Richardson v. Omaha Sch. Dist.

• Citation: 957 F.3d 869
• Decision Date: 27 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-2058,19-2058
• Parties: Chad RICHARDSON, Individually, and as Parents and Next Friends of L; Tonya Richardson, Individually, and as Parents and Next Friends of L Plaintiffs - Appellants v. OMAHA SCHOOL DISTRICT; Jacob Sherwood, Superintendent; Amanda Green, Principal; Dawn Dillon, Teacher Defendants - Appellees Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

957 F.3d 869

Chad RICHARDSON, Individually, and as Parents and Next Friends of L; Tonya Richardson, Individually, and as Parents and Next Friends of L Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.OMAHA SCHOOL DISTRICT; Jacob Sherwood, Superintendent; Amanda Green, Principal; Dawn Dillon, Teacher Defendants - Appellees

Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)

No. 19-2058

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 11, 2020

Filed: April 27, 2020

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant was George McAllaster Rozzell, of Rogers, AR. The following attorneys also appeared on the appellant brief; John Russell Elrod, of Fayetteville, AR., Mason Boling, of Rogers, AR., Michael Dewayne Sutton, of Fayetteville, AR.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Marshall S. Ney, of Rogers, AR. The following attorney also appeared on the appellee brief; Katherine Church Campbell, of Rogers, AR.

The following attorneys appeared on the amicus brief; Selene Almazan-Altobelli, of Towson, MD., Catherine Merino Reisman, of Haddonfield, NJ., Jessica F. Salonus, of Towson, MD., Ellen M. Saideman, of Towson, MD.

Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Chad and Tonya Richardson (collectively, "the Richardsons") appeal the district court’s¹ grant of Omaha School District’s motion to dismiss in part and motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

I.

The Richardsons filed an administrative complaint against the school district with the Arkansas Department of Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq . The Richardsons claimed that their child, "L," was denied his right to a free appropriate public education ("FAPE"). See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). Specifically, they alleged that the school district (1) failed to conduct necessary evaluations of L; (2) failed to develop and implement an individualized education plan ("IEP") for L; (3) failed to ensure that L was not bullied by peers and teachers; and (4) failed to educate L in the least restrictive environment possible. On April 14, 2017, the hearing officer found in favor of the Richardsons on their first two allegations but found in favor of the school district on the Richardsons’ third and fourth allegations.

The Richardsons subsequently filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. In Count One, they sought an award of attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party of the administrative-level IDEA hearing on their first two allegations. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(C). The school district filed a motion to dismiss Count One, and the district court granted the motion.²

Counts Two and Three of the complaint alleged discrimination against L in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 - 12165. The school district filed a motion for summary judgment as to those counts, and the district court granted the motion. The Richardsons appeal.

II.

A.

The Richardsons first argue that the district court erred in granting the school district’s motion to dismiss Count One because the district court determined the claim for attorneys’ fees was time barred. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of the Richardsons’ claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Minter v. Bartruff , 939 F.3d 925, 926 (8th Cir. 2019). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A court may dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) as barred by the statute of limitations if the complaint itself establishes that the claim is time-barred." Humphrey v. Eureka Gardens Pub. Facility Bd. , 891 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2018). We also review de novo "the district court’s decision to borrow a particular state statute of limitations." Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist. , 220 F.3d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 2000).

The IDEA includes a default ninety-day statute of limitations for merits actions after the administrative decision if the relevant state has no explicit time limitation, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B), but it does not include a statute of limitations for a prevailing party to file a cause of action for attorneys’ fees, see § 1415(i)(3). The parties dispute what statute of limitations applies. "When a federal law has no statute of limitations, courts may borrow the most closely analogous state statute of limitations, unless doing so would frustrate the policy embodied in the federal law." Birmingham , 220 F.3d at 854. "We have not previously determined what state statute is most analogous in this situation ...." Brittany O. v. Bentonville Sch. Dist. , 683 F. App'x 556, 557-58 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (declining to reach the issue).

The district court borrowed the ninety-day statute of limitations for merits actions of the administrative decision from Arkansas Code section 6-41-216(g), a provision of the Children with Disabilities Act, see Ark. Code § 6-41-201, Arkansas’s statutory framework for IDEA compliance. See Ark. Code § 6-41-202. If the ninety-day statute of limitations applies, the Richardsons do not contest that the district court properly dismissed their claims.

The Richardsons argue instead that we should borrow a different statute of limitations. They first point to the four-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). That statute provides a default four-year statute of limitations for "civil action[s] arising under an Act of Congress" passed after § 1658 was enacted in December 1990. The Richardsons concede that they did not raise this argument before the district court.

Even if the Richardsons did not waive this argument, but see Cromeans v. Morgan Keegan & Co. , 859 F.3d 558, 568 n.5 (8th Cir. 2017), it nevertheless fails. As the Richardsons concede, the IDEA provided for a prevailing parent’s right to attorneys’ fees in 1986, years before § 1658 was enacted. See Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 § 2, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796. Thus, § 1658 ’s default four-year statute of limitations does not apply.

The Richardsons argue that this reading leads to absurd results because the IDEA did not provide a prevailing school district with a cause of action for attorneys’ fees until 2004. In other words, school districts would benefit from the four-year default when seeking an award for attorneys’ fees, but parents would not benefit from the same default. Be that as it may, the text of § 1658 is clear. See D.G. ex rel. LaNisha T. v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist. , 806 F.3d 310, 319 (5th Cir. 2015) ("If the cause of action for attorneys’ fees was created after December 1, 1990, the answer would be four years. ... But ... the cause of action for attorney’s fees under the IDEA was first created in 1986." (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).

Next, the Richardsons argue we should borrow Arkansas’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Ark. Code § 16-56-105. This argument is not without support. Both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have borrowed similar, years-long statutes of limitations for a prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees claim under the IDEA. See Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2. v. D.A. , 792 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2015) ; Zipperer ex rel. Zipperer v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty. , 111 F.3d 847, 852 & n.9 (11th Cir. 1997).

The Seventh Circuit explained the difficulty in identifying an analogous statute of limitations: "an action for attorneys’ fees presents a unique problem in that it may arguably be characterized as either an independent cause of action ... or as ancillary to the judicial review of the administrative decision." Powers v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ., Div. of Special Educ. , 61 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995). The Eleventh Circuit noted this difficulty and reasoned that the IDEA "provides two distinguishable causes of action": one for the appeal of a substantive administrative decision and "an independent claim for attorneys’ fees." Zipperer , 111 F.3d at 851. It rejected the argument that a claim for attorneys’ fees "is analogous to the appeal of an administrative hearing" and applied a four-year statute of limitations provided for "actions founded on statutory liability." Id . at 850-51. It reasoned that a longer period would "encourage the involvement of parents, as represented by attorneys, in securing appropriate public educations for their children." Id . at 852. It also reasoned that "the resolution of claims for attorneys’ fees is less urgent." Id . at 851.

Following the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "a request for attorneys’ fees under the IDEA is more analogous to an independent claim than an ancillary proceeding." Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 , 792 F.3d at 1063-64. It based its conclusion on the fact that the hearing officer may not award the attorneys’ fees. Id . at 1064. It noted also that "the adoption of the state law limitations period for judicial review of administrative agency decisions" might mean that the party who prevailed at the administrative hearing would have to determine whether to file an action for attorneys’ fees before the party that lost at the administrative hearing decided whether to seek judicial review of the merits of the decision. Id. It therefore looked to a three-year statute of limitations for statutory liability actions and a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, declining to decide which applied because it determined that both statutes of limitations were met. Id . at 1064 n.9.

By contrast, the Seventh Circuit determined that an action for attorneys’ fees is a claim ancillary to the underlying dispute. Powers , 61 F.3d at 556. It relied on one of its...