Dillingham v. Doctors Clinic, P. A.

• Decision Date: 28 January 1976
• Docket Number: No. 30580,30580
• Parties: Clarence Cornelious DILLINGHAM v. DOCTORS CLINIC, P.A., et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 625

223 S.E.2d 625

236 Ga. 302

Clarence Cornelious DILLINGHAM v. DOCTORS CLINIC, P.A., et al.

No. 30580.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 28, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1976.

Hendon, Egerton, Harrison, Glean & Kovacich, Michael Anthony Glean, Decatur, for appellant.

Erwin, Epting, Gibson & Chilivis, Gary B. Blasingame, Henry G. Garrard, III, Athens, for appellees.

HALL, Justice.

This court granted an application for a writ of certiorari to review the decision and judgment of the Court of Appeals in Dillingham v. Doctors Clinic, P.A., 135 Ga.App. 736, 219 S.E.2d 2 (1975) because of a conflict between that decision which followed White v. Augusta Motel Hotel &c Co., 119 Ga.App. 351, 352, 167 S.E.2d 161 (1969) and the decision in Beaver v. Southern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 120 Ga.App. 576, 171 S.E.2d 658 (1969). Dillingham and White held that a negligence petition must 'contain at least a general allegation of negligence.' Beaver held that the 'absence of a general allegation of negligence will not subject the petition to dismissal . . ..' We approve the ruling in Beaver, disapprove the rulings in Dillingham and White, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's petition on the ground that it failed to state a claim for relief.

The CPA abolished 'issue pleading,' substituted in lieu thereof 'notice pleading,' and directs that 'all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.' Code Ann. § 81A-108; Bourn v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67, 70, 166 S.E.2d 89 (1969); Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Service, Inc., 118 Ga.App. 498, 164 S.E.2d 246 (1968); Byrd v. Ford Motor Co., 118 Ga.App. 333, 163 S.E.2d 327 (1968). 'Under the CPA, a pleading should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' Cochran v. McCollum, 233 Ga. 104, 210 S.E.2d 13 (1974). This principle has been followed consistently by this court since Martin v. Approved BanCredit Corp., 224 Ga. 550, 163 S.E.2d 885 (1968). It is important to note that the sustaining of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is res judicata on the merits of the claim.

In this case the plaintiff husband filed a pro se complaint sounding in tort for loss of services and consortium which resulted in the breakup of his marriage. He alleged that a doctor at the clinic performed an operation of a 'questionable nature' to induce weight loss in the wife without his consent. In our opinion it cannot be said as a matter of law that it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff will not be able to prove facts at the trial to entitle him to relief under his claim. It must be remembered that the objective of the CPA is to avoid technicalities and to require only a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and a general indication of the type of litigation involved; the discovery process bears the burden of filling in details. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); 5 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil: § 1215, p. 109-112 (1969); 2A Moore's Federal Practice, § 8.13, p. 1699 (1975).

The above principles are even more important where the court is construing pro se pleadings. This is well illustrated by the celebrated case of Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944), which was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Conley, supra. See 5 Wright and Miller, supra, § 1220, pp. 146-148.

During oral argument, the plaintiff's attorney stated that his client in his pro se petition was seeking to set forth a claim for relief...