Dickson v. Inter-Carolinas Motor Bus Co.

• Decision Date: 07 August 1931
• Docket Number: 13222.
• Parties: DICKSON et al. v. INTER-CAROLINAS MOTOR BUS CO. et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

159 S.E. 625

161 S.C. 297

DICKSON et al. v. INTER-CAROLINAS MOTOR BUS CO. et al.

No. 13222.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

August 7, 1931

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Spartanburg County; J Henry Johnson, Judge.

Consolidated actions by Spartan Dickson and by Newman Dickson, by their guardian ad litem, S.C. Dickson, against the Inter-Carolinas Motor Bus Company and another. From judgments in favor of plaintiffs, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Mauldin & Love, of Greenville, and Jesse W. Boyd, of Spartanburg, for appellants.

Evans & Galbraith and Nicholls, Wyche & Byrnes, all of Spartanburg for respondents.

CARTER J.

The actions involved in this appeal arose out of a collision between a bus owned by the defendant Inter-Carolinas Motor Bus Company, and a Chevrolet truck, the property of one S.C Dickson, father of the plaintiffs, Spartan Dickson and Newman Dickson, in the town of Greer, S. C., August 18, 1928. The bus, at the time in question, was being used by the defendant Inter-Carolinas Motor Bus Company in conducting its bus business, operating between Greenville, S. C. and Spartanburg, S. C., passing through the said town of Greer, and was driven by its agent and codefendant, J. M. Pratt. The truck was used for the purpose of delivering dairy products for the said S.C. Dickson in the said town of Greer, driven by his said son, Spartan Dickson, who, with the aid of his brother, Newman Dickson, was delivering dairy products to the customers of the said S.C. Dickson. It appears that the collision resulted in several suits against the defendants, but, at this time, we are only concerned with the suit of Spartan Dickson and the suit of Newman Dickson, brought by their guardian ad litem, S.C. Dickson, which were commenced in the court of common pleas for Spartanburg county, December --, 1928, and each of these plaintiffs asked for judgment against the defendants in the sum of $10,000, based upon the alleged injuries they sustained on account of the negligent, willful, wanton, reckless, and unlawful acts of the defendants, agents, and servants. The plaintiffs asked for punitive damages as well as actual damages. The defendants by answer admitted the formal allegations of the complaints, and also admitted "so much thereof as alleged that the defendants, Inter-Carolinas Motor Bus Company, owned a bus line operating between Greenville, South Carolina, and Spartanburg, South Carolina, and that the defendant, J. M. Pratt, was driving the bus on the day the accident was alleged to have occurred, and that the bus of the defendant did collide on that day with a Chevrolet Truck," but denied all other material allegations, and alleged "that the said accident was caused by the unlawful, willful, negligent acts of the driver of the said Chevrolet Truck," and the defendants further alleged contributory negligence by the plaintiffs who the defendants alleged were engaged in a joint enterprise. The cases were called for trial at the October, 1929, term of said court before his honor, Judge J. Henry Johnson, and a jury, and by consent of counsel, the cases were tried together, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff Spartan Dickson in the sum of $3,000 actual damages, and a verdict for the plaintiff Newman Dickson in the sum of $5,000 actual damages and the sum of $2,000 punitive damages. Motion by the defendants for a new trial was considered by the trial judge and refused, and, from entry of judgments on the verdicts, the defendants have appealed to this court.

The appellants present three exceptions. The first exception alleges error as follows: "In refusing to direct a verdict for the defendants upon the issue of punitive damages, and by submitting that issue to the jury, in that the testimony most favorably construed on the part of the plaintiffs showed that the defendants were only guilty of negligence, there being no evidence of gross negligence or wilfulness."

The law governing the award of punitive damages is too well settled in this state to call for citation of authorities or a discussion of the rules and principles applicable thereto, and, in disposing of this allegation of error, we deem it sufficient to state that in response to the allegations the plaintiffs, in each case, under consideration, introduced testimony tending to show recklessness and willfulness on the part of the defendants in the operation of the said bus at the time and place in question, which the jury might reasonably infer caused the collision and the injuries to the plaintiffs resulting therefrom. It is true, there was testimony introduced by the defendants from which a different inference might be drawn, but, conceding that fact, this court cannot say that the finding of the jury was wrong; that question being altogether a matter for the jury under the testimony of the case. This exception is therefore overruled.

In the second exception appellants impute error to the trial judge in the following particulars: "In refusing and overruling the motion for a new trial made by the defendants upon the ground that the verdicts in both cases were excessive, and that the amounts rendered could be only predicated upon passion or prejudice upon the part of the jury, neither verdict being supported by the testimony adduced."

A question as to the excessiveness of a verdict, where there is any evidence tending to support the same, is a matter for the determination of the trial judge in the exercise of his power and discretion, and when he refuses to disturb the verdict this court has no power to do so in the absence of a showing that there was an abuse of discretion in failing to grant a motion made for that purpose. See the opinion in the...