Dida v. Ascension Providence Hosp.
| Decision Date | 01 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:22-CV-0508-AGF |
| Parties | EAST DAWIT DIDA, Plaintiff, v. ASCENSION PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff Dawit Dida is a resident of the District of Columbia. Defendant Ascension Providence Hospital[1] is headquartered in Missouri and operates hospitals throughout the country including Providence Hospital in D.C., where Dida was employed for over ten years. According to his complaint, Dida fell ill in early 2016 and requested time off from work. He approached Ascension employee Lorenzo James at least three times seeking to obtain short-term and long-term disability coverage.[2] James told Dida that he was not entitled to coverage. At the beginning of February 2016, Ascension notified Dida that it was eliminating his position and terminating his employment effective February 29, 2016.
Shortly after his termination, Dida underwent open-heart surgery followed by several weeks of hospitalization and recovery the cost of which Dida incurred personally, and which he claims should have been covered by his health insurance through Ascension. Dida was later deemed disabled by the Social Security Administration with an onset date of February 1, 2016.
According to Dida's brief on the present motion, Dida filed a charge of discrimination with the D.C. Office of Human Rights (OHR) on January 4, 2017, alleging violations of the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA) and the D.C. Family and Medical Leave Act (DCFMLA). This document is not in the Court record. The parties participated in mediated settlement negotiations facilitated through OHR, but the process was unsuccessful, leading Dida to withdraw his OHR complaint on August 24, 2021. The record does not indicate why the matter remained pending with the OHR for over four years. OHR granted withdrawal on September 24, 2021, and Dida filed the present action in D.C. Superior Court on November 5, 2021, asserting violations of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),[3] the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA) and a state law claim for breach of contract. Dida seeks over $300,000 in actual damages and additional unspecified compensatory, expectation, and liquidated damages.
Ascension removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and filed a motion to transfer the case to this Court or dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The D.C. district court granted the motion to transfer because Ascension's longterm disability plan contains a forum selection clause designating this Court as the exclusive venue for any actions arising under it. ECF No. 10, referring to ECF No. 4-4 at 42. The D.C. district court deferred consideration of Ascension's motion to dismiss, leaving the matter to this Court for resolution.
In support of the motion, Ascension contends that (1) Dida's FMLA claim is time-barred; (2) Dida failed to exhaust administrative remedies on his ADA claim; (3) Dida failed to exhaust administrative remedies on his ERISA claim and the claim is time-barred; and (4) Dida fails to state a valid claim for breach of contract because he had no employment agreement with Ascension, and the statute on which Dida relies is inapplicable. In response, Dida centrally asserts that applicable statutes of limitations were tolled while his charge was pending before the OHR, and D.C. law does not require the exhaustion of remedies.
Though Ascension's disability plan designates this Court as the proper forum, it contains no choice of law provision. Dida filed his OHR complaint and subsequent lawsuit pursuant to D.C. administrative procedures and local pleading requirements. Ascension's motion to dismiss asserts affirmative defenses that the parties briefed before the D.C district court based on D.C. law. Ascension recently renewed its motion before this Court without any modification or additional analysis on choice of law considerations. ECF No. 14.
Choice of law questions cannot be addressed simplistically and may vary from issue to issue. In general, to the extent resolution of the motion depends on application of the DCOHR framework governing Dida's OHR complaint and initial pleadings, the Court naturally looks to D.C. Circuit and district court precedent. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 526 (1990) (). In all other respects, however, where general principles of federal law apply, the Court relies on Eighth Circuit precedent. See e.g., In re Folgers Coffee, Mktg. Litig., 21-2984-MD-W-BP, 2022 WL 989727, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 9, 2022) . The Court also notes consistent D.C. authority as relevant and aligned in principle.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” McShane Constr. Co. v. Gotham Ins. Co., 867 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Untimeliness under a statute of limitations and failure to exhaust administrative remedies are affirmative defenses that a defendant bears the burden to plead and prove. Jessie v. Potter, 516 F.3d 709, 713 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008); Miles v. Bellfontaine Habilitation Ctr., 481 F.3d 1106, 1107 (8th Cir. 2007); Coleman v. Mayorkas, CV 18-2268 (BAH), 2021 WL 930263, at *15 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2021). A court may dismiss a claim as precluded by the statute of limitations if the complaint itself establishes that the claim is time-barred. Richardson v. Omaha School District, 957 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 2020). However, because limitations issues often depend on questions of fact, the court should hesitate to dismiss a complaint on statute of limitations grounds based solely on the face of the complaint. Joyce v. Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, 635 F.3d 364, 368 (8th Cir. 2011) (); Adams v. D.C., 740 F.Supp.2d 173, 180 (D.D.C. 2010), aff'd in part, 618 Fed.Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (). In the D.C. Circuit where Dida originally filed his lawsuit, a plaintiff need not plead exhaustion in his complaint, and a defendant bears the burden of proving non-exhaustion by a preponderance of the evidence. Briscoe v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 61 F.Supp.3d 78, 84-85 (D.D.C. 2014 (involving DCHRA and Title VII claims and citing Moore v. D.C., 445 Fed.Appx. 365, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); Fowler v. D.C., CV 18-634 (RDM), 2021 WL 4206591, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2021) ().
The DCHRA creates an election-of-remedies framework. Ibrahim v. Unisys Corp., 582 F.Supp.2d 41, 46 (D.D.C. 2008). A person claiming discrimination may file an administrative complaint with the OHR or a lawsuit in a court of competent jurisdiction. Id.; D.C. Code § 2-1403.16. Once a claimant has filed an OHR complaint, he may file a lawsuit only if the OHR dismisses the complaint for administrative convenience or the claimant withdraws the complaint before receiving a determination, as Plaintiff did here. § 2-1403.16. In that instance, the claimant maintains all rights to sue as if no complaint had been filed. Id. In the interim, the statute of limitations is tolled while a complaint is pending with the OHR. Id.[4]
Similar to Missouri, the OHR and EEOC have a work-sharing agreement whereby claims filed with one entity are cross-filed with the other. See Hammel v. Marsh USA Inc., 79 F.Supp.3d 234, 240 (D.D.C. 2015). In Hammel, the plaintiff filed an EEOC charge alleging employment discrimination under Title VII and the DCHRA. Due to an error on the address label, Hammel did not receive the EEOC's right-to-sue letter until seven months after it was issued, when she contacted the EEOC to inquire as to the status of the matter. Upon receipt of the letter, Hammel filed a lawsuit in D.C. superior court. Her employer removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss it as untimely. The district court found that § 2-1403.16 tolled the statute of limitations on her DCHRA claims until the EEOC issued the right-to-sue letter. Id. at 241 (clarifying that the tolling provision applied to any administrative process, whether before the OHR or EEOC). Without explicitly referring to equitable tolling, the court also declined to dismiss Hammel's Title VII claims as untimely, reasoning that Hammel had provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that she received the right-to-sue letter when it was mailed.
Additionally on the present facts, the Court finds guidance in Murphy v. D.C., 390 F.Supp.3d 59 (D.D.C. 2019). There, the plaintiff requested FMLA leave for serious health conditions, but his employer disregarded his application and inquiries. Two months later, he had a heart attack and filed another application, and he was fired two days later. Murphy promptly filed a charge with the EEOC and OHR. Over 31 months passed before...
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