Dickson v. McMahan, 246-80
| Decision Date | 16 June 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 246-80,246-80 |
| Citation | 140 Vt. 23,433 A.2d 310 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | Jeremy DICKSON and Sandra Dickson v. John W. McMAHAN and Roland C. Carter. |
Otterman & Allen, P. C., Bradford, for plaintiffs.
William A. Kelk of Kilmurry & Stone, P. C., Stowe, for defendant.
Before BARNEY, C. J., and LARROW, BILLINGS, HILL and UNDERWOOD, JJ.
Defendant McMahan appeals from a judgment order requiring him to convey a house and approximately 40 acres of land to the plaintiffs Dickson. McMahan owned the property as a tenant in common with defendant Carter at the time of this suit, but has become the sole defendant since Carter has subsequently conveyed his interest to McMahan. The property is located in Bradford and Newbury.
The trial court found the following facts. The plaintiffs and the defendants carried on negotiations for the sale of the property in 1977 and early 1978, but were unable to agree on terms. On April 4, 1978, plaintiff Jeremy Dickson called defendant McMahan and offered $57,000 for the property, with a June 1, 1978, closing date. On April 6, 1978, McMahan called the Dicksons and accepted the $57,000 offer but requested a September 1, 1978, closing date. On April 23, 1978, the plaintiffs sent McMahan a proposed purchase and sale agreement for $57,000 and a deposit check for $500. The proposed agreement changed the closing date to August 25, 1978, and made the sale conditional upon plaintiffs' sale of their house and upon their obtaining financing within 14 days. The letter accompanying the agreement stated that the "contingencies ... are merely pro forma as I already hold a purchase and sale agreement on (the house), and I anticipate no problems in obtaining financing (I should hear within a week.)." McMahan answered by letter on April 27, returning the agreement and the $500 check because the cotenant Carter's first name was incorrect on the agreement. That was the only reason he gave for returning the agreement. McMahan stated in the letter, "I am in agreement insofar as the date of possession is concerned and the purchase price and I believe Mr. Carter is too." He went on to express a desire to negotiate as to when he received his share of the money, saying he needed "to talk with a tax man before that to discuss the matter of capital gains." The plaintiffs then prepared an identical purchase and sale agreement with the name change and had Carter sign it. On May 11, McMahan telephoned the plaintiffs and stated that he could not agree to the two conditions relating to the sale of the plaintiffs' house and the obtaining of financing. He refused to sign the corrected purchase and sale agreement, and returned it, along with the deposit, to the plaintiffs by letter dated May 25, 1978. It is interesting to note that when McMahan sent the May 25 letter, he was in possession of a $70,000 certified check from another prospective purchaser. At trial McMahan said he was not interested in that sale and had returned the check. Upon initiation of this suit, however, he filed a counterclaim alleging damages because the $70,000 sale had been forestalled. He later agreed to dismissal of the counterclaim.
The trial court concluded that McMahan's April 27 letter satisfied the Statute of Frauds, 12 V.S.A. § 181, and that it constituted an acceptance of the conditions in plaintiffs' April 25 letter, namely, moving the closing date to August 25 and making the agreement subject to selling their house and obtaining financing. The court also concluded that McMahan had entered into a specifically enforceable contract for the sale of the property on the terms proposed by the plaintiffs when he returned the proposed purchase and sale agreement requesting only that the name of Mr. Carter be corrected in the final version to be signed by McMahan.
McMahan's first argument asks this Court to determine that the parties...
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Stonewall of Woodstock Corp. v. Stardust 11TS, LLC, 17-417
...at 146-47, 86 A.2d at 637. Both the property and the price were specified on the receipt signed by the buyer. Id. In Dickson v. McMahan, 140 Vt. 23, 24-25, 433 A.2d 310, 311-12 (1981), the Statute was satisfied by a signed letter from the seller of property stating that he was "in agreement......
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Stonewall of Woodstock Corp. v. Stardust 11TS, LLC
...82 A.2d at 637. Both the property and the price were specified on the receipt signed by the buyer. Id. In Dickson v. McMahan, 140 Vt. 23, 24-25, 433 A.2d 310, 311-12 (1981), the Statute was satisfied by a signed letter from the seller of property stating that he was "inagreement" about the ......