Dietz v. General Elec. Co.
| Citation | 169 Ariz. 505,821 P.2d 166 |
| Decision Date | 21 November 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-90-0435-CQ,CV-90-0435-CQ |
| Parties | Alexander B. DIETZ and Irma N. Dietz, husband and wife, and Mary Antoinette Dietz, Alexander Rudy Dietz and Amy Suzette Dietz, minors, By and Through their parent and natural guardian, Alexander B. Dietz, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, S & C Electric Company, General Electric Wiring Co., a subsidiary of General Electric Co., Defendants. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Arizona |
This question of law was certified to us by the Honorable William D. Browning, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. It arises from Arizona's statutory abrogation of the doctrine of joint and several liability. We accepted certification because the issue is one of first impression and requires interpretation of Arizona's version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 et seq.
We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-1861. The procedures for answering certified questions are specified in Rule 27, Ariz.R.Sup.Ct., 17A A.R.S.
Alexander B. Dietz (Dietz) was injured in the course of his employment at the Magma Copper Company (Magma) mine at San Manuel, Arizona, on June 8, 1987. Shortly after his injury, he filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits under A.R.S. § 23-1061. Magma, self-insured for workers' compensation, accepted the claim and paid Dietz medical and other benefits.
In June 1989, Dietz filed a negligence action in Pima County Superior Court, naming General Electric Company and S & C Electric Company as defendants. He sought damages for his industrial injuries and alleged that General Electric and S & C Electric (Defendants) caused those injuries by negligently manufacturing and distributing certain appliances he had used while working for Magma. Upon petition by General Electric, the cause was removed to the District Court.
Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2506, Defendants named Magma as a nonparty at fault. Dietz moved to strike this designation, arguing that under A.R.S. § 12-2501(H), an employer liable for workers' compensation cannot be considered a nonparty at fault. Before ruling on Dietz' motion, the district judge certified the following question to this court:
When an employer negligently contributes to an employee's injury, may the joint tortfeasors have that negligence considered for the assessment of fault under A.R.S. § 12-2506 or does A.R.S. § 12-2501(H) preclude such consideration?
DISCUSSION
With certain exceptions not relevant to this case, the liability of tortfeasors in Arizona is several only. By statute,
[e]ach defendant is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault.... To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, the trier of fact shall multiply the total amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff by the percentage of each defendant's fault....
A.R.S. § 12-2506(A). 1
Section 12-2506 also provides that when assessing the percentage of each defendant's fault, the factfinder "shall consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged injury ... regardless of whether the person was, or could have been, named as a party to the suit." § 12-2506(B). The percentages of fault assessed against such "nonparties are used only as a vehicle for accurately determining the fault of the named parties." Id. Assessment of fault against the nonparty does not subject the nonparty to liability. Id.
Defendants invoked these statutory provisions, naming Magma as a nonparty at fault under § 12-2506. Designating Magma a nonparty at fault would allow Defendants to offer trial evidence of Magma's negligence and to argue that the jury should attribute all or some percentage of fault to Magma, thereby reducing Defendants' percentage of fault and consequent liability.
From Dietz' viewpoint, this designation would result in the named Defendants "laying off" their liability on a nonparty that could not defend itself. Even worse, Dietz could not join Magma as a defendant because Arizona law provides that an employer complying with the requirements of the workers' compensation statutes "shall not be liable for damages at common law ... for injury or death of an employee...." A.R.S. § 23-906(A). The sole relevant exception is for employees who have "elected" to reject the provisions of the workers' compensation law and thereby retained their common law rights against their employer. A.R.S. § 23-906(A), (B). Having accepted workers' compensation benefits, Dietz could not have named Magma as a party defendant but, instead, could bring his action only against Defendants.
Dietz therefore moved the district court to strike the designation of Magma as a § 12-2506 nonparty at fault, relying on § 12-2501(H), part of the UCATA article, 2 which provides:
This article does not create a right of contribution against an employer ... liable for workmen's compensation in connection with an injury.... For purposes of determining the amount of pro rata shares under this article, any employer ... who has paid or who is liable for workmen's compensation shall not be considered....
(Emphasis added.)
Section 12-2506, providing for the assessment of fault against nonparties, is part of the same article as § 12-2501(H). Dietz argues, therefore, that the provisions of § 12-2501(H) govern and apply to § 12-2506, thus prohibiting assessment of fault against Magma, an "employer ... who has paid ... workmen's compensation...." Defendants, on the other hand, contend that § 12-2501(H) applies only to the assessment of fault for contribution purposes. Defendants argue that for the purpose of determining each defendant's percentage of several liability, the assessment of fault against nonparties is governed by A.R.S. § 12-2506(B). This provision requires such assessment "regardless of whether" the nonparty "could have been" made a party. (Emphasis added.)
The contribution provisions of Arizona's version of the UCATA, including 12- 2501(H), were enacted in 1984. Laws 1984, Ch. 237, § 1. See generally Butler & Gage, Comparative Negligence and Uniform Contribution: New Arizona Law, 20 ARIZ. BAR J. 16 (1984). The 1984 legislation (the "original article") provided a scheme for contribution between joint tortfeasors, 3 and contained comparative negligence provisions (A.R.S. § 12-2505). The original article, however, neither addressed nor modified the common law doctrine of joint and several liability. See ante note 2. At common law, a tortfeasor could be held responsible for the entire damage
sustained by the plaintiff, even though the defendant's act concurred or combined with that of another wrongdoer to produce the result--or, as the courts have put it, that the defendant is liable for all consequences proximately caused by the defendant's wrongful act.
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 47, at 328 (5th ed. 1984); see Curlee v. Morris, 72 Ariz. 125, 231 P.2d 752 (1951).
The 1984 enactment of UCATA left in place the common law doctrine that a defendant whose wrong had contributed to the damage to any degree could be liable for all of the damage. It allowed such a defendant to recoup from the other joint tortfeasors all or part of the "excess" it had paid (see A.R.S. § 12-2501(A) and (B)) and provided a system for establishing the fault of nonparty joint tortfeasors to facilitate such contribution claims.
The employer exception contained in § 12-2501(H) of the original article therefore simply prevented joint tortfeasors from asserting contribution claims against employers who enjoyed statutory immunity under the workers' compensation act. The reason for such a provision is obvious: failure to exempt such employers from the contribution requirements would effectively repeal the employer's statutory immunity from employee tort actions.
Unlike the original article, the provisions of § 12-2506 do not pertain to contribution but, rather, abolish joint liability and establish a scheme of several liability based on comparative fault. The current § 12-2506 was enacted in 1987 and requires the trier of fact in a negligence case to "consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged injury ... regardless of whether the person was, or could have been, named as a party to the suit." A.R.S. § 12-2506(B) (emphasis added). Magma enjoys an employer's statutory immunity from suit and could not be made a party defendant. Under § 12-2506(B), however, if Magma was a joint tortfeasor, its fault must be considered by the factfinder. In Defendants' view, the later-enacted § 12-2506 overcomes the prior provisions of § 12-2501(H).
Defendants buttress their argument by citing numerous cases, all of which allow the fault of a nonparty, immune employer to be considered in assessing a percentage of fault to each party to the action. See Williams v. White Mountain Construction Co., 749 P.2d 423, 429 (Colo.1988); Pape v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 231 Kan. 441, 647 P.2d 320 (1982); Bode v. Clark Equipment Co., 719 P.2d 824 (Okla.1986); Taylor v. Delgarno Transp., Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983); see also Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978) (). We consider these cases to be only marginally relevant. They correctly indicate that...
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