Dietz v. Bouldin
Citation | 794 F.3d 1093 |
Decision Date | 24 July 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 13–35377.,13–35377. |
Parties | Rocky DIETZ, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Hillary BOULDIN, Defendant–Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Geoffrey C. Angel (argued), Angel Law Firm, Bozeman, MT, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
John F. Bohyer and Jesse Beaudette (argued), Bohyer, Erickson, Beaudette & Tranel PC, Missoula, MT, for Defendant–Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Richard W. Anderson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:11–cv–00036–RWA.
Before: RAYMOND C. FISHER, CARLOS T. BEA and MARY H. MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
We consider, as a matter of first impression in this circuit, whether a jury can be recalled shortly after it has been ordered discharged. Joining the majority of circuit courts to have decided the issue, we hold a district court may re-empanel a jury shortly after dismissal, but only if, during the period of dismissal, the jurors were not exposed to any outside influences that would compromise their ability to fairly reconsider the verdict.
Hillary Bouldin's vehicle collided with Rocky Dietz's in August 2009. Dietz subsequently filed a negligence complaint in Montana state court against Bouldin for “injuries including to his low back” and “physical pain, suffering, grief, anxiety and a loss of course of life” stemming from the accident. The case was subsequently removed to federal court.
Before trial, Bouldin admitted he was at fault and that Dietz was injured as a result of the accident. The parties stipulated to $10,136 in past expenses Dietz incurred as a result of the accident. The only disputed issue at trial was the amount of future damages Bouldin owed Dietz. Dietz presented evidence he would need regular physical therapy, medication and injections to alleviate the pain he was experiencing following the accident. Bouldin emphasized that Dietz had a long list of medical conditions predating the collision, that only some of his medical expenses were related to the accident and that he was exaggerating the amount of treatment he would actually seek.
During closing argument, Bouldin's counsel reminded the jury of the stipulated amount of past damages and explained that its award additionally had to include the reasonable value of necessary care, treatment and services received and those reasonably probable to be required in the future. He suggested the jury award Dietz an amount “somewhere between ten and $20,000, depending on what you feel his relief is, what level of pain he has, and how his condition has been affected by this automobile accident.”
During deliberations, a juror sent the following question to the judge: “Has the $10,136 medical expenses been paid; and if so, by whom?” The court responded that the information was not germane to the jury's verdict. Speaking to the parties' counsel, the court then observed:
What I'm wondering—[l]et's just do a little speculating on our own. If we end up with a verdict in less than that amount, and I can't believe that would happen, but if this is what we're heading toward, that would be grounds for a mistrial and I don't want a mistrial. Do you think they understand clearly, after the argument and the instructions, that their verdict may not be less than that amount?
Bouldin's counsel said he had made the point “crystal clear,” and the court agreed. Accordingly, the court took no further action to instruct the jury to award at least $10,136 in damages. The jury returned with a verdict, finding for Dietz but awarding him damages in the amount of $0. The court asked counsel if they would like the jury polled, and both declined. The court then thanked the jurors for their time, told them they were “free to go,” discharged them and recessed. Realizing the verdict was a legal impossibility given the stipulated damages exceeded $10,000, the court quickly called back the jurors, noting for the record it was doing so “moments after having dismissed them.” It told the jurors their verdict violated the stipulation, inquired whether any of them had experienced undue outside influence in the period following dismissal and, when they collectively responded they had not, ordered them to reconvene the following morning to issue a new verdict consistent with the stipulation. Dietz objected to this procedure and moved for a mistrial, arguing recall was not appropriate because the jury had been dismissed. The jury again found for Dietz and awarded him damages in the sum of $15,000. Dietz timely appealed.
Dietz argues the district court erred by recalling the jury after it had already been dismissed. Given the circumstances here, where the court promptly recalled the jurors, questioned them and found they were not exposed to prejudicial influence during the brief duration of their dismissal, we conclude the recall was not an abuse of discretion. We thus affirm the judgment.1
We first address the correct standard of review for a district court's decision to re-empanel discharged jurors. Dietz argues “the judgment is void because the district court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law,” so we must review de novo the district court's decision to re-empanel the jurors. Bouldin counters that the correct standard should be abuse of discretion because Dietz requests a new trial based on an alleged error committed by the district court.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) provides relief from a final judgment if it is void as a matter of law. The list of such judgments is “exceedingly short,” and “Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 176 L.Ed.2d 158 (2010).
Here, Dietz does not allege that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment or that he was deprived of notice or an opportunity to be heard. Instead, he argues the court should have granted his motion for a mistrial because the verdict did not comply with the stipulated damages. Denials of motions for mistrial are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hagege, 437 F.3d 943, 958–59 (9th Cir.2006). Therefore, that is the standard of review we apply here.
Our circuit has not yet addressed when a district court abuses its discretion by recalling jurors after dismissing them.2 Therefore, we must decide what legal standard governs our analysis.
Typically, a jury is no longer an entity after the court discharges it, and its duties “are presumed to be at an end when its verdict has been rendered, received, and published.” Summers v. United States, 11 F.2d 583, 586 (4th Cir.1926). When the jury has “been discharged altogether and relieved, by the instructions of the judge, of any duty to return.... it has ceased to be a jury, and, if its members happen to come together again, they are there as individuals, and no longer as an organized group, an arm or agency of the law.” Porret v. City of New York, 252 N.Y. 208, 169 N.E. 280, 280 (1929) (opinion of Cardozo, C.J.). Correspondingly, the “protective shield” imposed by the district court, which prevents jurors from being subjected to prejudicial outside influences, is removed upon dismissal. United States v. Figueroa, 683 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir.2012) ; see also United States v. Marinari, 32 F.3d 1209, 1214 (7th Cir.1994) ( ).
Nevertheless, several courts have recognized that in certain limited circumstances, a district court may recall a jury immediately after dismissal to correct an error in its verdict. See Figueroa, 683 F.3d at 73 ; United States v. Rojas, 617 F.3d 669, 677 (2d Cir.2010) ; Marinari, 32 F.3d at 1215. These courts look at the totality of circumstances to determine whether the jurors were exposed to prejudicial outside influence before the recall. See Wagner v. Jones, 758 F.3d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir.2014), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1529, 191 L.Ed.2d 558 (2015) . This line of cases appears to originate from Summers v. United States, 11 F.2d 583.
Other circuits have extended the Summers rule to situations where the jurors have been released but effectively remained under control of the court.3 For example, the Third Circuit upheld a district court's decision to re-empanel a jury where the court...
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Dietz v. Bouldin
...anew. The next day, the reassembled jury returned a verdict awarding Dietz $15,000 in damages.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 794 F.3d 1093 (2015). The court held that a district court could reempanel the jury shortly after dismissal as long as during the period of dismissal, the jur......
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United States v. Martin
...error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard." Dietz v. Bouldin , 794 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa , 559 U.S. 260, 271, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 176 L.Ed.2d 158 (2010) ). Although it is a ......
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United States v. Wanland
...jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard." Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir.2015). Judgments are generally considered void for jurisdictional defects only when "the court that rendered judgment lacked ......
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State v. Platero
...id. at 1894, Platero consented to re-empaneling the jury and did not ask the court to make such an inquiry, see Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093, 1099 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that an inquiry into whether jurors were exposed to compromising influences "may not be necessary where the part......
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