Didlake v. Wash. State
| Decision Date | 16 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 71633–6–I.,71633–6–I. |
| Citation | 345 P.3d 43,186 Wash.App. 417 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | James DIDLAKE, Dustin Johnson, Shelly Burke, Monica Fischer, Michael Bennett, individually and on behalf of all classes of similarly situated persons, Appellants, v. WASHINGTON STATE, and Washington State Department of Licensing, Respondents. |
Ryan Boyd Robertson, Andrea King Robertson, Robertson Law, PLLC, Roblin John Williamson, Kathryn A. Williams, Williamson & Williams, Seattle, WA, for Appellants.
Leah E. Harris, Washington State Attorney General's Office, Licensing & Administrative Law Atty. General, Attorney at Law, Eric Daniel Peterson, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Respondents.
¶ 1 Washington's implied consent statute, RCW 46.20.308, requires that a driver arrested for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) pay a filing fee to obtain an administrative review hearing to prevent a driver's license suspension or revocation. James Didlake, Dustin Johnson, Shelly Burke, Monica Fischer, and Michael Bennett (collectively Didlake) appeal a trial court decision that this fee for hearing requirement does not violate procedural due process. Because the driving privilege is not a fundamental right and the Department of Licensing (Department) waives the fee for indigent drivers, Didlake does not establish a constitutional due process violation. And because he received notice and a hearing, Didlake does not show that the fee requirement violated due process in his case. Therefore, he cannot prove any set of facts that would justify recovery for a procedural due process violation. We affirm.
¶ 2 At various times and places in 2010 or 2011, police arrested James Didlake, Dustin Johnson, Shelly Burke, Monica Fischer, and Michael Bennett for DUI. As required by Washington's implied consent law, the Department initiated license suspension proceedings against them. Didlake, Burke, Fischer, and Bennett each paid a $200 fee for an administrative review hearing. After they prevailed at their hearings, the Department rescinded their license suspensions. Johnson paid two fees and prevailed at one of his two hearings related to two separate arrests.
¶ 3 Didlake filed a class action lawsuit against the Department, asking for injunctive and declaratory relief, plus a refund and damages. He alleged that the statutory fee for an administrative hearing violates due process.1 Didlake filed a motion for class certification under CR 23. After filing its answer, the Department filed a motion to dismiss Didlake's lawsuit under CR 12(b)(6).
¶ 4 At a hearing on November 16, 2012, the trial court heard the Department's 12(b)(6) motion. The court did not hear argument on Didlake's motion for class certification.
¶ 5 In a memorandum opinion and order entered April 5, 2013, the trial court granted the Department's motion to dismiss. Didlake asked the Washington Supreme Court for direct review. On March 5, 2014, the Supreme Court transferred the case to this court.
¶ 6 When a party files an answer before filing a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6), a court should consider the motion as one for judgment on the pleadings under CR 12(c).2 Motions under CR 12(b)(6) and 12(c) raise identical issues, whether a request for relief states a claim for which a court can grant relief, and this court reviews decisions under either rule de novo.3 A court may dismiss a complaint under CR 12 only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts which would justify recovery.”4 The court must assume the truth of facts alleged in the complaint, as well as hypothetical facts, viewing both in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.5 If the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings, the reviewing court treats a CR 12 motion as a motion for summary judgment under CR 56(c).6 Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.7 Here, the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings: a declaration and fee study about administrative costs, which the Department filed to support its motion to dismiss. Therefore, the summary judgment standard applies. Because the parties agree that no disputes of material fact exist, our de novo review under CR 56(c) is the same as it would be under CR 12.
¶ 7 A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law that this court also reviews de novo.8 A reviewing court presumes that a statute is constitutional, and the party challenging it bears the burden of proving otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.9 A party may bring a facial or an as-applied challenge.10 To prevail in a facial challenge, a party must show that “no set of circumstances exists in which the statute, as currently written, can be constitutionally applied.”11 By contrast, a party succeeds in an as-applied challenge by proving that an otherwise valid statute is unconstitutional as applied to that party.12
¶ 8 Under Washington law, drivers in the state have given “implied consent” to testing for alcohol or drug impairment.13 This law “ ‘provides law enforcement officers with an effective means of obtaining physical evidence of intoxication since any person operating a motor vehicle on the roads of this state is deemed to have consented to the administration of a blood alcohol test.’ ”14
¶ 9 The arresting law enforcement officer must immediately notify the Department of the arrest and transmit a sworn report within 72 hours.15 This sworn report must state that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the arrestee drove a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.16 The report must further state that either the driver refused to take a test or took a test that revealed a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 or higher.17 Upon receipt of the officer's report, the Department “shall suspend, revoke, or deny” the driver's license effective 60 days from the date of arrest or when the suspension is sustained at a hearing, whichever comes first.18
¶ 10 The implied consent law provides certain procedural protections to drivers. The Department must give the driver written notice that it intends to suspend or revoke the driver's license.19 The Department must also notify the driver of the right to a hearing and specify the steps to obtain one.20 Within 20 days of this notice, the driver may request in writing a formal hearing before the Department.21 As part of the request, the driver must pay a mandatory fee. The Department may waive the fee, however, for drivers who are indigent.22
¶ 11 At the hearing, the driver may have assistance of counsel, question witnesses, present evidence, and testify.23 The hearing officer determines if the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was driving under the influence and if the driver refused to take a test or took a test that revealed a BAC of 0.08 or higher. After the hearing, the Department “shall order that the suspension, revocation, or denial either be rescinded or sustained.”24
¶ 12 The parties each argue the issue of standing at some length. Most of the discussion concerns Didlake's standing to bring claims related to a putative class. Because the trial court dismissed Didlake's own claims, which he had standing to bring, without ruling on his motion for class certification, we do not address this issue.
¶ 13 Didlake contends that the implied consent statute's required fee for hearing violated his right to procedural due process. He appears to raise both facial and as-applied challenges, arguing that due process requires an initial hearing at no cost and that he and other members of the putative class should receive refunds of the fees they paid to obtain hearings. Both the United States and Washington State Constitutions declare that no person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.25 Didlake has a protected property interest in his driver's license that Washington courts have recognized as “‘important’ ” and “ ‘substantial.’ ”26 In any proceeding to deprive him of this property interest, the State must afford him procedural due process.27 Procedural due process imposes limits on governmental decisions that deprive a person of “liberty” or “property” interests within the meaning of a constitution's due process clause.28
¶ 14 Essential elements of procedural due process include notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.29 “A meaningful opportunity to be heard means ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ”30 To determine what procedural protections due process requires in a particular situation, a court must consider three factors: (1) the private interest affected, (2) the risk that the relevant procedures will erroneously deprive a party of that interest, and (3) any countervailing governmental interests involved.31
¶ 15 The first factor requires a court to consider the nature of the private interest affected. In cases involving due process challenges to filing fees, both the United States and Washington Supreme Courts have held that if a fundamental interest is not involved, requiring a fee for access to court or an administrative hearing, even from indigent persons, does not violate due process.
¶ 16 Boddie v. Connecticut32 involved a class action lawsuit brought by litigants who could not pay the fees and costs required to obtain a divorce. There, the United States Supreme Court noted the state's monopolization of divorce proceedings and held that due process prohibits a state from denying indigent persons access to courts for purposes of dissolving a marriage solely because of their inability to pay fees.33 The Court emphasized that it did not decide “that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due...
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...of facts alleged in the complaint and the hypothetical facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Didlake v. State , 186 Wash. App. 417, 422, 345 P.3d 43 (2015).¶37 RCW 7.24 governs declaratory judgment actions. Three sections within RCW 7.24 set the backdrop for this appeal.......
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