Dilieto v. Cnty. Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp., P.C.

• Decision Date: 27 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. 18838.,18838.
• Citation: 310 Conn. 38,74 A.3d 1212
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Michele DiLIETO et al. v. COUNTY OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY GROUP, P.C., et al.

310 Conn. 38

74 A.3d 1212

Michele DiLIETO et al.

v.COUNTY OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY GROUP, P.C., et al.

No. 18838.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 3, 2012.

Decided Aug. 27, 2013.

Steven D. Ecker, with whom were Rodney S. Margol and, on the brief, William F. Gallagher, Hugh D. Hughes, New Haven, and C. Rufus Pennington II, for the appellant (named plaintiff).

Jeffrey R. Babbin, New Haven, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

PALMER, ZARELLA, DiPENTIMA, GRUENDEL and BEAR, Js.

PALMER, J.

The named plaintiff, Michele DiLieto,¹ commenced this medical malpractice action against the named defendant, County Obstetrics and Gynecology Group, P.C. (County Obstetrics), and the defendants Scott Casper, a physician employed by County Obstetrics, and Yale University School of Medicine,² alleging that they negligently had removed her reproductive organs and pelvic lymph nodes. Following a trial, the jury found the defendants liable and awarded $5,200,000 to the substitute plaintiff, Michael J. Daly, who was DiLieto's bankruptcy trustee.³ After awarding Daly $5,886,113.64 in interest under the offer of judgment statute, General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 52–192a,⁴ as well as costs, the trial court rendered judgment for Daly in the total amount of $11,110,045.79. The defendants appealed to this court, and we affirmed the judgment of the trial court except with respect to the amount of interest awarded under § 52–192a, which we concluded should have been calculated from the date of Daly's substitution as plaintiff rather than from the date that the offer of judgment was filed. See DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 297 Conn. 105, 145, 154, 998 A.2d 730 (2010). We therefore remanded the case to the trial court with direction to award offer of judgment interest accruing from that date. Id., at 164, 998 A.2d 730. Thereafter, Daly filed a motion in the trial court for, inter alia, postjudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 37–3b.⁵ Prior to the filing of that motion, Ronald I. Chorches had been substituted for Daly as DiLieto's bankruptcy trustee, and, during the pendency of the motion, the trial court granted DiLieto's motion to substitute herself as the plaintiff. The trial court denied that portion of the motion seeking postjudgment interest under § 37–3b, concluding that DiLieto had failed to demonstrate that the defendants wrongfully detained money that was payable to her under the judgment, the standard that this court has deemed applicable to claims for interest under General Statutes § 37–3a.⁶ On appeal,⁷ DiLieto contends that the trial court should not have applied the wrongful detention standard of § 37–3a⁸ in declining to award postjudgment interest under § 37–3b. We conclude that the proper standard for an award of interest under § 37–3a is the same standard for an award of interest under the version of § 37–3b in effect before the 1997 amendment, and that, under both provisions, a plaintiff who obtains a judgment is entitled to interest when the trial court determines, in the exercise of its sound discretion, that such an award would be fair and equitable. We also conclude that, although the trial court properly determined that the same standard applies to both provisions, the standard that the court actually did apply was incorrect. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court for consideration of DiLieto's request for postjudgment interest under the correct legal standard.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Following our remand in DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., supra, 297 Conn. 105, 998 A.2d 730, Daly filed a motion for, inter alia, an award of postjudgment interest under § 37–3b, calculated at the maximum statutory annual rate of 10 percent, in the amount of $1,769,146. The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that, in accordance with Carrano v. Yale–New Haven Hospital, 112 Conn.App. 767, 773–74, 963 A.2d 1117 (2009), the wrongful detention standard applicable to an award of interest under § 37–3a applies to interest awarded under § 37–3b. The defendants further maintained that, because their appeal was brought in good faith, the money that was payable to Daly under the judgment, which had been stayed automatically by operation of Practice Book § 61–11,⁹ was not wrongfully detained for the period that their appeal was pending.

DiLieto, who, by the time the court was considering Daly's motion, had been substituted as the plaintiff, claimed that, under Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 301, 304–305, 472 A.2d 316 (1984), a party who recovers offer of judgment interest under § 52–192a is entitled to postjudgment interest under § 37–3b as a matter of law. She also argued that, to the extent that Carrano holds that wrongful detention is an element of an award of interest under § 37–3b, that case was wrongly decided because it conflicts with Gionfriddo and, furthermore, that, in contrast to § 37–3a, § 37–3b does not contain language explicitly or implicitly conditioning an award of interest on a finding that money was wrongfully detained. She also argued that, even if wrongful detention is a requirement under § 37–3b, that requirement was met in the present case because this court determined in DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., supra, 297 Conn. at 105, 998 A.2d 730, that the defendants' failure to compensate her for her injuries was unreasonable beginning on January 27, 2000, the date on which the defendants were deemed to have rejected her reasonable offers to settle. See id., at 158–59, 998 A.2d 730. According to DiLieto, if the defendants' detention of the money due under the judgment was sufficiently unreasonable to trigger six years of punitive offer of judgment interest under § 52–192a, “then [a fortiorari] their decision to withhold payment after [July 14, 2006] was sufficiently unreasonable to trigger [her] entitlement to postjudgment interest under ... § [37–3b].”

The trial court agreed with the defendants that, under Carrano, the wrongful detention standard of § 37–3a also applies to an award of postjudgment interest under § 37–3b. The trial court further observed that, under Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's & Cos. Collective, 121 Conn.App. 31, 994 A.2d 262, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 918, 996 A.2d 277 (2010), “in the context of [§ 37–3a], wrongful is not synonymous with bad faith conduct. Rather, wrongful means simply that the act is performed without the legal right to do so.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 63, 994 A.2d 262. The trial court therefore concluded that, because the judgment had been stayed by operation of Practice Book § 61–11, the defendants had a legal right to withholdpayment of the judgment while their appeal was pending, and, consequently, their failure to pay the judgment during the pendency of the appeal reasonably could not be characterized as wrongful. Specifically, the trial court stated: “[DiLieto has] presented no authority to [impose] a legal obligation [on] the defendants to [satisfy] the judgment while the appeal was pending. Or, put another way, [she has] failed to show that the defendants had no legal right to withhold payment during that time.... [The] court finds that the defendants' appeal [in DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., supra, 297 Conn. 105, 998 A.2d 730] ... was bona fide and made in good faith. Taking into account the circumstances of this case and all equitable considerations, [the court concludes that] nothing has been presented ... by way of evidence or argument to compel the conclusion that the money payable to [DiLieto] under the judgment has been wrongfully detained by the defendants.” In reaching its conclusion, the court did not address DiLieto's contention that Gionfriddo established a right to postjudgment interest as a matter of law when, as in the present case, the plaintiff is entitled to offer of judgment interest under § 52–192a.

On appeal to this court, DiLieto claims that the trial court incorrectly applied the wrongful detention standard of § 37–3a in concluding that she was not entitled to postjudgment interest under § 37–3b. DiLieto also renews her claim that she is entitled to § 37–3b interest by virtue of our decision in Gionfriddo. Although we are unpersuaded by DiLieto's claim under Gionfriddo, we agree that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in denying the motion for postjudgment interest under the version of § 37–3b in effect before the 1997 amendment.¹⁰ In particular, we conclude that the standard to determine an award of interest under § 37–3a is no different from the standard to determine an award of interest under the version of § 37–3b in effect before the 1997 amendment and, further, that interest is authorized under those provisions when the trial court determines, in its discretion, that considerations of fairness and equity warrant such an award. We also conclude that the trial court misperceived the standard applicable under § 37–3a and that, because the court applied that same incorrect standard to the motion at issue, that portion of the judgment denying an award of postjudgment interest must be reversed.

As with all claims involving statutory interpretation, we begin our analysis with the language of the relevant statutory provision. The applicable version of § 37–3b, which was enacted in 1981; see Public Acts 1981, No. 81–315, § 2; provides: “For a cause of action arising on or after October 1, 1981, interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in any action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, computed from the date of judgment.” General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 37–3b. Thus, by its...