United States v. Martin
| Decision Date | 18 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | CR-14-00678-01-PHX-DGC |
| Citation | 555 F.Supp.3d 821 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Joseph S. MARTIN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Christine Duey, Michael Sheckels, Assistant US Attorneys, US Dept. of Justice - Human Rights & Special Prosecutions, Washington, DC, Joseph Edward Koehler, Assistant US Attorney, US Attorneys Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff.
In September 2015, Defendant Joseph Martin was convicted of sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact. Doc. 299. Martin has completed his prison term, is now serving a term of supervised release, and has filed an amended motion to vacate his convictions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). Doc. 398. The motion is fully briefed (Docs. 398-402), including supplemental briefing (Docs. 404, 407), and no party requests oral argument. The Court will deny the motion.1
In October 2013, Martin sexually assaulted a female minor on a residential street outside of a private residence in Germany. See Doc. 399 at 2-3.2 In May 2014, a federal grand jury indicted him for conspiracy to commit aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, and abusive sexual contact in violation of federal law. Doc. 3.
The indictment cited the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act ("MEJA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261 et seq. , which authorizes federal court jurisdiction over criminal acts of military personnel and their dependents overseas. Id. After a six-day jury trial, Martin was acquitted of conspiracy and convicted on the sexual abuse and abusive sexual conduct charges.3 Doc. 245. The Court sentenced Martin to 96 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. Doc. 299.4
In February 2021, Martin filed a motion to vacate or set aside the judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. 1, Case No. 21-cv-213-DGC-JZB. He has moved to stay the § 2255 motion pending the Court's decision in this matter. Doc. 7, Case No. 21-cv-213-DGC-JZB.
Congress enacted MEJA to address "a jurisdictional gap created by host nations’ reluctance to prosecute crimes against Americans committed by civilians accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States." United States v. Arnt , 474 F.3d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007). MEJA applies when a person connected with the Armed Forces engages in conduct abroad that would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year if committed in the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a)(1)-(2). The statute requires that the culpable party engage in the conduct: (1) while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States, or (2) while a member of the Armed Forces. See id. MEJA defines the phrase "accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States" as, among other things, a dependent of a member of the Armed Forces who resides with the Armed Forces member outside the United States and is "not a national of or ordinarily resident in the host nation." Id. § 3267(2)(A)-(C).
A party may challenge a judgment at the district court level under Rule 60(b)(4). The rule provides that "[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the [reason that] the judgment is void." Id. The list of void judgments under the rule is "exceedingly short," and "applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard." Dietz v. Bouldin , 794 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa , 559 U.S. 260, 271, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 176 L.Ed.2d 158 (2010) ). Although it is a rule of civil procedure, it applies to habeas cases arising from a criminal conviction where parties seek "to obtain vacatur of a judgment that is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction[.]" Gonzalez v. Crosby , 545 U.S. 524, 535, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005). A district court also may address subject-matter jurisdiction "on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 506, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). If the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Martin makes two arguments in support of his claim that the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.5
First, Martin argues that his indictment was defective because the government charged him only with violations of the federal sexual assault statutes, not with a MEJA violation as a separate offense. See Docs. 3, 398 at 13-16. Because the incident occurred in Germany and the charged offenses apply only within the special and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, Martin contends that the Court lacked the power to hear his case. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2242, 2244 (); see also Bond v. United States , 572 U.S. 844, 857, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 189 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014) ().
Second, if the indictment is sufficient, Martin argues that MEJA does not apply because he does not meet one of its threshold elements – he was "not a national of or ordinarily resident in the host nation" at the time of the incident. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2)(C). Martin claims he was "ordinarily resident" in Germany because he was born and raised there and had left the country only for short trips with his family. Doc. 398 at 18. Because the government never presented sufficient evidence to prove that he was not "ordinarily resident" in Germany, Martin argues, it could not establish the "jurisdictional facts" required for subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 9.
The government replies that Martin lived in Germany solely because of his "connection to the military rather than because of other significant ‘local ties.’ " Doc. 399 at 21 (quoting United States v. Williams , 836 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ). It also contends that his arguments, while couched as subject-matter jurisdiction challenges, actually involve the extraterritorial reach of his charged offenses, which is not a basis for voiding a judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). See Doc. 404 at 1-2.6
Martin argues that his indictment was "defective" because it did not charge violations of MEJA. This argument is based on the incorrect premise that defective indictments deprive a federal court of subject matter jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court has explained, "defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case." United States v. Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ; Arnt , 474 F.3d at 1162 (). Because a defective indictment does not constitute a "jurisdictional error," it provides no basis to void Martin's judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). Dietz , 794 F.3d at 1096.
Martin's argument also fails on the merits. He argues that the government was required to charge him with a violation of MEJA, not with the federal sex offenses of which he was convicted. Doc. 398 at 14-15. He relies on a House Report for MEJA which stated that a qualifying defendant alleged to have violated 18 U.S.C. § 2242 should be charged with "a violation of section 3261, not section 2242," and that "a violation of section 2242 need not be charged." H.R. Rep. No. 106-778, at 15 (2000); see also Department of Defense Instruction 5525.11 ¶ 6.1.1 ().
The Court is not persuaded that language in a House Report delineates the extent and nature of a MEJA violation. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, "legislative history – no matter how clear – can't override statutory text." Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp. , 671 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). And MEJA's text clearly suggests that it establishes a method for prosecuting certain persons for existing federal offenses that are committed outside the United States:
18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (italics and underscoring added). The statute thus applies to conduct that constitutes a federal offense – "an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" – and applies the punishment for "that offense." Id. It does not purport to create a new crime, and it does not set forth the elements of a new offense. Similarly, the title of the statute – the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act – expressly focuses on extending the jurisdiction of federal courts rather than creating new crimes. The language of the statute and its title take precedence over the House Report, and simply cannot be squared with Martin's argument that the government was required to charge MEJA as the offense committed by Martin. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 234, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (...
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