of the parents.' " Olson (quoting Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 131 (N.D.1980)).
¶11 In this case, the trial court rejected the parties' proposed definitions and granted "joint legal custody" without definition. Absent a specific definition of its meaning, we conclude the judge's pronouncement, "I award joint legal custody," is a meaningless amorphism. We believe, however, the trial court probably intended to grant to Thomas Dickson specific rights which it did not enumerate. For the proper disposition of this case, therefore, we remand for the trial court to specify the rights granted to Thomas Dickson.
¶12 Generally, modification of custody requires the trial court to find a significant change of circumstances in which the child's best interests compel a change in custody. Lovin v. Lovin, 1997 ND 55, p 16, 561 N.W.2d 612; Loll v. Loll, 1997 ND 51, p 12, 561 N.W.2d 625. Because the judge's pronouncement of "joint legal custody" was meaningless, there has been no modification in this case, and we need not address whether there had been a significant change of circumstances.
¶13 The trial court ordered, "[w]hen [the child] shall be out of plaintiff's care for more than 36 hours, plaintiff shall contact the defendant at least 48 hours in advance to inquire if he would like to exercise visitation during this time period." Stephanie Dickson argues this is not in the best interest of the child because it will not allow the child to spend extended periods of time with others as she grows older.
¶14 We will not reverse an order specifying the conditions of visitation unless the decision is clearly erroneous. Reinecke at 699; N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support the finding, or if, on review of the entire evidence, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made." Steffes v. Steffes, 1997 ND 49, p 8, 560 N.W.2d 888.
¶15 The district court ordered the second amended judgment in contemplation of Stephanie Dickson moving to New York, and the court modified visitation accordingly. However, she moved back to North Dakota with the child. Stephanie and Thomas Dickson now live in the same city. This condition of visitation is now reasonable and workable. We conclude the record supports the court's implementation of this condition of visitation and we are not convinced a mistake has been made. Therefore, we affirm.
¶16 Under the original, stipulated divorce judgment, the court ordered Thomas Dickson to pay all the child's noncovered medical expenses. In contemplation of Stephanie Dickson's move to New York, the court modified payment of medical expenses, ordering Thomas Dickson pay two-thirds of the child's noncovered medical expenses and Stephanie Dickson pay one-third. Stephanie Dickson did not appeal the reduction. Stephanie Dickson now argues the trial court erred in refusing to reinstate Thomas Dickson's obligation to pay all the child's medical expenses upon her return to North Dakota.
¶17 In its memorandum opinion of June 21, 1996, the district court found, under the guidelines, Thomas Dickson had a...
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