Dickson v. United States

• Decision Date: 31 August 1878
• Citation: 125 Mass. 311
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Oliver Dickson & another, executors, v. United States of America & others

125 Mass. 311

Oliver Dickson & another, executors, v. United States of America & others

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

August 31, 1878

Argued November 22, 1877

Suffolk. Bill in equity filed April 4, 1877, by the executors of the will of John Gardner of Boston, who died March 16 1876, against the United States and the heirs at law of the testator, to obtain the instructions of the court as to the validity and effect of the residuary clause in a will dated January 17, 1862, and admitted to probate April 17, 1876, by which the testator, after making certain legacies and providing for the payment of certain annuities, provided as follows: "Fifth. Wishing to contribute my mite towards suppressing the rebellion and restoring the Union, I give and devise the rest and residue of my estate, after paying the donation and providing for the payment of the annuities aforesaid, to the United States of America."

All the parties submitted the case to the decision of the court upon the following facts: The residue of the estate of the testator, after payment of debts, legacies and expenses of administration, and providing for the annuities, is of considerable amount, consisting partly of real estate situated in this Commonwealth and in the State of Iowa, and partly of personal estate. The plaintiffs have, for the benefit of the estate, and with the consent of all the parties in interest, managed the real estate in question and collected the rents thereof, and now have in their hands moneys arising from such rents, for which it is their duty to account, either to the United States or to the heirs at law. Morton, J., entered a decree in favor of the United States; and the heirs at law appealed.

Decree affirmed.

C. C. Read, for the heirs at law. 1. The gift to the United States is not an absolute gift. In determining the character of a gift, we must examine carefully the language of the testator, and consider the purpose which he had in mind, the party whom he intended to benefit, and the occasion which prompted him to give. The gift was made during the late rebellion, and its purpose is expressed; and the fact that this expressed purpose precedes the gift itself clearly shows that the gift is not an absolute gift. The rebellion was suppressed and the Union restored more than ten years before the testator's death; and of this the court will take judicial notice.

In all cases where money has been so applied to the public debt, or for the benefit of the country, the testator has expressly so applied it. Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227. Nightingale v. Goulburn, 5 Hare 484. Newland v. Attorney General, 3 Meriv. 684. Ashton v. Langdale, 15 Jur. 868. United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315.

The immediate purpose and the ultimate object of the testator having been fully accomplished long before his death, and there being no expression of intention to apply the gift to any other purpose, or to make it absolute, the gift fails, and the residue of his estate must go to his heirs at law. In re Ward' Trusts, L. R. 7 Ch. 727.

2. The right to dispose of property by last will and testament in this state is not absolute and unlimited. Fosdick v. Fosdick, 6 Allen 41. Article 9 of the Amendments of the Constitution of the United States provides that "the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." And by article 10, "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." Among the enumerated powers of the United States, that of taking by devise is not included, and such power cannot be implied. See argument of counsel in 94 U.S. 319. The right of the government to take land by grant, for a governmental purpose, does not include the power or capacity to take by devise. Jackson v. Hammond, 2 Caines Cas. 337. Auburn Theological Seminary v. Childs, 4 Paige 419. McCartee v. Orphan Asylum, 9 Cowen 437. Downing v. Marshall, 23 N.Y. 366, 383, 385. Levy v. Levy, 33 N.Y. 97, 122. In re Fox's Will, 52 N.Y. 530, 533.

G. P. Sanger & P. Cummings, for the United States.

Gray, C. J. Colt & Lord, JJ., absent.

OPINION

Gray, C. J.

The single question in this case is whether the residuary devise and bequest to the United States of America is valid; and upon this question, after full examination of the authorities cited in the learned argument for the heirs at law and next of kin, we can have no doubt.

The introductory clause of this devise and bequest merely expresses the motive of the testator, and in no way defines or limits the purposes to which the property may be applied by the devisee.

In England, bequests for the benefit of the country, or for the payment of the national debt, have always been held valid. Newland v. Attorney General, 3 Meriv. 684. Nightingale v. Goulburn , 5 Hare 484, and 2 Phillips 594. Ashton v. Langdale, 15 Jur. 868. While Massachusetts was an English colony, that eminent common lawyer, Serjeant Maynard, gave an opinion that a bequest "to the public use of the country of New England" was a good bequest. 1 Hutchinson's Hist. Mass. (2d ed.) 101, note.

The property or money, when received by the United States, must doubtless be applied to public purposes authorized by the Constitution and laws. But the right to receive money or property, voluntarily contributed, is not a separate power, but a capacity belonging to the United States as a body politic and incident to the right of sovereignty, and to which may be applied the words used by eminent judges in speaking of the implied capacity of the United States to enter into contracts.

Chief Justice Marshall said, "The United States is a government, and, consequently, a body politic and corporate capable of attaining the objects for which it was created, by the means which are necessary for their attainment. This great corporation was ordained and established by the American people, and endowed by them with great powers for important purposes. Its powers are unquestionably limited; but, while within those limits, it is a perfect government as any other, having all the faculties and properties belonging to a government, with a perfect right to use them freely, in order to accomplish the objects of its institution. It will certainly require no argument to prove that one of the means by which some of these objects are to be accomplished is contract; the government, therefore, is capable of contracting, and its contracts may be made in the name of the...