Didato v. Palmetto Bay Owners Ass'n
| Decision Date | 13 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | 2005-UP-630 |
| Parties | Michael Roy Didato, Appellant, v. Palmetto Bay Owners Association, Inc.; Palmetto Bay Horizontal Property Regime; Gregory A. Wynn; and Eugene Kransinki; Matt Bricker; Diane Peterkin; Nora Bess, and Jeremy White, Individually and as Directors of Palmetto Bay Horizontal Property Regime, Respondents. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Submitted November 1, 2005
Appeal from Beaufort County Curtis L. Coltrane, Special Circuit Court Judge
Jack D. Simrill, of Hilton Head Island, for Appellant.
Bob J Conley and Thomas J. Keaveny, both of Charleston, for Respondents.
Michael Roy Didato brought suit against Respondents, alleging breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act and slander of title. He appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Respondents, which found the claims were barred under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. We affirm.
In April of 1999, Michael Roy Didato bought a condominium unit at the Palmetto Bay Horizontal Property Regime (Regime). Shortly after moving in, Didato switched the door on the mechanical closet adjacent to his living room and balcony with his front door. Didato vacated the unit in February of 2001 and gave control of the unit to his sister, Madelaine Arata, and his father, Roy Didato.
Gregory A. Wynn, the Regime Manager, wrote Didato on March 21, 2001 and informed him that the door exchange was prohibited. Wynn contended the mechanical closet door was a common element of the Regime and the door's removal violated the by-laws of the Regime. Wynn advised Didato to place the doors back in their original positions before March 31, 2001, or the Regime would have the door to the mechanical closet replaced at Didato's expense. Didato responded by letter dated March 27, 2001, refusing to replace the doors and threatening to call the police if the Regime attempted to gain access to his unit.
On April 9, 2001, Anne C. Marscher, an attorney for the Regime wrote Didato and requested he replace the mechanical closet door. The letter informed Didato that a special assessment of $50 a day would be levied against him and constitute a lien on his property if Didato failed to comply. After Didato decided to sell the unit, Arata and her husband made extensive repairs to the unit. Didato claims Arata replaced the mechanical door as one of the first tasks [she] attended to when [she] entered the unit on March 31, 2001.” The Regime contends it did not notice the doors had been replaced until May 31, 2001, and the Regime levied fines against the unit from May 10, 2001 until that date.
On June 20, 2001, Didato signed a specific power of attorney making Arata his attorney-in-fact with respect to the sale of the unit. On January 8, 2002, Marscher wrote Didato and demanded payment of $1, 999.56 in fines and attorneys' fees arising from the door exchange. The Regime filed a lien on Didato's unit for that amount on January 9, 2002.
Arata hired an attorney, H. Fred Kuhn, Jr., to get the lien removed. On July 11, 2002, Marscher wrote Kuhn that [p]ursuant to [their] telephone conversation... Michael R Didato will not be responsible for the $1, 100 billed in fines.” The Regime executed a release and satisfaction of lien with respect to the unit on July 16, 2002. Arata sold the unit on July 17, 2002 and paid the Regime the remainder of the amount owed. Kuhn stated he was hired to remove the lien and agreed that the parties reached a resolution as to the lien.” Likewise, Arata agreed that the lien matter was resolved by [the] release and satisfaction of the lien.”
Almost a year later, Didato filed a complaint against the Regime for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act and slander of title. The Regime answered, alleging various defenses, including accord and satisfaction. The Regime made a motion for summary judgment, asserting Didato's claims were barred under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. [1] The trial court granted the Regime's motion. Didato filed a motion to reconsider and amend judgment, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard applied by the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law. In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” White v. J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., 360 S.C. 366, 370-71, 601 S.E.2d 342, 344 (2004) (citations omitted).
Didato asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Regime finding Didato's claims were barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. We disagree.
The elements of an accord and satisfaction are the agreement between the parties to settle a dispute (the accord), and the payment of the consideration expressed in the accord (the satisfaction).” Fanning v. Hicks, 284 S.C. 456, 458, 327 S.E.2d 342, 343 (1985).
Didato initially argues that because his sister and Kuhn made an agreement with the Regime, the Regime is precluded from asserting accord and satisfaction against Didato personally pursuant to Brazell Brothers Contractors v. Hill, 245 S.C. 69, 138 S.E.2d 835 (1964). In Brazell Brothers, the insurer for the Brazells paid Hill $475.00 in satisfaction of Hill's claims against the Brazells arising from an automobile collision. Id. at 72, 138 S.E.2d at 836. When the Brazells asserted a claim against Hill arising from the same accident, Hill argued the agreement with the insurer constituted a compromise and settlement of all claims arising from the accident. Id. at 72-73, 138 S.E.2d at 836. Because South Carolina recognizes an automobile accident as creating two separate causes of action, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held [s]ince [the Brazells'] cause of action was separate and distinct from [Hill's cause of action], we perceive no legal impediment to settlement of it alone, leaving the Brazells untrammeled in the pursuit of their own claim, as to which the [insurance] carrier owed no responsibility and had no authority.” Id. at 74, 138 S.E.2d at 837 (emphasis added). Unlike the insurance carrier in Brazell Brothers, Arata...
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