Diederich v. Tri-City Ry. Co. of Iowa

Decision Date12 February 1935
Docket Number42622.
Citation258 N.W. 899,219 Iowa 587
PartiesDIEDERICH v. TRI-CITY RY. CO. OF IOWA.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from District Court, Scott County; W. W. Scott, Judge.

Plaintiff was employed by the defendant street car company as one of its motormen. He suffered an accidental injury to his person which arose out of and in the course of his employment. He commenced an action to recover compensation under the Iowa Compensation Act (Code 1931, § 1361 et seq.), alleging permanent total disability. The Industrial Commissioner allowed him partial recovery. He appealed to the district court, which reversed the Industrial Commissioner. From the ruling and order of the district court, the defendant street car company has appealed to this court. Opinion states the facts.

Affirmed.

Lane & Waterman, of Davenport, for appellant.

Bush & Bush, of Davenport, for appellee.

MITCHELL, Justice.

Wilhelm Diederich was a resident of Davenport, Iowa, and employed by the Tri-City Railroad Company of Iowa as a motorman on one of the street cars which the company operated. He had held the position of street car operator or motorman for about thirty years.

It is stipulated in the record that on May 21, 1930, Diederich suffered an accidental injury to his person, which arose out of and in the course of his employment with appellant, and at the time thereof he was working seven days per week and received as wages per day the sum of $5.27. The accident occurred near the intersection of Spring and East River streets, in Davenport, Iowa. It appears that while he was acting in his capacity as motorman, the street car he was operating passed under a viaduct on East River street, the trolley jumped off the wire, and the rope became unfastened. In order to replace the trolley Diederich had to climb up the steps to the top of the street car, and, while replacing the trolley he received a shock which caused him to fall from the top of the street car to the paved street below. The fall rendered him unconscious. He was helped to the doctor's office and from there to the hospital, where certain X-rays were taken. For six days he remained in the hospital, when he was taken home on a stretcher and was thereafter confined in bed continuously for six weeks. After he was able to be up he took heat treatments and then was taken to the hospital, where a plaster cast was applied to and kept on his body for six weeks. He remained under the doctor's care for a period of about seven months, and thereafter was examined at various times by physicians. The medical witnesses seemed to agree that appellee had suffered a fracture of the first lumbar vertebra, the injury being described by some witnesses as a compression fracture, meaning that the vertebra after being fractured was compressed or pushed together. The formation of new bone had caused the first lumbar vertebra to fuse or join with the twelfth thoracic vertebra immediately above it, and with the second lumbar vertebra immediately below it. The resulting fixation is permanent, and causes the three vertebraeto function as a single unit. There is no question but that appellee suffered a great amount of pain; that he has and always will have a stiff back, which limits his ability to turn and bend.

On the 30th day of June, 1931, the appellee filed with the Iowa Industrial Commissioner his petition for arbitration, in which he claimed he was totally and permanently disabled. To this the appellant filed an answer, denying that the claimant was totally and permanently disabled. A hearing was held before the Honorable Ralph Young, Deputy Industrial Commissioner, and a decision was rendered, in which the appellant was ordered to pay the claimant $15 per week for 100 weeks, including the compensation already paid in the case.

Thereafter, on the 15th day of June, 1932, the appellee filed with the Iowa Industrial Commissioner an application for reopening of the case, claiming that he was totally and permanently disabled. An answer was filed by the appellant company denying this, and a hearing was had before the Deputy Industrial Commissioner, in which he increased the disability from 25 per cent. permanent disability to 30 per cent.

From this ruling the appellee appealed to the district court of Scott county. The court, after due consideration, entered an order reversing the decision of the Industrial Commissioner, and entered judgment against the Tri-City Railroad Company for additional compensation at the rate of $15 per week for the remainder of 400 weeks, as provided by Code, § 1395, after allowing credit for the 99 payments theretofore made under the original order of the commissioner.

The railroad company, being dissatisfied with the judgment and order of the district court, has appealed to this court.

The appellant assigned as error that the commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive upon the lower court, and the district court had no jurisdiction to review the evidence and to make findings.

In a very recent decision, this court said, in the case of Almquist v. Shenandoah Nurseries, 254 N.W. 35, at page 37 :" If the evidence upon the point in question is in conflict, then, of course, the finding of the industrial commissioner is binding on this court. * * * But, on the other hand, the courts may interfere with the findings of the industrial commissioner under the circumstances authorized by section 1453 of the 1931 Code."

The court then quoted a part of that section, and said: " So, if, as contemplated by the statute just quoted, the evidence does not sustain the conclusion reached by the industrial commissioner, then the courts may set aside, modify, or reverse his ruling. Arthur v. Marble Rock Consolidated School District, 209 Iowa, 280, 228 N.W. 70, 66 A.L.R. 718; Mallinger v. Webster City Oil Co., 211 Iowa, 847, 234 N.W. 254; Petersen v. Corno Mills Co., 216 Iowa, 894, 249 N.W. 408; Tunnicliff v. Bettendorf et al., 204 Iowa, 168, 214 N.W. 516."

On the same page it is said: " To illustrate, we said in the Tunnicliff Case, reading on page 170 of 204 Iowa, 214 N.W. 516, 517:‘ There is no merit in appellant's contention that the findings of fact of the industrial commissioner are conclusive. As we have said, there was no conflict in the evidence; and if the facts found by the commissioner do not support the order made by him, or if there is not sufficient competent evidence to support the finding, the order based thereon may be reviewed and set aside by the court."

On the next page the court said: " When the industrial commissioner's finding, however, is not supported by the evidence, and when, on the other hand, the evidence is without conflict and all of it is against the conclusion reached by him, then the courts may interfere and modify, set aside, or reverse his ruling, as shown by the cases above indicated."

The court then fully reviewed the evidence, and said: " Nowhere in the record is there any dispute on the material facts. Consequently the appellee, without controversy, proved that there was a personal injury which caused the employee's death, and that the same arose out of and in the course of the employee's employment. Hence, the commissioner erred as a matter of law in finding that she was not entitled to...

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