Rose v. State
| Citation | 92 A.3d 903 |
| Decision Date | 24 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2012–129–Appeal.,2012–129–Appeal. |
| Parties | Alexander ROSE v. STATE of Rhode Island. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Janice M. Weisfeld, Office of the Public Defender, for Applicant.
Lauren S. Zurier, Department of Attorney General, for State.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.
The applicant Alexander Rose (Rose or applicant), appeals from a Superior Court judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and his application for postconviction relief.1 On appeal, the applicant argues that the hearing justice erred by miscalculating the length of his sentence. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The pertinent facts in this matter are not in dispute. On December 23, 1992, Rose was incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) while awaiting the disposition of an allegation of first-degree child molestation. On March 14, 1994, Rose pled nolo contendere to one count of first-degree child molestation. The sentencing justice imposed the mandatory minimum sentence under G.L.1956 § 11–37–8.2 of twenty years,2 with eight years to serve, and the remaining twelve years suspended with twelve years probation. At the plea hearing, the sentencing justice engaged in the following colloquy with Rose:
“THE COURT: You heard the recommendation of a 20–year sentence, eight years to serve. You'll receive credit for time served retroactive to December 23, 1992. What I want to make sure you understand is that after you're released from that eight years to serve, you still have a 12–year suspended sentence hanging over you and 12 years probation. Do you understand that?
“[Rose]: I understand.
“THE COURT: When I say, ‘hanging over you,’ I just mean that for 12 years after your release you are going to be on probation[.] [D]uring that period * * * you will comply with the terms and conditions of probation. If * * * a judge after a hearing were to find that you violated probation, that judge could then revoke the 12–year suspended sentence and you could be ordered to serve up to 12 years at the ACI. You understand all that?
“[Rose]: Yes.
A judgment of conviction and commitment entered on March 17, 1994.3
Rose was released from the ACI on parole on December 17, 1997, less than four years after the imposition of his sentence. In addition to receiving credit for the fifteen months he was confined while awaiting disposition of his case, Rose also earned credits under G.L.1956 § 42–56–24 for good behavior and participation in institutional industries. Rose completed his period of parole without incident sometime in July 1999. To date, he has not violated the terms of his probation.
On October 13, 2010, Rose filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he requested that the Superior Court order his discharge from the allegedly unlawful custody of his probation officer. Thereafter, on October 25, 2010, Rose moved to amend his pleadings to add an application for postconviction relief under G.L.1956 § 10–9.1–1(a)(5).4 In a memorandum in support of his petition and application, he asserted that his period of probation had ended on December 17, 2009, twelve years after the date of his release from the ACI. Rose alternatively argued that, if his sentence did not end on December 17, 2009, it would terminate in July 2011, twelve years after his successful completion of parole. The state objected to Rose's petition, arguing that Rose's period of probation does not end until March 2014, twenty years from the date his sentence was imposed.
A Superior Court hearing justice denied Rose's petition for habeas corpus and his application for postconviction relief in a written decision filed on September 22, 2011. In her decision, the hearing justice concluded that Rose's probation placed him under an implied obligation to keep the peace and be of good behavior for the full length of his sentence. She stated that Rose's “ ‘20–year full sentence’ began on March 14, 1994 and [runs] until March 13, 2014.” In reaching her conclusion, the hearing justice specifically reasoned that Rose's “good time credit does not change the beginning date and end date of [his] full sentence.” She did not expressly address whether Rose's credits for time served or his time spent on parole could alter the end date of his sentence.
An order denying Rose's petition for habeas corpus and his application for postconviction relief entered on October 19, 2011. Final judgment entered on April 3, 2012. The applicant timely filed a notice of appeal on September 27, 2011.5
To decide this appeal, we must construe several statutory provisions. “[T]his Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo.” McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810, 819 (R.I.2013) (quoting Bucci v. Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069, 1078 (R.I.2013)). “[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I.2013) (quoting Alessi v. Bowen Court Condominium, 44 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I.2012)). “[O]ur ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.” Swain v. Estate of Tyre ex rel. Reilly, 57 A.3d 283, 289 (R.I.2012) (quoting Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I.2001)).
On appeal, Rose argues that the hearing justice erred in concluding that his sentence could not end before March 13, 2014. He does not dispute that he is under an obligation to keep the peace and be of good behavior for the full length of his sentence. Rose instead asserts that his full sentence expired earlier than March 13, 2014 because the credits that he received for time served and good time 6 accelerated the start date, and consequently, the end date of his probationary period. Although he initially made a similar argument about his grant of parole, he conceded at oral argument that his release on parole did not have any effect on the end date of his probationary period. Accordingly, we are left with two questions to resolve in this appeal: What effect, if any, do Rose's credits for (1) good time and (2) time served have on the total length of his sentence?
Rose's sentence is the result of the interplay of several statutory provisions. In particular, “[t]he Legislature has provided by statute several methods of mitigating a defendant's sentence: suspension, probation, good-time credits, [and] parole,” among others. State v. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d 1328, 1331 (R.I.1983). Good-time credits are available in 7 Neil P. Cohen, 2 The Law of Probation and Parole, § 28:26 at 28–42 (2d ed.1999); see generally Michael M. O'Hear, Solving the Good–Time Puzzle: Why Following the Rules Should Get You Out of Prison Early, 2012 Wis. L.Rev. 195, 195, 200 (2012) (). Good-time credit serves two primary purposes: it incentivizes orderly behavior while incarcerated. In addition, since good-time credit “results in early release for many inmates[, it] reduces prison overcrowding.” Neil P. Cohen, 1 The Law of Probation and Parole, § 4:20 at 4–37, § 4:28 at 4–48 (2d ed.1999); see also Ceceila Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 465, 487–91 (2010) ().
Our Legislature has endowed the Department of Corrections (DOC) in § 42–56–24 with the authority to mitigate a defendant's sentence by rewarding a prisoner's good behavior and industriousness with credits towards his or her sentence. The version of § 42–56–24 in effect in 1994 8 provided:
“(a) The director or his or her designee shall keep a record of the conduct of each prisoner, and for each month that a prisoner who has been sentenced to imprisonment for six (6) months or more and not under sentence to imprisonment for life, appears by the record to have faithfully observed all the rules and requirements of the institutions and not to have been subjected to discipline, there shall, with the consent of the director of the department of corrections * * * be deducted from the term or terms of sentence of that prisoner the same number of days that there are years in the term of his or her sentence; provided that when the sentence is for a longer term than ten (10) years, only ten (10) days shall be deducted for one month's good behavior * * *.
“ * * *
The first clause of § 42–56–24(a) clearly limits that provision's applicability to situations where a defendant is “ sentenced to imprisonment for six (6) months or more” but not “ sentenced to imprisonment for life.” (Emphases added.) That section then goes on to state...
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