Dimitriadis v. Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 24 May 2011
• Citation: 84 A.D.3d 1150,923 N.Y.S.2d 691,2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 04410
• Parties: Paraskevi DIMITRIADIS, etc., et al., appellants,v.VISITING NURSE SERVICE OF NEW YORK, respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

84 A.D.3d 1150

923 N.Y.S.2d 691

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 04410

Paraskevi DIMITRIADIS, etc., et al., appellants,

v.VISITING NURSE SERVICE OF NEW YORK, respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

May 24, 2011.

Robert Weiss, New York, N.Y., for appellants.Rosenblum & Newfield, LLC, White Plains, N.Y. (Peter Koziolkowsky of counsel), for respondent.WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful death, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Spodek, J.), dated June 18, 2009, which, among other things, granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate a previous order of the same court dated January 27, 2009, granting the plaintiffs' motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike its answer upon its default in complying with discovery.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

A motion to vacate a default is addressed to the sound discretion of the Supreme Court ( see Gerdes v. Canales, 74 A.D.3d 1017, 903 N.Y.S.2d 499; Scala v. 4020 Jerusalem Owners, Inc., 72 A.D.3d 926, 927, 898 N.Y.S.2d 661; Matter of Lee v. Morgan, 67 A.D.3d 681, 682, 889 N.Y.S.2d 205; Holt Constr. Corp. v. J & R Music World, 294 A.D.2d 540, 742 N.Y.S.2d 876). To obtain relief from a default pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), the moving defendant must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action ( see Felsen v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC, 83 A.D.3d 656, 919 N.Y.S.2d 883; Westchester Med. Ctr. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 80 A.D.3d 695, 696, 915 N.Y.S.2d 495; Farrah v. Pinos, 78 A.D.3d 1115, 911 N.Y.S.2d 653; Francis v. Long Is. Coll. Hosp., 45 A.D.3d 529, 530, 844 N.Y.S.2d 721). Other factors which the court should consider include whether the default prejudiced the opposing party, whether it was willful or evinced an intent to abandon the litigation, and whether vacating the default would serve the strong public policy of resolving cases on their merits when possible ( see U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Dick, 67 A.D.3d 900, 902, 889 N.Y.S.2d 223; Klughaupt v. Hi–Tower Contrs., Inc., 64 A.D.3d 545, 546, 882 N.Y.S.2d 313; Westchester Med. Ctr. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 58 A.D.3d 832, 832–833, 872 N.Y.S.2d 196; Moore v. Day, 55 A.D.3d 803, 804, 866 N.Y.S.2d 303).

Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to vacate its default. The defendant established a reasonable excuse for the default, and the affidavit of its expert demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense. Furthermore, the record does not indicate that ...