Dillon v. Twin City Bank, 95-713

Decision Date08 July 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-713,95-713
Citation924 S.W.2d 802,325 Ark. 309
PartiesMary DILLON, Kathleen Inmon, and Dorothy Johnson, Appellants, v. TWIN CITY BANK, Appellee.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

John Ogles, Hubert Alexander, Jacksonville, for appellants.

Susan Gordon Gunter, Graham F. Sloan, No. Little Rock, for appellee.

ROAF, Justice.

Appellants Kathleen Inmon and Mary Dillon are mother and daughter respectively. Dorothy Johnson is Inmon's aunt. Appellee Twin City Bank, a creditor of Inmon, sued Inmon, Dillon, and Johnson for the alleged fraudulent conveyance of certain property. Inmon and Dillon appeal from the chancellor's ruling that Inmon made fraudulent transfers with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Twin City Bank. The final decree entered by the chancellor purportedly transferred real property that was involved in the dispute, 7500 Toltec, from Johnson to Inmon. However, after the chancellor made her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but prior to her entering the final decree, Johnson deeded the real property to Inmon. We hold that this appeal is moot and dismiss.

An in-depth discussion of the underlying facts of this case is not necessary, since the appeal is moot. In her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the chancellor determined that cash funds used to purchase two pieces of real property, 13 Woodbriar and 7500 Toltec, were paid by Inmon. The chancellor then determined that 13 Woodbriar was titled in Dillon's name when it was purchased in April 1991. She found that Inmon made deposits in an account in Dillon's name and signed checks with Dillon's name for the construction of 13 Woodbriar. The chancellor found that all cash deposits in Dillon's account and all cash payments for 13 Woodbriar were from funds from the sale of Inmon's father's property and Inmon's alimony. She determined that the purchase of the lot and the construction costs of 13 Woodbriar were fraudulent conveyances from Inmon to Dillon. The chancellor found that all proceeds from the sale of 13 Woodbriar were placed in an account in the name of Dillon. The chancellor found that Inmon purchased 7500 Toltec and had it titled in Dillon's name. She found that funds used to construct Toltec came from the account in Dillon's name that mainly contained the deposit from the sale of 13 Woodbriar. The chancellor concluded that Inmon was the true and equitable owner of 7500 Toltec. The chancellor found that Dillon transferred 7500 Toltec to Johnson and ruled that the deed of 7500 Toltec from Dillon to Johnson should be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. In sum, the chancellor determined that Inmon fraudulently conveyed funds to Dillon by making deposits in Dillon's checking accounts and purchasing property in her name. She found that the funds were used to build 13 Woodbriar, and the money from the sale of Woodbriar was used in the construction of 7500 Toltec. The chancellor directed Twin City Bank to prepare a precedent regarding the title and ownership of 7500 Toltec and send it to appellants for approval prior to presenting it to the court for entry. Following the entry of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Johnson transferred 7500 Toltec to Inmon by quitclaim deed. The deed was recorded on November 15, 1994.

The decree from which appellants appeal was entered on December 16, 1994. The decree states that neither Dillon nor Johnson hold a legal or equitable interest in 7500 Toltec. The decree states that it operates to pass title of the property to Inmon. However, Johnson voluntarily conveyed 7500 Toltec to Inmon by quitclaim deed prior to the decree being entered. 1 Therefore, this case is moot.

A case becomes moot when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon a then existing legal controversy. Arkansas Intercollegiate Conference v. Parnham, 309...

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16 cases
  • Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • January 31, 2019
    ...A case is moot when a decision would not have any practical legal effect upon a then existing legal controversy. Dillon v. Twin City Bank , 325 Ark. 309, 924 S.W.2d 802 (1996). Without question, our decision in this matter would have no effect on the now-resolved controversy as a result of ......
  • Trujillo v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • February 11, 2016
    ...will not review issues that are moot. See Forrest Constr., Inc. v. Milam, 345 Ark. 1, 43 S.W.3d 140 (2001) ; Dillon v. Twin City Bank, 325 Ark. 309, 924 S.W.2d 802 (1996). To do so would be to render advisory opinions, which this court will not do. McCuen v. McGee, 315 Ark. 561, 868 S.W.2d ......
  • Wilson v. Pulaski Ass'n of Classroom Teachers, 96-1048
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • October 23, 1997
    ...becomes moot when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect on an existing legal controversy. Dillon v. Twin City Bank, 325 Ark. 309, 924 S.W.2d 802 (1996); Arkansas Intercollegiate Conference v. Parnham, 309 Ark. 170, 828 S.W.2d 828 (1992). An exception to the mootness doc......
  • Cotten v. Fooks
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • September 27, 2001
    ...state will not review issues that are moot. See Forrest Constr. Inc. v. Milam, 345 Ark. 1, 43 S.W.3d 140 (2001); Dillon v. Twin City Bank, 325 Ark. 309, 924 S.W.2d 802 (1996). To do so would be to render advisory opinions, which this court will not do. McCuen v. McGee, 315 Ark. 561, 868 S.W......
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