Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hosp. & Dispensary

• Decision Date: 19 November 1940
• Citation: 284 N.Y. 176,30 N.E.2d 373
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: DILLON v. ROCKAWAY BEACH HOSPITAL & DISPENSARY.

284 N.Y. 176

30 N.E.2d 373

DILLON

v.ROCKAWAY BEACH HOSPITAL & DISPENSARY.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 19, 1940.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Action by William G. Dillon against Rockaway Beach Hospital and Dispensary for injuries sustained as the result of the alleged negligence of hospital's servants. From a judgment entered on order of Appellate Division, Second Department, 259 App.Div. 1033, 21 N.Y.S.2d 502, affirming a judgment of the trial term dismissing the complaint at the close of plaintiff's case without prejudice, the plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and new trial granted. Joseph A. Byrne and John J. Cunneen, both of New York City, for appellant.

Daniel Miner, Clarence S. Zipp, and William S. O'Connor, all of New York City, for respondent.

FINCH, Judge.

This is an action by a paying patient against a charitable hospital to recover for injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of the latter's servants. At the close of the plaintiff's case the complaint was dismissed without prejudice. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital on November 27, 1936, at 8 a. m., preparatory to undergoing an operation. At about 5:30 p. m., a hospital attendant brought in an electric light lamp having a reflector which was hung on top of the bedstead at the foot of the bed. The lamp was attached by two hooks similar to the earbows of eye glasses. Plaintiff was taken to the operating room at about 8 p. m., and at that time the lamp was still hanging on the end of the bed. For purposes of the operation, he was given a spinal anesthetic which ‘deadened’ his body from about the middle of the body to the end of his feet. When he was brought back to his room by two attendants about one hour after he had left, he did not see the lamp on the bedstead. Plaintiff was put into bed and covered with a sheet and spread which had been there. Fifteen minutes later, a special nurse whose services were paid for by plaintiff, came into the room. At about midnight plaintiff felt a burning sensation in his feet and complained to the special nurse and another nurse who had come into the room. The other nurse lifted the bed cothes and removed an electric light lamp, the same lamp which previously had been hung on the bedstead. Upon subsequent examination the foot was found to be severely burned. Counsel for defendant conceded that plaintiff's doctor if called would have testified that when plaintiff was brought back to his room after the operation, his foot had no such burn and that such a burn could be produced by the lamp in question.

Respondent contends that the foregoing does not amount to a prima facie case because it contains no proof (1) that the burn was caused by the lamp, and (2) that the lamp was in a position to burn plaintiff's foot as a result of the negligence of any person for whose act or omission defendant is liable.

We find that plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to entitle him to go to the jury.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient if it supports the inference of causation or of negligence even though it does not negative the existence of remote possibilities that the injury was not caused by the defendant or that the defendant was not negligent. ‘It is enough that he (plaintiff) shows facts and conditions from which the negligence of the defendant and the causation of the accident by that negligence may be reasonably inferred.’ Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank, 278 N.Y. 1, 7, 14 N.E.2d 828, 830;Cornbrooks v. Terminal Barber Shops, Inc., 282 N.Y. 217, 223, 26 N.E.2d 25;Rosenberg v. Schwartz, 260 N.Y. 162, 166, 183 N.E. 282;Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 170, 126 N.E. 814.

That the burn was caused by the lamp was sufficiently proved. Plaintiff's evidence, if believed, showed that he had no burn on his foot when put into bed after the operation; that while he was in bed he felt a burning sensation; that the lamp was removed from the vicinity of his foot; that after the lamp was removed, the heat pain abated; that plaintiff's foot suffered a severe burn; and that the burn is of a kind which could be caused by the lamp in question. Upon a trial, such a chain of evidence must be deemed sufficient to permit the jury to infer that the lamp caused the injury. To hold otherwise and to determine as a matter of law that the foregoing evidence is insufficient would impose an unduly stringent standard greatly in excess of the requirements of reasonable proof. 1 Wigmore on the Law of Evidence, 3d Ed., s 41.

The proof was also sufficient to permit the jury to find that the injury was caused by the negligence of defendant's servants.

Although defendant alleges itself to be a hospital organized for charitable purposes as well as for the treatment of paying patients, no argument for immunity in the case at bar has been offered upon that score. Indeed, it is now settled that even a charitable hospital is liable for the acts of its servants....