Dimitrov v. I.N.S., 94-70114
Decision Date | 14 September 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 94-70114,94-70114 |
Citation | 67 F.3d 306 |
Parties | NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Dimitre DIMITROV, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Before: BEEZER and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges, and EZRA, District Judge. *
On May 13, 1991, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged Dimitrov with deportability under section 241(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1251(a)(1)(B) (the Act), for entering the United States in an "unknown manner," apparently without inspection. After a deportation hearing at which Dimitrov conceded deportability, the IJ denied Dimitrov's request for asylum and withholding of deportation.
The filing deadline for the notice of appeal of the IJ's decision was August 2, 1993. Although Dimitrov submitted the filing fee to his attorney on July 29, 1993, the attorney did not file the notice until August 5, 1993, three days after the deadline. On August 12, 1993, the INS moved for summary dismissal on the ground that the BIA lacked jurisdiction over an untimely appeal. On February 9, 1994, the BIA refused to take Dimitrov's case on certification pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Sec. 3.1(c), dismissed his appeal as untimely and denied the INS's motion for summary dismissal. This petition for review followed.
The INS argues we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's dismissal of Dimitrov's untimely appeal because the relevant jurisdictional statute, section 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1105a(a), vests jurisdiction in the court of appeals from "all final orders of deportation." Because the decision of the IJ becomes final in the absence of a timely appeal, Da Cruz v. INS, 4 F.3d 721, 722 (9th Cir.1993), the government contends that only the IJ's decision--and not the BIA's dismissal--is a final, appealable order.
This argument is without merit. The BIA's summary dismissal of an untimely appeal is a final agency action for which an alien can petition for review. Gonzalez-Julio v. INS, 34 F.3d 820, 822 (9th Cir.1994) ( ). See also Vlaicu v. INS, 998 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir.1993) ( ); Shamsi v. INS, 998 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir.1993) ( ); Da Cruz, 4 F.3d at 722 ( ); Hernandez-Rivera v. INS, 630 F.2d 1352, 1353 (9th Cir.1980) (same). In each of these cases, we had jurisdiction to review the propriety of the BIA's dismissal or acceptance of an untimely appeal. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider Dimitrov's petition for review.
We do not, however, have jurisdiction to review the merits of Dimitrov's asylum claim or the IJ's decision to deny his claim. Our review is confined to the BIA's decision and the bases upon which the BIA relied in reaching its decision. Martinez-Zelaya v. INS, 841 F.2d 294, 296 (9th Cir.1988).
In Martinez-Zelaya, an alien appealing an IJ's decision failed to file a brief in support of her appeal. The BIA summarily dismissed the appeal as frivolous and filed solely for the purpose of delay. Id. at 295. In her brief, Martinez-Zelaya did not address the propriety of the BIA's summary dismissal, instead arguing the points she failed to make to the BIA. We held our Id. at 296; De La Cruz v. INS, 951 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir.1991). See also Da Cruz, 4 F.3d at 722-23 (). Thus, while Dimitrov's brief sets forth the merits of his asylum claim, we will not address those arguments. Our review is limited to the propriety of the BIA's summary dismissal of Dimitrov's untimely appeal.
We review de novo whether the BIA had jurisdiction to consider an untimely appeal. Da Cruz, 4 F.3d at 722. The time limit for filing an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Id. at 722; Hernandez-Rivera, 630 F.2d at 1354. When an appeal is not taken within the allotted time, the right to appeal is lost. Da Cruz, 4 F.3d at 722.
There are exceptions to this rule however. Under the doctrine of "unique circumstances," if a party is misled by the words or conduct of a court as to the time within which to file a notice of appeal, an appellate tribunal may have jurisdiction to hear an otherwise untimely appeal. See Vlaicu, 998 F.2d at 760 ( ); Shamsi, 998 F.2d at 763 ( ); Hernandez-Rivera, 630 F.2d at 1355 ( ).
Dimitrov contends he is the victim of "unique circumstances" because his lawyer failed to file the appeal within the prescribed time limit. But Dimitrov ignores the fact that in every circuit, in every court and even in those cases which Dimitrov cites, the "unique circumstances" excuse only applies when there has been official misleading as to the time within which to file an appeal; that is, where a court, a government agency or agency regulations themselves somehow mislead the petitioner into believing that he is properly and timely filing his appeal. See Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1964) ( ); Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 217 (1962) ( ). When the time period expires as a result of the petitioner's action, or that of his attorney, the circumstances are not "unique" and do not warrant acceptance of an untimely appeal. United Artists Corp. v. La Cage Aux Folles, Inc., 771 F.2d 1265, 1268-69 (9th Cir.1985).
In this case, Dimitrov does not argue that either he or his attorney was misled by the court, by the INS or by INS regulations into filing an untimely appeal....
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