Dicus v. Dicus
| Decision Date | 28 June 1917 |
| Docket Number | 53. |
| Citation | 101 A. 697,131 Md. 87 |
| Parties | DICUS v. DICUS. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore City; Walter I. Dawkins Judge.
"To be officially reported."
Suit for divorce by Margaret S. Dicus against Jacob M. Dicus. From a decree dismissing the suit, plaintiff appeals. Decree reversed and cause remanded.
Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON URNER, and CONSTABLE, JJ.
David Ash, of Baltimore, for appellant.
Morrill N. Packard and Benjamin L. Freeny, both of Baltimore, for appellee.
The appellant sued for a divorce from her husband, the appellee on the grounds of cruelty and adultery, and this appeal is from a decree dismissing the bill of complaint.
The only evidence in support of the charge of cruelty was the appellant's own testimony, and that was contradicted by the appellee. There was no corroboration in any form of the wife's statements as to the mistreatment of which she complained. In a suit for divorce a decree cannot be entered upon the testimony of the plaintiff alone, but corroborative proof is requisite. Code, art. 35, § 4; Tomkey v Tomkey, 130 Md. 292, 100 A. 283; Marshall v. Marshall, 122 Md. 694, 91 A. 1067; Twigg v. Twigg, 107 Md. 677, 69 A. 517. The allegation of cruelty therefore is not sufficiently sustained to justify a decree of divorce on that ground.
With respect to the charge of adultery we have reached a different conclusion. In our opinion the proof points convincingly to the husband's infidelity. It is shown and admitted that he is living in the same house with the woman who is named in the bill as the person with whom the alleged adultery was committed. This woman, according to the decided weight of the testimony, has a bad reputation for chastity. She was embraced and caressed by the appellant's husband on a number of occasions in the presence of a caller at the house, who testified to that effect. It is proven by another disinterested witness that the corespondent surreptitiously left the appellee's house one afternon by the back way, while his wife and family were away from home. Just before the woman left the house, as it was testified, the appellee went to the back gate and looked up and down the alley, through which she immediately afterwards took her departure. They were twice alone together for the greater part of the day at an untenanted house of the appellee in the country. On one of these occasions he was heard to address a term of endearment to her when she called to him from an upper room to bring some water. He was once heard to talk to the woman so immodestly that she protested, with the remark that a visitor, before whom the language was used, might think that she was being kept by the appellee. His associations with the corespondent were begun long prior to the final separation between himself and his wife in October, 1913, and have continued to the present time. He is the only male lodger in the house which the woman occupies with her sister and niece. The sister's reputation for chastity has also been impeached.
The proof in this case is clear as to the existence of the disposition and opportunities from which the commission of the adultery charged is to be inferred. It is not necessary, and it is usually impossible, that direct evidence of the fact of adultery shall be offered. The offense may be proven by circumstances which justify the inference of guilt. Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 86 Md. 529, 39 A. 416; Thiess v. Thiess, 124 Md. 295, 92 A. 922; Kremelberg v. Kremelberg, 52 Md. 553; Rasch v. Rasch, 105 Md. 506, 66 A. 499; Robbins v. Robbins, 121 Md. 695, 89 A. 1135. The conduct of the appellee and corespondent, as described in the testimony, their familiarities and embraces, his open immodesty of language in addressing her, their clandestine movements when they were alone at his house, her reputation for lack of virtue and his position and opportunities as an inmate of her home, lead us irresistibly to a conviction as to the adulterous nature of their relations.
This is the second suit by the appellant for divorce from her husband...
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