DiMarco v. Hudson Valley Blood Services

• Decision Date: 06 June 1989
• Citation: 542 N.Y.S.2d 521,147 A.D.2d 156
• Parties: Pasquale DiMARCO et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HUDSON VALLEY BLOOD SERVICES et al., Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 521

542 N.Y.S.2d 521

147 A.D.2d 156

Pasquale DiMARCO et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HUDSON VALLEY BLOOD SERVICES et al., Defendants-Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

First Department.

June 6, 1989.

Salvatore J. Calabrese, of counsel (Sweeney & Calabrese, White Plains, attys.) for plaintiffs-appellants.

Roger K. Solymosy, of counsel (Neil Brody, Jeremy Heisler and Kevin B. Pollak with him on the brief; Killarney Rein Brody & Fabiani, New York City, attys.) for defendants-respondents.

Before KUPFERMAN, J.P., and ROSS, CARRO, ELLERIN and WALLACH, JJ.

ELLERIN, Justice.

In January 1985, while undergoing open heart surgery at Westchester County Medical Center, plaintiff Pasquale DiMarco received numerous blood transfusions. The defendants, two blood banks, supplied the blood which plaintiff received during this operation. Mr. DiMarco discovered that he had contracted the disease acquired immune deficiency syndrome ("AIDS") when in July 1986 he was contacted by defendant New York Blood Center--Greater New York Blood Bank and alerted that he had received contaminated blood during the transfusion. From July 1986 through November 1987, plaintiff underwent testing and treatment by this defendant for AIDS.

In April 1988, he commenced this action against the two defendant blood banks, alleging in the complaint that he contracted the disease from contaminated blood supplied by the defendants during his surgery, and asserting two causes of action, one sounding in medical malpractice and the other in negligence, based on a theory that the defendants were negligent in their failure to test for AIDS the blood which was transfused into his body.

Instead of answering the complaint, the defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it is time barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations. The IAS Court granted the motion and dismissed both causes of action.

The plaintiff does not appeal from the dismissal of the medical malpractice claim. Accordingly, our attention is focused solely on the negligence cause of action.

The statute of limitations for a negligence action brought to recover damages for personal injury is three years (CPLR 214). On the motion, it was defendants' position that the cause of action accrued when the plaintiff was injured--that is, when he was exposed to the allegedly contaminated blood in January 1985--and, that, therefore, this action, commenced on April 12, 1988, three years and three months after the exposure to the blood, was untimely.

In response, plaintiff contended that the negligence cause of action arose at the time Mr. DiMarco first discovered the injury, July 1986. Plaintiff relied on CPLR 214-c(2), which provides that "the three year period within which an action to recover damages for personal injury ... caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance ... shall be computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff." Plaintiff argued that since his injury was caused by the latent effects of his exposure to the contaminated blood, his action did not accrue until his discovery of the latent injury, in July 1986, and, therefore, this action, commenced less than three years from that date, is timely.

In reply, the defendants asserted that CPLR 214-c applies only to toxic tort victims who had been unknowingly exposed to toxic chemicals and not to natural substances such as contaminated blood.

The IAS Court adopted the defendants' position and ruled that the statute does not apply to the negligence cause of action asserted by plaintiff. The Court held that CPLR 214-c was meant to apply only to actions arising from the latent effects of exposure to certain toxic substances or materials. The Court then described AIDS as a "virus/disease", which in its opinion "does not fall within the ambit of a 'toxic' substance exception created by CPLR 214-c" (141 Misc.2d 59, 62, 532 N.Y.S.2d 488).

On this appeal we must determine whether CPLR 214-c should encompass within its remedial scope situations, such as the one before us, where the plaintiff's injury is caused by the latent effects of exposure to contaminated blood.

Generally, in the construction of statutes, the intention of the Legislature is first to be sought from a literal reading of the act itself or of all the statutes relating to the same general subject matter. In this respect, the legislative intent is to be ascertained from the words and language used in the statute, and if the language thereof is unambiguous and the words plain and clear, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. (McKinney's, Statutes, § 92(b).)

The language of CPLR 214-c is as follows:

§ 214-c. Certain actions to be commenced within three years of discovery

1. In this section: "exposure" means direct or indirect exposure by absorption, contact, ingestion, inhalation or injection.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 214, the three year period within which an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances, in any form, upon or within the body or upon or within property must be commenced shall be computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier. (Emphasis added.)

The language of this statute is unambiguous and the words "plain and clear". The statute applies to injuries caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances in any form. The Legislature did not enumerate the substances to which the statute would apply, or otherwise impose any limitation on the language. The statute applies to "any substance", and certainly the contaminated blood to which plaintiff was allegedly exposed is a "substance".

By its terms, the statute clearly applies to the circumstances of plaintiff's action, an action "to recover damages for personal injury ... caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance." Here, plaintiff seeks to recover for his injuries in contracting the deadly disease AIDS in 1986 caused by the latent effects of his exposure to the contaminated blood in January 1985.

Despite the plain meaning of the statute, the defendants argue that we should resort to an examination of the legislative history of CPLR 214-c for guidance to its interpretation. However, an examination of its legislative history provides even stronger support for applications of the statute to a case of this type.

The legislative history reveals that CPLR 214-c was enacted to remedy a widespread injustice of the common law rules in determining the time of accrual of an action. The New York courts had steadfastly refused to alter the ancient doctrine that in tort cases the statute of limitations runs from the date the injury is inflicted, regardless of when the injury is actually discovered. The Court of Appeals on numerous occasions stated that if change were to be made it would have to come from the Legislature. (See McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries to 7B McKinney's Consolidated Laws, CPLR § 214 -c, 1989 Pocket Part, p. 329; e.g., Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 430 N.E.2d 1297; Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical, 12 N.Y.2d 212, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 188 N.E.2d 142 cert. denied 374 U.S. 808, 83 S.Ct. 1697, 10 L.Ed.2d 1032.) Accordingly, as part of a comprehensive bill (L.1986 c. 682), which addressed other inequities of tort law as well, the Legislature enacted CPLR 214-c to ameliorate the harsh effect of this ancient common law...