Dillingham v. United States

Citation423 U.S. 64,96 S.Ct. 303,46 L.Ed.2d 205
Decision Date01 December 1975
Docket NumberNo. 74-6738,74-6738
PartiesEdward Earl DILLINGHAM v. UNITED STATES
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

PER CURIAM.

An interval of 22 months elapsed between petitioner's arrest and indictment, and a further period of 12 months between his indictment and trial, upon charges of automobile theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2312, and 2313. The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied petitioner's motions made immediately after arraignment and posttrial to dismiss the indictment on the ground that petitioner had been denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that under United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), the 22-month "pre-indictment delay . . . is not to be counted for the purposes of a Sixth Amendment motion absent a showing of actual prejudice." 502 F.2d 1233, 1235 (1974). This reading of Marion was incorrect. Marion presented the question whether in assessing a denial of speedy trial claim, there was to be counted a delay between the end of the criminal scheme charged and the indictment of a suspect not arrested or otherwise charged previous to the indictment. The Court held: "On its face, the protection of the (Sixth) Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been 'accused' in the course of that prosecution. These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time." 404 U.S., at 313, 92 S.Ct., at 459. In contrast, the Government constituted petitioner an "accused" when it arrested him and thereby commenced its prosecution of him. Marion made this clear, id., at 320-321, 92 S.Ct., at 463, where the Court stated:

"To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. These considerations were substantial underpinnings for the decision in Klopfer v. North Carolina (386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967)); see also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-378, 89 S.Ct. 575, 576-577, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969). So viewed, it is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of...

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  • McCarthy v. Manson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • 3 Diciembre 1982
    ...United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-321, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). See also Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65, 96 S.Ct. 303, 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975). Thus, in the present case, petitioner's right to a speedy trial attached on April 5, 1975 when he was ar......
  • U.S. v. Mays
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 3 Marzo 1977
    ...F.2d 1273, 1275-1276 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carey, 475 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1973); cf., Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975).5 The Court also decided the applicability of the Sixth Amendment guarantees to the pre-indictment period......
  • United States v. Gouveia, 83-128
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 29 Mayo 1984
    ...United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2047-2048, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975) (per curiam); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S., at 320, 92 S.Ct., at 463, but we have never held that the right to......
  • Graves v. United States
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 2 Octubre 1984
    ...a formal accusation. See MacDonald, supra, 456 U.S. at 6-7, 102 S.Ct. at 1500-1502; Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65, 96 S.Ct. 303, 303-304, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975) (per curiam). Appellant was arrested October 16, 1979, and his trial began November 5, 1981. Thus, as the trial c......
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2 books & journal articles
  • U.s. Supreme Court Decisions: 1975-1976
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 5-9, September 1976
    • Invalid date
    ...Stone v. Powell, infra, I.D.1. C. Procedure at Trial 1. Speedy Trial a. Post-Arrest/Pre-Indictment Delay Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 95 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975). In a per curiam decision, the Court held that a 22-month delay between the defendant's arrest and indictmen......
  • Pronouncements of the U.s. Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field: 1985-1986
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 15-9, September 1986
    • Invalid date
    ...trial right for post-arrest, preindictment delay. The requirement of "actual prejudice" was rejected in Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975). The main reason for the delay occasioned by the interlocutory appeals in the present case was the Ninth Circuit's failure to act promptly.......

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