Dillon v. Seattle Police Pension Bd.

• Decision Date: 28 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 36242-9-I,36242-9-I
• Citation: 916 P.2d 956,82 Wn.App. 168
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Timothy C. DILLON, Appellant, v. SEATTLE POLICE PENSION BOARD, Respondent.

Page 168

82 Wn.App. 168

916 P.2d 956

Timothy C. DILLON, Appellant, v. SEATTLE POLICE PENSION BOARD, Respondent.

No. 36242-9-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 1.

May 28, 1996.

Mark S. McCarty, Seattle, for Appellant.

Gary E. Keese, Seattle, for Respondent.

ELLINGTON, Judge.

Timothy Dillon appeals the Superior Court's order affirming the Seattle Police Pension Board decision that his mental disability was not "incurred in the line of duty." Dillon argues the Superior Court erred when it affirmed the Board's decision because the Board incorrectly applied the law and its decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We agree the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and reverse.

Dillon was a police officer with the Seattle Police Department. While off duty in 1985, he shot himself in the hand while cleaning his gun. As a result of his injury, he was granted a disability retirement. In March 1988, the Seattle Police Pension Board found Dillon to be physically and mentally capable of working as a patrolman and ordered him to return to duty, despite a statement from his treating physician that he did not have "the function, control and ability, with the hand injury, to protect himself or others."

Almost immediately, Dillon's ability to perform his duties was questioned by fellow police officers. Dillon himself did not believe he could perform, and became anxious and depressed. He sought psychiatric treatment.

In March 1990, Dillon was granted a six-month mental disability leave. Then, in August 1990, the Pension Board canceled Dillon's disability leave and ordered him to return to return to duty on a trial basis for 60 days. However, the Board's decision was reversed by the Director of the Department of Retirement Systems, who found that a preponderance of evidence supported Dillon's contention that he was mentally disabled. The Director remanded the case to the Board for a determination of whether Dillon's disability was incurred in the line of duty. The Board found that Dillon's disability was not incurred in the line of duty.

Dillon filed a petition in King County Superior Court for review of the Board's decision by writ of certiorari. The court affirmed the Board, finding Dillon failed to meet his burden of proving the decision of the Board was not supported by substantial evidence or was otherwise contrary to law. This appeal followed.

On appeal from an administrative decision reviewed by writ of certiorari, this court must determine de novo (1) whether the Seattle Police Pension Board committed an error of law when it concluded Dillon's disability was not caused in the line of duty ¹ and (2) whether the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence. See RCW 7.16.120(3), (5); see also Hilltop Terrace Ass'n. v. Island Cy., 126 Wash.2d 22, 29, 891 P.2d 29 (1995). Substantial evidence is evidence of a sufficient quantity " 'to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding.' " Id. at 34, 891 P.2d 29, quoting State v. Maxfield, 125 Wash.2d 378, 385, 886 P.2d 123 (1994).

The statute does not define what constitutes an injury incurred in the line of duty, and no cases were found defining the phrase. However, an injury "incurred in the line of duty" is equivalent to an injury incurred "in the course of employment" as determined in workers' compensation cases. ² Under workers' compensation laws, a worker who becomes disabled from an occupational disease is entitled to the same benefits as a worker who suffered an injury. RCW 51.32.180; see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. McDowell, 58 Wash.App. 283, 285, 792 P.2d 1269 (1990). An occupational disease is "such disease or infection as arises naturally and proximately out of employment...." RCW 51.08.140. Therefore, Dillon was required to prove that his mental disease arose "naturally and proximately" out of his employment.

A worker shows his disease was proximately caused by his work if he establishes he would not have contracted the disease, but for the aggravating condition of his job. Dennis v. Department of Labor and Industries, 109 Wash.2d 467, 477, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987). The worker must establish, by competent medical testimony, that his job probably (as opposed to possibly) caused his disease. Id.

The medical evidence in this case established that, but for the aggravating condition of his job, Dillon would not have been disabled by his condition. Dillon presented evidence from three medical providers which was uncontradicted. Although Dillon's caregivers never used the exact words, ³ their testimony established that his job probably, as opposed to possibly, caused his disease. The evidence from Dr. H. Berryman Edwards, who evaluated Dillon on behalf of the Board and concluded that Dillon was not mentally disabled, did not contradict the evidence of Dillon's medical providers on this point. Dillon, therefore, established that his disability was proximately caused by his job.

To establish that a disease arose "naturally" out of employment, a worker must establish that his or her occupational disease came about as a matter of course as a natural consequence or incident of distinctive conditions of his or her particular employment. The conditions need not be peculiar to, nor unique to, the worker's particular employment. Moreover, the focus is upon conditions giving rise to the occupational disease, or the disease-based disability resulting from work-related aggravation of a nonwork-related disease, and not upon whether the disease itself is common to that particular employment. The worker, in attempting to satisfy the "naturally" requirement, must show that his or her particular work conditions more probably caused his or her disease or disease-based disability than conditions in everyday life or all employments in general; the disease or disease-based disability must be a natural incident of conditions of that worker's particular employment. Finally, the conditions causing the disease or disease-based disability must be conditions of employment, that is, conditions of the worker's particular occupation as opposed to conditions coincidentally occurring in his or her workplace.

Dennis, 109 Wash.2d at 481, 745 P.2d 1295.

Dillon also established by competent evidence that his condition arose "naturally" out of his employment. According to Dillon's experts, he developed...