Dilworth v. State

• Decision Date: 12 March 1959
• Citation: 204 Tenn. 522,8 McCanless 522,322 S.W.2d 219
• Parties: , 204 Tenn. 522 James Robert DILWORTH v. STATE of Tennessee. James DOTSON v. STATE of Tennessee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 219

322 S.W.2d 219

8 McCanless 522, 204 Tenn. 522

James Robert DILWORTH v. STATE of Tennessee.

James DOTSON v. STATE of Tennessee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 12, 1959.

Thomas E. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff in error.

O. B. Hofstetter, Jr., D. L. Lansden and James C. Kirby, Jr., Nashville, for defendants in error.

BURNETT, Justice.

The defendants in error were arrested for operating trucks with excessive weights upon Woodmont Boulevard in Davidson County, Tennessee, in violation of a Resolution of the Davidson County Quarterly Court adopted pursuant to Chapter 178 of the Public Acts of 1955. This Act is codified in the present Code of Tennessee and carried as Sections 59-1113, 59-1114, and 59-1115 to 59-1117, T.C.A. The warrants were dismissed by the trial judge and the State has appealed. Able briefs have been filed by both sides, arguments heard and we now have the matter for disposition.

The defendants in error moved in the trial court to dismiss the warrants upon several grounds. The trial judge sustained the motion to dismiss on the sole ground that the statute in question violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and contravened and violated Article 11, Section 8, of the Constitution of Tennessee in that it was class legislation denying the defendants equal protection of the law.

The purpose of this Act as stated in its caption is 'to protect the streets roads and highways or other public thoroughfares in Tennessee, including the bridges on such highways from unnecessary injury or damage, etc.' The first section of the Act (Section 59-1113, T.C.A.), among other things, authorizes the County Government, acting in conjunction with the County Highway Department, to prescribe the maximum gross weights of vehicles using County roads and provides that a violation of such regulations as propounded by the governing authorities of the County is a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine.

Section 3 of the Act (Section 59-1115, T.C.A.) provides that this Act 'shall have no application to passenger buses or common carriers by motor vehicle authorized by a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the public service commission of the state of Tennessee or the interstate commerce commission to operate as common carriers,' and that it shall not apply to the highways on the 'state highway system, or to streets within the boundaries of incorporated municipalities.' It is because of this section wherein these vehicles, there named, are excluded from the operation of the Act that the contention is made that the Act denies these defendants in error the equal protection of the law.

Pursuant to this Act the Davidson County Court by resolution imposed 10 ton gross weight limits upon Woodmont Boulevard and Bluefield Avenue. It was on Woodmont Boulevard that the violation of this resolution is charged to these defendants in error, that is, that they were operating on this County street with truck loads in excess of the gross weight limits allowed by the resolution on this County road or street.

Under the general law of the State (Section 59-1109, T.C.A.), common carriers are authorized to have a gross weight limit up to 55,980 pounds. Thus it is by the resolution of the County Court that operators of any other trucks other than common carriers, that is, those authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Public Service Commission, are limited to 20,000 pounds while those that are under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Public Service Commission are authorized to operate trucks carrying a gross weight of 55,980 pounds. The argument thus is that the effect of this resolution, which is adopted pursuant to the Statute here in question, is to prohibit private and contract motor carriers from using Woodmont Boulevard transporting loads in excess of 20,000 pounds while permitting common carriers to carry loads up to 55,980 pounds.

The parties stipulated certain facts to-wit: Woodmont Boulevard is a public road maintained by Davidson County and located just South of the City limits of Nashville. It is a paved lateral highway extending from Franklin Road westward across the Hillsboro Road to Harding Road for a distance of approximately four miles. In conjunction with Thompson Lane which extends from the Franklin Road eastward across the Nolensville Road to the Murfreesboro Road it is used substantially by common carriers, contract carriers and private carriers as a short cut to bypass downtown Nashville in traveling between the main route highways. It is also used substantially by private trucks for local and cross town movement of goods belonging to the owners of the truck operators. It is the only direct arterial thoroughfare providing access from the southeast to the southwest suburban areas adjacent to the City of Nashville.

The defendants in error when arrested, and the charge in the warrant under which this arrest herein is made, is that they were operating the truck with a gross weight of 23,600 pounds and were hauling for a local crushed stone company which is located on Robertson Road on the west side of Nashville. It is likewise stipulated that this route was regularly used by this company for the delivery of their stone to purchasers at construction sites on the southern and southeastern sides of Nashville.

Thus it is that we have the obvious contention of the respective parties. As here presented both parties have set forth their contentions in an exceptionally plausible manner.

The State, of course, contends that the Legislature in enacting this Act has a very broad discretion in classification in the exercise of its power of regulation; that if possible and reason can be found to conceivably justify this classification the statute should be upheld and that there where the validity of the Statute is challenged as to its constitutionality the attacker must show facts and details sufficiently to justify its contention. It is contended that making the classification here of exempting those regulated by the Interstate Commerce and Public Service Commissions of this State from the obligations of this Statute that the Legislature was justified because of the type of services rendered by the motor vehicles operated under either of these boards. It is said that buses and common carriers being subject to the regulations of these commissions and that since privately owned buses or trucks and contract carriers are not so regulated that this makes a valid distinction which would allow the exception made in the statute. The argument is that the traveling and shipping public's welfare, safety, and convenience demand that these common carriers and those regulated by these commissions must operate upon schedule and over planned routes with fixed points, etc., and that private carriers do not have to thus operate and consequently this is a reasonable and just distinction.

The argument is further made that these commissions, that is, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the State Public Service and Utilities Commission regulate the category exempt here while the County Court under this Act regulates the private carriers. Argument further is that those carriers here exempt from this Statute have been...