Dilibero v. State Of R.I.
| Citation | 996 A.2d 599 |
| Decision Date | 04 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2009-136-Appeal.,2009-136-Appeal. |
| Parties | David DiLIBEROv.STATE of Rhode Island. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
Catherine Gibran, Office of the Public Defender, for Plaintiff.
Lauren S. Zurier, Department of Attorney General, for Defendant.
The petitioner, David DiLibero, appeals from an order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After examining the written and oral submissions of the parties, we conclude that this appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this order, we dismiss this appeal.
On November 10, 1992, Mr. DiLibero pled nolo contendere to multiple robbery and conspiracy charges and was sentenced to concurrent forty-year terms of imprisonment, with twenty years to serve and twenty years suspended. He since has been sentenced to additional time to serve for a litany of drug-and robbery- related offenses. Between March 2003 and May 2006, Mr. DiLibero was released on parole on four separate occasions. As a special condition of his parole, petitioner was required to cooperate with the electronic monitoring program,1 which he did for a total of 449 days.
On September 4, 2008, Mr. DiLibero petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. His petition appears to have been based on three arguments: (1) the time petitioner spent on community confinement while on parole should be credited toward his original sentence, (2) the good-time credits Mr. DiLibero may have accrued during the 449 days he spent on community confinement should also be credited toward his original sentence, and (3) time should be deducted from his original sentence for “meritorious service” performed during his incarceration.
On October 14, 2008, a hearing was held on the petition. At the hearing, Mr. DiLibero asserted two arguments to support his position that he should receive credit toward his full sentence for time spent paroled on community confinement. He argued first that his parole permit was a contract of adhesion and, second, that placing a parolee on community confinement violates the statute that governs the administration of community confinement, G.L.1956 § 42-56-20.2, when the total time the person is in prison and on community confinement exceeds his or her full sentence. In a decision denying petitioner's requested relief, the hearing justice stated that the plain and clear language of G.L.1956 § 13-8-19(b) 2 precluded petitioner from receiving credit toward his full sentence for the time he spent as a parolee on community confinement. At the close of the hearing, the hearing justice issued a decision and entered an order denying the petition. On November 5, 2008, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.
Thereafter, petitioner requested bail pending this appeal, but this request was denied on July 27, 2009, after a hearing. This Court also denied petitioner's request for bail on September 16, 2009, but ordered that his appeal be expedited.
This appeal is procedurally deficient in a number of ways. At the outset, petitioner incorrectly sought relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus. General Laws 1956 § 10-9-1 provides:
“Every person imprisoned in any correctional institution or otherwise restrained of his or her liberty, other than persons imprisoned or restrained pursuant to a final judgment entered in a criminal proceeding, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, according to the provisions of this chapter, to obtain relief from the imprisonment or restraint, if it shall prove to be unlawful.”
This Court has noted that § 10-9-1, ...
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Rose v. State
...a writ of habeas corpus, we will confine our review to the denial of Rose's application for postconviction relief. See DiLibero v. State, 996 A.2d 599, 601 (R.I.2010) (citing G.L.1956 § 10–9–22). We note, however, that in this case, the distinction is immaterial. Rose sought the same relief......
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Iozzi v. City of Cranston
...to reach the merits of the issues raised, and we affirm the underlying judgment pertaining to Triton and Veolia. 7See DiLibero v. State, 996 A.2d 599, 601 (R.I.2010) (mem.) (holding that “this Court will not entertain untimely appeals.”).BPeerless's Judgment Moving now to plaintiffs' appeal......
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Iozzi v. City of Cranston
...to reach the merits of the issues raised, and we affirm the underlying judgment pertaining to Triton and Veolia.7 See DiLibero v. State, 996 A.2d 599, 601 (R.I. 2010) (mem.) (holding that "this Court will not entertain untimely appeals.").BPeerless's Judgment Moving now to plaintiffs' appea......
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Pawtucket Redevelopment Agency v. Brown
...decline to address the merits of plaintiff's appeal of the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law.5 See DiLibero v. State, 996 A.2d 599, 601 (R.I.2010) (mem.) (holding that “this Court will not entertain untimely appeals”). Conversely, the errors with defendant's notice of app......