Georges v. Ob-Gyn Servs., P.C.
Decision Date | 03 June 2020 |
Docket Number | SC 20170 |
Citation | 335 Conn. 669,240 A.3d 249 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Jenniyah GEORGES et al. v. OB-GYN SERVICES, P.C., et al. |
David J. Robertson, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Malaina J. Sylvestre, for the appellants (defendants).
Alinor C. Sterling, Bridgeport, with whom were James D. Horwitz and, on the brief, Cynthia C. Bott, Bridgeport, for the appellees (named plaintiff et al.).
Jeffrey R. Babbin, New Haven and Christopher P. Kriesen, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.
Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker, Js.**
The defendants, OB-GYN Services, P.C., and Brenda Gilmore, appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered following a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff Marie Leoma and the named plaintiff, Jenniyah Georges, Leoma's minor daughter, on certain medical malpractice claims.1 The Appellate Court, however, granted in part the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely and denied the defendants' motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit a late appeal. On appeal to this court, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court (1) improperly granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the portion of the appeal challenging the jury's verdict as untimely, and (2) abused its discretion in denying their motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit a late appeal. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The plaintiffs filed their original complaint on December 12, 2011. In that complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed malpractice during Leoma's pregnancy and labor, and during the delivery of Jenniyah Georges, causing Jenniyah Georges to sustain severe, permanent injuries. On May 16, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an offer of compromise directed to both defendants, offering to settle the claim for $2 million. The defendants did not accept the offer of compromise, which resulted in it being deemed rejected thirty days later by operation of law.2 A jury trial ensued.
On October 28, 2016, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs of $4.2 million as against both defendants. The trial court accepted the verdict that same day. The defendants did not file any postjudgment motions challenging the jury's verdict.
On November 8, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking offer of compromise interest. The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to such interest pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a (c)3 and Practice Book § 17-18 because the defendants failed to accept the plaintiffs' offer of compromise for $2 million and the jury's verdict of $4.2 million exceeded that amount. The plaintiffs' motion also sought postjudgment interest under General Statutes § 37-3b.4 The defendants filed an objection to the plaintiffs' motion. On November 28, 2016, evidently as a result of a clerical error, an entry was placed on the electronic docket, stating "judgment on verdict for plaintiff."
On December 12, 2016, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision, awarding the plaintiffs both offer of compromise and postjudgment interest. With respect to offer of compromise interest, the court concluded that the "end date" for calculating the interest was the date the judgment was rendered and clarified that the judgment was rendered on October 28, 2016—the date the verdict was accepted by the court—not November 28, 2016. The court clarified that the docket entry made on November 28, 2016, which referenced November 28, 2016, as the date of the judgment, had been made in error. The court awarded the plaintiffs $1,639,496.55 in offer of compromise interest. The trial court also awarded the plaintiffs postjudgment interest under § 37-3b, to be calculated at 10 percent per year, commencing on November 17, 2016, twenty days from the date of the judgment, "subject to tolling as permitted by statute."
On December 16, 2016, the defendants filed an appeal with the Appellate Court, challenging both the jury's verdict and the trial court's awards of offer of compromise and postjudgment interest.5 The plaintiffs filed a timely motion to dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, to dismiss the portion of the appeal challenging the jury's verdict. They claimed that the defendants failed to file the appeal within twenty days of the date the judgment was rendered, as required by Practice Book § 63-1 (a). The defendants filed an objection to that motion, arguing that their appeal from the judgment rendered in accordance with the jury's verdict was timely because they filed it within twenty days of the trial court's December 12, 2016 memorandum of decision awarding the offer of compromise and postjudgment interest. The defendants also filed a motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit a late appeal pursuant to Practice Book §§ 60-2 (5)6 and 60-3,7 arguing, in the alternative, that there was "good cause" to permit the late appeal in light of the "significant amount of confusion in the trial court" concerning the date the judgment was rendered. This motion largely focused on the erroneous docket entry of November 28, 2016, listing that date as the date of the judgment.
The Appellate Court granted in part the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss and denied the defendants' motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit a late appeal. This certified appeal followed.8
The defendants claim that the Appellate Court improperly granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the portion of the defendants' appeal challenging the jury's verdict because the appeal was timely. We disagree.
We review the Appellate Court's decision to dismiss an untimely appeal for abuse of discretion; see, e.g., Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction , 248 Conn. 52, 53, 59, 61, 727 A.2d 213 (1999) ; cf. Kelley v. Bonney , 221 Conn. 549, 559 and n.4, 606 A.2d 693 (1992) ( ); but questions concerning whether the judgment was final for purposes of appeal, or when the twenty day appeal period began to run, are questions of law over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Hylton v. Gunter , 313 Conn. 472, 478, 97 A.3d 970 (2014) ; In re Haley B. , 262 Conn. 406, 410–11, 815 A.2d 113 (2003).
"Unless a different time period is provided by statute, an appeal must be filed within twenty days of the date notice of the judgment or decision is given." Practice Book § 63-1 (a). "In civil jury cases, the appeal period shall begin when the verdict is accepted." Practice Book § 63-1 (b). Likewise, with respect to the date the judgment is deemed to have been rendered in such cases, Practice Book § 17-2 provides in relevant part: "If no motions under Sections 16-35 or [17-2A] are filed, upon the expiration of the time provided for the filing of such motions, judgment on the verdict shall be rendered in accordance with the verdict, and the date of the judgment shall be the date the verdict was accepted ...." (Emphasis added.)
In the present case, the trial court accepted the jury's verdict on October 28, 2016, which meant that, in the absence of an extension of time or the filing of a postverdict motion by the defendants, the defendants had until November 17, 2016, to appeal from the judgment rendered in accordance with that verdict. The defendants did not file any posttrial motions under Practice Book § 16-35 or Practice Book § 17-2A ; nor did they request an extension of the appeal period. The defendants did not file their appeal until December 16, 2016, approximately one month after the deadline. The defendants contend, however, that their appeal was nonetheless timely because they filed it within twenty days of the court's December 12, 2016 decision awarding offer of compromise and postjudgment interest. The defendants argue that the appeal period should be measured from the date of this subsequent decision, rather than the date the verdict was accepted, because (1) there was no appealable final judgment until the court awarded offer of compromise and postjudgment interest, and (2) the plaintiffs' November 8, 2016 motion for interest created a new twenty day appeal period pursuant to Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1).
We address these questions of law in turn.
The first question is whether the date of the final judgment for purposes of appeal is October 28, 2016, the date the trial court accepted the jury's verdict. It is well settled that "the acceptance of the jury verdict at the time it is [returned] is deemed to constitute a final judgment ... unless a motion to set aside is later filed." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kolich v. Shugrue , 198 Conn. 322, 327, 502 A.2d 918 (1986) ; see also Practice Book § 17-2. The defendants argue, however, that, in the present case, the judgment did not become final for purposes of appeal when the verdict was accepted because the trial court had yet to determine whether, or how much, offer of compromise interest should be awarded under § 52-192a.
This court has held that the presence of an unresolved claim for relief can delay the finality of a judgment on the merits. This, however, is the exception to the usual rule and generally applies only if the form of relief being sought "seek[s] compensation for the alleged[ly] wrongful conduct of the defendants, which depend[s] upon an assessment of the underlying merits of the transaction between the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven , 294 Conn. 280, 297, 984 A.2d 658 (2009) ; see, e.g., Balf Co. v. Spera Construction Co. , 222 Conn. 211, 215, 608 A.2d 682 (1992) (...
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